Counterfactuals and two kinds of ought (original) (raw)

2013

Abstract

I discuss Caspar Hare\u2019s solution to a new variant of Parfit\u2019s Non-Identity Problem. Hare\u2019s solution rests on distinguishing two kinds of ought: The Ought of Omniscient Desire: what you oughtOD to do is what an omniscient, rational creature with appropriate interests would want you to do. The Ought of Most Reason: what you oughtMR to do is what there is most reason to do. I argue that the distinction does not dissolve the problem. Moreover, I show that Hare\u2019s proposal to spell out his distinction in terms of an embedded counterfactual (if you had not done what you did, then, if you had done what you did, what would the consequence have been?) is flawed

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