Hinge commitments vis-a-vis the transmission problem (original) (raw)
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Hinge commitments and common knowledge
Synthese, 2022
Contemporary epistemology has explored the notion of a hinge commitment as set out in Wittgenstein's final notebooks, published as On Certainty. These are usually understood as essentially groundless certainties that provide the necessary framework within which rational evaluations can take place. John Greco has recently offered a striking account of hinge commitments as a distinctive kind of knowledge that he calls 'common knowledge'. According to Greco, this is knowledge that members of the community get to have without incurring any epistemic burden, and as such is fundamentally different from other kinds of knowledge. I offer a critique of Greco's proposal. While I agree that there is a variety of knowledge that counts as common knowledge, I contend that it is not to be understood as knowledge that one gets for free as Greco suggests. Moreover, I argue that our hinge commitments do not count as common knowledge-either in Greco's sense of the term or in the alternative manner that I set out-because properly understood they are not in the market for knowledge at all. In defence of this claim, I suggest that Greco's conception of a hinge commitment is both missing some crucial elements and also (relatedly) too broad in its extension, in that it encompasses both instances of common knowledge (in my sense of the term) and hinge commitments proper. 1 Introductory remarks John Greco's work is always a delight to read: pellucid and full of insight. It is thus a pleasure to be invited to comment on his important contributions to contemporary epistemology as part of this volume. There are many topics where we agree, but obviously the most interesting topics are those where we don't. With that in mind, I want
In Quest of a Wittgensteinian Hinge Epistemology
Looking at things from the point of view of Wittgenstein's Philosophy, N. Da Costa and S. Wuppuluri (eds.), Springer, 2019
Hinge epistemology is a family of theories about justification (and knowledge) which give centre-stage to Wittgenstein’s notion of a “hinge”. In the following, I will first put forward some basic methodological considerations regarding the relationship between merely exegetical work on, in particular, Wittgenstein’s texts, and more theoretically committed work, which aims at developing suggestions that can be found in the texts, even though they are not clearly attributable as such to their author (§1). I will then summarize the main tenets of what, to date, is still the most widespread reading of On Certainty (§2) – the so-called “framework reading”. In light of the initial methodological considerations and of this exegesis of On Certainty, I will then review some contemporary attempts at developing Wittgenstein’s ideas in an anti-skeptical direction, such as Crispin Wright’s, Michael Williams’ and Duncan Pritchard’s (§3). I will argue that, their intrinsic merits notwithstanding, they fail to take proper measure of Wittgenstein’s own position. I will then close by sketching my own version of hinge epistemology and by highlighting points of contact and disagreement with Wittgenstein’s own views as portrayed by the framework reading (§4).
Revisionism, Scepticism, and the Non-Belief Theory of Hinge-commitments
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, 2018
In his recent work, Duncan Pritchard defends a novel Wittgensteinian response to the problem of radical scepticism. The response makes essential use of a form of non-epistemicism about the nature of hinge-commitments. According to non-epistemicism, hinge-commitments cannot be known or grounded in rational considerations, such as reasons and evidence. On Pritchard's version of non-epistemicism, hinge-commitments express propositions but cannot be believed. This is the non-belief theory of hinge-commitments (NBT). One of the main reasons in favour of NBT over rival anti-sceptical Wittgensteinian views is that it has less theoretical costs and revisionary consequences than its rivals. In this paper, I argue that NBT fairs at least as bad as its rivals in terms of its theoretical costs and revisionism. In particular, I argue that NBT is inconsistent with certain kinds of philosophical disagreement; that it faces worries with mental-state scepticism; and that it faces difficulties in explaining how we can represent ourselves as committed to hinge-commitments.
WITTGENSTEINIAN HINGE EPISTEMOLOGY AND DEEP DISAGREEMENT
TOPOI, 2018
Deep disagreements concern our most basic and fundamental commitments. Such disagreements seem to be problematic because they appear to manifest epistemic incommensurability in our epistemic systems, and thereby lead to epistemic relativism. This problem is confronted via consideration of a Wittgensteinian hinge epistemology. On the face of it, this proposal exacerbates the problem of deep disagreements by granting that our most fundamental commitments are essentially arationally held. It is argued, however, that a hinge epistemology, properly understood, does not licence epistemic incommensurability or epistemic relativism at all. On the contrary, such an epistemology in fact shows us how to rationally respond to deep disagreements. It is claimed that if we can resist these consequences even from the perspective of a hinge epistemology, then we should be very suspicious of the idea that deep disagreements in general are as epistemologically problematic as has been widely supposed.
"I Know", "I know", "I know". Hinge epistemology, invariantism and skepticism1
Skepticism and Invariantism, C. Kyriachou & K. Wallbridge (eds.), Routledge, 2021
In this paper, I first present and discuss in some depth Wittgenstein's radical form of contextualism about knowledge ascriptions (§1). Accordingly, though superficially similar, uses of "I know" can serve three fundamentally different functions: an ordinary, genuinely epistemic one; a grammatical, non-epistemic one; and a 'philosophical', nonsensical one (§ §1.1-1.3). I then briefly present Wittgenstein's anti-skeptical strategies (§2), and compare my reading of On Certainty with therapeutic ones (§3.1), and with contextualist ones, such as Travis' and Williams' (§3.3-3.3). On reflection, the ordinary use of "I know" turns out to be the only common ground between Wittgenstein's position and contemporary contextualism regarding knowledge ascriptions. With respect to such a use, Wittgenstein was in fact an invariantist. I explore Wittgenstein's invariantism in (§4). In closing (§5), I consider the relationship between my own version of hinge epistemology, contemporary contextualism and skepticism. While I do not follow Wittgenstein in his claim that skeptical doubts are nonsensical, I don't think they pose a threat to our ordinary knowledge either. Yet, we do not have knowledge of hinges, since reasons for them would be circular. Hinges, rather, are rationally assumed, albeit without any justification, because they are constitutive of epistemic rationality. With that picture in hand, I then close by defusing the objection, raised by contextualists such as DeRose, that if we don't have knowledge of hinges, we would have to condone abominable conjunctions such as "I know there is a hand here, but I don't know
Wittgenstein On Hinge Commitments and Radical Scepticism in On Certainty
An overview of Wittgenstein’s remarks on scepticism in On Certainty is offered. Particular focus is given to the radical new conception of the structure of reasons that Wittgenstein offers in this work, which has at its heart the notion of a “hinge” commitment. A core problem for this conception of the structure of reasons is set out, and several possible developments of this idea are then evaluated in light of this problem.
Hinge Epistemology is a special issue devoted to the relevance of Wittgenstein's conception of certainty in epistemology. This special issue, edited by A. Coliva & D. Moyal-Sharrock, is forthcoming (2015) in the International Journal for the Study of Skepticism. Contributions by Yves Bouchard, Annalisa Coliva, Pascal Engel, H.-J. Glock, John Greco, Allan Hazlett, Martin Kusch, Michael Lynch. Danièle Moyal-Sharrock, Luigi Perissinotto, Duncan Pritchard, Genia Schönbaumsfeld, and Claudine Tiercelin.
Closure, deduction and hinge commitments
Synthese, 2021
Duncan Pritchard recently proposed a Wittgensteinian solution to closure-based skepticism. According to Wittgenstein, all epistemic systems assume certain truths.The notions that we are not disembodied brains, that the Earth has existed for a long time and that one's name is such-and-such all function as "hinge commitments." Pritchard views a hinge commitment as a positive propositional attitude that is not a belief. Because closure principles concern only knowledge-apt beliefs, they do not apply to hinge commitments. Thus, from the fact that a subject knows that he is sitting in a room, and the fact that the subject's sitting in a room entails his bodily existence, it does not follow that the subject also knows that he is not an envatted brain. This paper rejects Pritchard's non-belief reading of hinge commitments. I start by showing that the non-belief reading fails to solve the skeptical paradox because the reasons that Pritchard uses to support the non-belief reading do not exempt hinge propositions from closure principles. I then proceed to argue that the non-belief reading is false as it claims that hinge commitments, unlike ordinary beliefs, are rationally unresponsive—with the help of a scenario in which a subject's experience is internally chaotic, we can safely conclude that the hinge commitment that one is not systematically mistaken about the world is equally responsive to one's evidential situations.
On the Nature of Hinge Commitments
Sképsis, 2019
This is a critical commentary on Pritchard's book Epistemic Angst. In Section 2, I present the closure-based radical skeptical paradox. Then in Section 3, I sketch Pritchard’s undercutting response to this paradox. Finally, in Section 4, I put forward two concerns about Pritchard’s response and I also propose a reading of hinge commitments, the ability reading, that might put some pressure on Pritchard’s own reading of these commitments.