HEIDEGGER EXERGUE to BEING AND TIME (original) (raw)
What is Missing? The Incompleteness and Failure of Heidegger’s Being and Time
Lee Braver, ed., Being and Time, Division III, Heidegger's Unanswered Question of Being (MIT Press), 2015
In this essay, I first consider several prevalent interpretations of the fragmentariness and “failure” of Being and Time, including three of Heidegger’s divergent and at times conflicting self-interpretations. I then turn to questions of hermeneutics that are provoked by this incompleteness and its reception in relation to Heidegger’s approach to hermeneutics as the art of interpretation. Heidegger’s practice and elucidation of destructuring, creative, and violent interpretations that intend to liberate the “unthought” in the text appear to clarify his own subsequent depictions of Being and Time. But there remains a discrepancy and distance between the contingent incompleteness of Being and Time owing to the circumstances of its publication and the role this incompleteness is later given as part of the history of being. I accordingly examine the “gap” between the thought (or unthought) and the contingent empirically or ontically existing “author.” I conclude that Heidegger’s best interpretations of the significance of Being and Time in his philosophical journey entail a different understanding of the relationship between “life and work” than the one Heidegger himself maintained—one that is closer to the hermeneutical perspective and interpretive strategies, which embrace critical autobiographical and biographical reflection, encouraged by Wilhelm Dilthey and Georg Misch.
The American Journal of Semiotics, 1990
At the beginning of the thesis, a brief review of the development of the term phenomenology in the history of Western philosophy reveals the development of phenomenology and the history of Western philosophy. This article takes the seventh section of Introduction to Being and Time as the main research object. Through the review of the overall thought of the introduction, through the combing of the first few chapters of the introduction, the important position of phenomenology in this book is determined. The methodological guide to problem solving and the highlights of Heidegger's phenomenological thoughts in the first few chapters of the introduction. Finally, through the combing and understanding of Heidegger's thoughts in the article, combined with some specific expressions, he has developed an understanding of Heidegger's phenomenological method, that is, phenomenology is a scientific technical means for studying and dealing with problems.
Heidegger and the Concept of Time – the turn[s] of a radical epoch[é]
Originally published in Existentia: An International Journal of Philosophy (Vol. XIV / Fasc.3-4, 2004. SOCIETAS PHILOSOPHIA CLASSICA).
This essay examines the methodological detours that are at work in Martin Heidegger’s writing between the years of 1924 (The Concept of Time) and 1962 (the lecture, “Time and Being”). The aim is to demonstrate how his style of phenomenological interrogation is driven on the basis of multiple moments of epoché, postponement, withdrawal, suspension, detour, etc., despite his resistance to the 'method' of epoché as it was developed by Edmund Husserl. Heidegger’s radical refinements of his own methods constitute a multiplicity of ‘turns’ – inevitably turning back to the issue of the epoché and the temporizing / delay / withholding of that which originally gives Being.
Heidegger: Being and Time and the Care for the Self
The secret of Being and Time and of its constant cultural and philosophical presence lies in its unusual hermeneutical richness. Being and Time becomes, so to speak, a precise seismometer capable of detecting the slips and falls of the contemporary era with surprising accuracy. It offers us an exact scan of the ethi- cal and moral conscience of our time. Being and Time does not develop a philosophical theory among others, rather it faces the challenge of thoroughly reflecting upon the dilemma that is constantly present in philosophy, namely the question of human being and its relation to being in general. From this point of view, I would like to consider the possibility of reading this fundamental work of Heidegger as an ethics of the care, that is, as book that promotes a cultivation of the self and the other.
Understanding the Concept of Being in general: From Being and Time back to Young Heidegger
Conatus, 2024
This paper exhibits a way of understanding Heidegger's concept of being in general [Sein überhaupt] -the central aim of Being and Time's questioning- by getting insight into his early years. I argue that the term "being" [Sein] as Heidegger understands it in the early 1920s describes the meaningful relation between humans and the things of their surrounding world which is given to us as a fact. I maintain that Sein überhaupt refers to this fact, i.e., the fact that every particular being is always with a certain meaning for us. I come to this conclusion by exploring (1) Heidegger's early analysis of Umwelterlebnis, (2) his early description of medieval transcendentia, (3) his critique of formalization and the introduction of formal indication. Lastly, (4) I observe the way Heidegger introduces the concepts of Sein and Sein überhaupt pointing to the simple fact of beings' being in meaningful relation to us.
2016
This article explores the extent to which Heidegger promises a novel understanding of the concept of time. Heidegger believes that the tradition of philosophy was mistaken in interpreting time as a moveable image of eternity. We are told that this definition of time is intelligible only if we have eternity as a point of departure to understand the meaning of time. Yet, Heidegger believes that we are barred from such a viewpoint. We can only understand the phenomenon of time from our mortal or finite vantage point. Contrary to the tradition of philosophy, Heidegger argues that time does not find its meaning in eternity, time finds its meaning in death. The article takes Heidegger's position to task. It argues that it is not evident why Heidegger's account of time should in any way be superior to the traditional conception of time. Drawing on the criticism raised by Lévinas and Blanchot, that death-like eternity-is never at our disposal to understand the phenomenon of time, it shows that although Heidegger is aware that death is never an event in our life, he nonetheless claims that it is the awareness of our finitude that informs our understanding of time. Yet if Heidegger does not see it as a problem that death is never at our disposal, then it becomes questionable whether Heidegger's initial critique launched against the tradition of philosophy still holds, because it is no longer evident why it matters that eternity, as a point of departure, is never at our disposal to understand the phenomenon of time.