HEIDEGGER EXERGUE to BEING AND TIME (original) (raw)
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Heidegger's Being and Time Explained: A Teaching Paper
2013
Heidegger's "Being and Time" is one of the most important but difficult books in twentieth century philosophy. But it is the basis of much modern continental philosophy, and has influenced modern American pragmatism. This teaching paper is an imagined dialogue between and enquirer who has yet to read it, and a philosopher who is familiar with its content and sees it as more than just a philosophy book but a basis for a way of life
NDPR Review of Braver (Ed.), Division III of Heidegger’s Being and Time
Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit is, famously, an unfinished work, rushed in to print in the face of awkward questions from an appointments committee about Heidegger’s lack of publications (Ga14:99). Until the 7th edition in 1953 the published text was labelled as the “first half” of the work, and yet a glance at the plan set out in SZ shows how optimistic even this was (SZ: 39-40). The entire of Part 2 is missing; this was intended to be an exercise in the “destruction”, in Heidegger’s distinctive sense of that term, of “traditional ontology”. But so is the third Division of Part 1, a Division whose title would have been “Time and Being”. It is this omission which is philosophically more significant. Thanks to published texts such as the Kant book, Ga3, and the many historically focussed lecture courses, we have a good idea of what Part 2 might have looked like. Yet the status of Division III of Part 1 is less clear. There is, of course, the 1962 lecture “On Time and Being”, but this is separated from SZ by more than thirty years and a vast array of conceptualistic and stylistic shifts: as Harman observes, it is “nearly comically different in tone” from Sein und Zeit (p.118).1 A much more plausible surrogate is the 1927 lecture course Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie, which claims to provide at least some of the missing material (Ga24:1). However, as we will see, matters are not so simple. There are deep internal problems with Ga24 itself. More broadly, this is a period in which Heidegger’s work starts to undergo the multiple methodological and philosophical changes that mark the development and ultimate abandonment of the Sein und Zeit project. Reconstructing Division III is thus not simply a matter of piecing together what it might have contained, but of making sense of why it failed to appear, and why, how and when Heidegger realised that it could no longer function as originally envisaged. Thinking through the fate of Division III thus brings one into direct contact with the key issues that both span and divide Heidegger’s early and later work: consider, for example, his suggestions that Sein und Zeit failed due to its reliance on “the language of metaphysics” or its dependence on a transcendental framework (Ga9:327-8; Ga65 250, 305 468; Ga71:§181). In other words, by understanding Division III, we can come to better understand both Heidegger’s own intellectual trajectory and the merits, or otherwise, of his legacy
Heidegger’s “Being and Time”: Critical Essays
Heidegger’s “Being and Time”: Critical Essays. Edited with an introduction by Richard Polt. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005. https://books.google.com/books/about/Heidegger\_s\_Being\_and\_Time.html?id=2dK0LmyRG-IC
What is Missing? The Incompleteness and Failure of Heidegger’s Being and Time
Lee Braver, ed., Being and Time, Division III, Heidegger's Unanswered Question of Being (MIT Press), 2015
In this essay, I first consider several prevalent interpretations of the fragmentariness and “failure” of Being and Time, including three of Heidegger’s divergent and at times conflicting self-interpretations. I then turn to questions of hermeneutics that are provoked by this incompleteness and its reception in relation to Heidegger’s approach to hermeneutics as the art of interpretation. Heidegger’s practice and elucidation of destructuring, creative, and violent interpretations that intend to liberate the “unthought” in the text appear to clarify his own subsequent depictions of Being and Time. But there remains a discrepancy and distance between the contingent incompleteness of Being and Time owing to the circumstances of its publication and the role this incompleteness is later given as part of the history of being. I accordingly examine the “gap” between the thought (or unthought) and the contingent empirically or ontically existing “author.” I conclude that Heidegger’s best interpretations of the significance of Being and Time in his philosophical journey entail a different understanding of the relationship between “life and work” than the one Heidegger himself maintained—one that is closer to the hermeneutical perspective and interpretive strategies, which embrace critical autobiographical and biographical reflection, encouraged by Wilhelm Dilthey and Georg Misch.
The American Journal of Semiotics, 1990
At the beginning of the thesis, a brief review of the development of the term phenomenology in the history of Western philosophy reveals the development of phenomenology and the history of Western philosophy. This article takes the seventh section of Introduction to Being and Time as the main research object. Through the review of the overall thought of the introduction, through the combing of the first few chapters of the introduction, the important position of phenomenology in this book is determined. The methodological guide to problem solving and the highlights of Heidegger's phenomenological thoughts in the first few chapters of the introduction. Finally, through the combing and understanding of Heidegger's thoughts in the article, combined with some specific expressions, he has developed an understanding of Heidegger's phenomenological method, that is, phenomenology is a scientific technical means for studying and dealing with problems.
Heidegger and the Concept of Time – the turn[s] of a radical epoch[é]
Originally published in Existentia: An International Journal of Philosophy (Vol. XIV / Fasc.3-4, 2004. SOCIETAS PHILOSOPHIA CLASSICA).
This essay examines the methodological detours that are at work in Martin Heidegger’s writing between the years of 1924 (The Concept of Time) and 1962 (the lecture, “Time and Being”). The aim is to demonstrate how his style of phenomenological interrogation is driven on the basis of multiple moments of epoché, postponement, withdrawal, suspension, detour, etc., despite his resistance to the 'method' of epoché as it was developed by Edmund Husserl. Heidegger’s radical refinements of his own methods constitute a multiplicity of ‘turns’ – inevitably turning back to the issue of the epoché and the temporizing / delay / withholding of that which originally gives Being.