Libet and the Case for Free Will Scepticism (original) (raw)
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In the extensive, recent debates on free will, the pioneering experiments by Benjamin Libet continue to play a significant role. It is often claimed that these experiments demonstrate the illusoriness of freely willed actions. In this paper, we provide a detailed analysis and evaluation of Libet’s experiments from a philosophy of science perspective. Our analysis focuses on Libet’s central notion of the “initiation” of freely willed processes by the brain. We examine four interpretations of the notion of initiation: in terms of a cause, a necessary condition, a correlation, and a regular succession. We argue that none of these four interpretations can be supported by the design and results of Libet’s experiments. In addition, we analyze two recent Libet-type experiments. Our general conclusion is that neither Libet’s original experiments nor later Libet-type experiments can justify the claim that allegedly freely willed processes are in fact initiated by the brain.
Why neuroscience does not disprove free will
Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews , 2019
While the question whether free will exists or not has concerned philosophers for centuries, empirical research on this question is relatively young. About 35 years ago Benjamin Libet designed an experiment that challenged the common intuition of free will, namely that conscious intentions are causally efficacious. Libet demonstrated that conscious intentions are preceded by a specific pattern of brain activation, suggesting that unconscious processes determine our decisions and we are only retrospectively informed about these decisions. Libet-style experiments have ever since dominated the discourse about the existence of free will and have found their way into the public media. Here we review the most important challenges to the common interpretation of Libet-style tasks and argue that the common interpretation is questionable. Brain activity preceding conscious decisions reflects the decision process rather than its outcome. Furthermore, the decision process is configured by conditional intentions that participants form at the beginning of the experiment. We conclude that Libet-style tasks do not provide a serious challenge to our intuition of free will.
A Critique of Libet and Wegner's Argument Against Free Will
The research of Benjamin Libet and Daniel Wegner are groundbreaking works in neuropsychology that make arguments against human freedom. However, Libet's and Wegner's arguments are marred with some philosophical inconsistencies including; misconceptions, logical errors, and causal fallacies which seems to emanate from the problem of subjecting the concept of free will to an empirical enquiry only. In this essay, it is argued that empirical enquiry alone limits the study of the role of consciousness and its involvement in decision-making. It is suggested that scientific assessment alone may not be exhaustive in the evaluation of the idea of free will considering the role of consciousness and the absence of causal evidence between the interactions of the mind and the brain.
The Problem of Free Will in the Context of Neuroscience Research
Neuroscience and Behavioral Physiology, 2019
This paper provides a critical discussion of two experiments which have been termed free will experiments conducted by scientists working in the field of cognitive psychology and neurosciences in recent decades. The author proposes two conceptual objections to the conclusion that these experiments demonstrate the absence of free will in humans.
From the late 20th century onwards, the idea of a free conscious will which we tend to attribute to each rational human being is coming under serious pressure. It seems that with the experiments of the psychologist Benjamin Libet and, more recently, John-Dylan Haynes, the idea of free conscious will has to sing its final swan song. But if the idea of free will might be a dogmatic relic from pre-scientific times, then this also counts for the famous proverb that science always ought to have the right on a last, final judgement. In this paper, we will examine both the 'weak' and 'hard' problem of experiments conducted in the positivist spirit of Libet and Haynes. Do the experiments have much explanatory power? What about the issue of causality and predictability? Can conscious experience be naturalized to its physical substratum? And what about the nature of deliberate action? These are the main questions that will be addressed in this paper.
Master thesis -- Do or don't: Why neuroscience hasn’t settled the question of free will
In recent years, scientists and science popularisers alike have seen profound consequences for our view of ourselves and the organisation of society in new findings about the functioning of the human brain. Prominent in the debate surrounding these claims is the question of free will, i.e. whether or not humans are able to choose and act freely in a certain fundamental sense thought required for our practice of holding ourselves free and responsible for our actions, both morally and legally. One common position, as taken by, e.g. Sam Harris (populariser) and Daniel Wegner (scientist), holds that free will of this kind is unsupportable in the face of empirical evidence – i.a. evidence from neuroscience about the way consciousness lags behind unconscious neural processes – and that we therefore need to revise our views and practices in light of these scientific facts. In this thesis, I argue that what might be termed the "revisionist" position is predicated not only on empirical evidence, but is essentially motivated by a belief in the fundamental incompatibility of free will with any reasonable (meta-) physics. In Part 1 I investigate the fundamental philosophical debate and find that the question of the possibility of free will is unresolved, thus challenging any simple appeal to the impossibility of free will such as that made by Harris in his short book on the subject, Free Will (2012). I also provide independent reason for upholding a broadly commonsense belief in free will by highlighting the sceptical nature of the challenge from determinism, which can be overcome with the help of P.F. Strawson’s "soft naturalism"-appeal to our self-justified reactive attitudes. In Part 2 I investigate the empirical evidence adduced as support for the revisionist position, focused through the well-developed argument presented by Wegner in his Illusion of Conscious Will (2002). Here I argue that the revisionist interpretation of the data loses out to a traditional interpretation that is realist about conscious causal efficacy when the former is divested of its untenable appeal to incompatibilism. I conclude that neuroscience has not settled the question of free will, and, furthermore, that the current state of the two debates – the theoretical and the empirical – supports a continued belief in free will of a kind that fits with our practice of generally believing ourselves free in our choices, and responsible for our actions.
To What Extent Is Free Will Actually Free? The Answer of Neurosciences
BRAIN. Broad Research in Artificial Intelligence and Neuroscience ISSN 2067-3957, 2018
Even though at the beginning of the 1980s the results of the first neuroscience experiments made some researchers label free will as an "illusion", researches of recent years have unexpectedly changed this perspective. It is raised the issue of post-classical, post-dualistic views in which free will can no longer be regarded as an "all-or-nothing" phenomenon, and in which freedom itself is paradoxically redefined as an unconscious predetermination out of an infinite number of options. The present paper summarizes the perspectives on free will generated by the first experiments in neuroscience and aims to find an answer regarding the freedom of choice, taking into account the latest scientific communications on this subject.
Free will, the self, and the brain
Behavioral Sciences & The Law, 2007
The free will problem is defined and three solutions are discussed: no-freedom theory, libertarianism, and compatibilism. Strict determinism is often assumed in arguing for libertarianism or no-freedom theory. It assumes that the history of the universe is fixed, but modern physics admits a certain degree of randomness in the determination of events. However, this is not enough for a compatibilist position—which is favored here—since freedom is not randomness. It is the I that chooses what to do. It is argued that the core of the free will problem is what this I is. A materialist view is favored: The I is an activity of the brain. In addition to absence of external and internal compulsion, freedom involves absence of causal sufficiency of influences acting on the I. A more elaborate compatibilist view is proposed, according to which causal determination is complete when we add events occurring in the I (of which the subject is not conscious). Contrary to what several authors have argued, the onset of the readiness potential before the decision to act is no problem here. The experience of agency is incomplete and fallible, rather than illusory. Some consequences of different views about freedom for the ascription of responsibility are discussed. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.