THE ORIGINS OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR (original) (raw)

Germany and the Origins of the First World War

The Journal of Modern History, 1983

Historians have variously condemned British Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey for contributing to the escalation of the July Crisis of 1914, and praised him as an heroic advocate of peace. Addressing this conundrum, this article first assesses historiographical debates around the significance of Grey's policy towards Germany in the events that led to the outbreak of the First World War. It then traces Grey's foreign policy vis-à-vis Germany on the one hand, and the Entente on the other. Finally, it provides an innovative analysis of Grey's policy from the vantage point of Berlin, arguing that in July 1914 decisions taken by the governments of other countries escalated the crisis and were taken regardless of Grey's position. The article concludes that current historiography overestimates British agency in July 1914 and that Grey was not as important to the outcome of the crisis as both his critics and his defenders have claimed. His actions could not change the minds of those on the continent who were bent on war. Introduction: the 'men of 1914' While there remains much dispute about the origins of the First World War, many historians agree that people, the so-called 'men of 1914' 2 , rather than structures or impersonal forces, unleashed this war. War came as a 'result of a series of deliberations by a handful of men.' 3 While not everyone agrees on the origins of the war, or even whether there is still a need to attribute 'war guilt' at all, it is undisputed that key decision-makers (indeed all of them men) took the fateful decisions of 1914. As Gordon Martel notes: It was the choices that men made during those fateful days that plunged the world into a war. […] The choices they made were rational, carefully calculated, premised on the assumptions and attitudes, ideas and experiences that they had accumulated over the years. Real people, actual flesh-and-blood human beings, were responsible for the tragedy of 1914 […]. 4 Even those who emphasise the crucial role played by contingency attribute agency and significance to key individuals, arguing that '[i]f any one of these leaders had acted differently […], he might well have interrupted the slide into war'. 5 This view is not new;