Nationalization of American Political Parties, 1880–1896. By Daniel Klinghard. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. 280p. 95.00.PartisanBalance:WhyPoliticalPartiesDon′tKilltheU.S.ConstitutionalSystem.ByDavidR.Mayhew.Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,2011.240p.95.00.Partisan Balance: Why Political Parties Don't Kill the U.S. Constitutional System. By David R. Mayhew. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011. 240p. 95.00.PartisanBalance:WhyPoliticalPartiesDon′tKilltheU.S.ConstitutionalSystem.ByDavidR.Mayhew.Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,2011.240p.29.95 (original) (raw)

Perspectives on Politics, 2013

Abstract

part from authoritarianism, but only in small part; the two are only weakly correlated. Nor do the measures employed here merely repackage other fundamental political orientations: Ethnocentrism is virtually uncorrelated with party identification, ideological identification, social trust, and opinions about whether American government is bigger than it should be, and it is only weakly correlated with egalitarianism. The remainder of Us Against Them demonstrates that ethnocentrism substantially shapes Americans’ opinions about a wide variety of policies, above and beyond the elements typically used to explain Americans’ policy preferences. Once again, both the analysis and the presentation are meticulous and expansive. Americans with an ethnocentric point of view are more likely to support increased federal spending on homeland security and border security, on national defense in general and on the war on terrorism in particular. They also were more likely to support the war in Iraq and to evaluate the presidency of George W. Bush favorably. The ethnocentric are less likely to support US assistance to other nations in general or to particular nations or foreign groups in need, and they are less favorably disposed toward immigrants to the United States. Ethnocentrism’s influence on Americans’ opinions is not limited to the non-American or new Americans, however. The ethnocentric are less likely to support the rights of gay and lesbian Americans to marry, adopt, and serve in the military. They are less likely to approve of government spending on welfare and food stamps and more likely to approve of adding restrictions to programs designed to help poor Americans. And the ethnocentric are less likely to support government programs that help other racial and ethnic groups. As an indication of the magnitude of these effects, the authors report that the impact of ethnocentrism in general rivals—and often exceeds—the impact of partisanship. While making a persuasive case for the influence of ethnocentrism on policy opinions, Kinder and Kam are also clear about the limits of that influence. They recount at length their search for effects on issues of special concern to women, finding very little. And they frequently note that a variety of other factors remain as influences on policy preferences, even after the impact of ethnocentrism has been taken into account. However, it might be easy to come away from the book with an exaggerated sense of the contribution of ethnocentrism to aggregate levels of support for particular government policies in the United States. Ethnocentrism promotes support for an aggressive approach to terrorism, for example, but the analysis here confirms that the least ethnocentric also tend to support more government spending on homeland security and border security, on national defense and the war on terror. Ethnocentrism promotes whites’ opposition to welfare, but the least ethnocentric white Americans also typically oppose increases in government spending on welfare and food stamps, oppose increases to welfare benefits to women who have additional children, and support limits on the length of time an individual can receive welfare. The least ethnocentric also tend to disapprove of gay sex, teen sex, and extramarital sex, just as the most ethnocentric do. Moreover, while the individual-level effects of ethnocentrism may often approach or exceed those of partisanship, the distribution of ethnocentrism differs considerably from the distribution of partisanship. Kinder and Kam find that a majority of Americans are neutral or very nearly so with regard to ethnocentrism; strong Democrats and Republicans are much more numerous than Americans at either extreme of the measures of ethnocentrism employed here. In the aggregate, then, the potential for ethnocentrism to divide Americans’ policy preferences—and, to the extent that their preferences matter, government policy—may be somewhat limited. Whatever the impact on policy, Us Against Them makes a powerful case for regarding ethnocentrism as an important source of Americans’ preferences on a remarkable range of policy options. Its argument and evidence will require the attention of scholars interested in the roots of Americans’ policy preferences (and its applicability outside the United States is sure to be an area for future research). The book will make a valuable addition to graduate and advanced undergraduate courses on public opinion and political psychology, not only as a source of knowledge about the fundamentals of American politics but also as a model of sophisticated analysis and lucid and lively presentation of first-rate social science.

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