Asymmetric Warfare: Threat and Response in the 21st Century (original) (raw)
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Military Transformation Past and Present [Chapter 1]
2 military transformations past and present organizations are flawed, so there has been little coherent thought about the organizational and operational implications of new weapons technologies. 4 This book is written for two very different audiences. First, the officers and civilians who make important decisions now or who may make them soon. Second, the members of the military policy analysis community who try to define and solve problems for the civilians and officers. The latter group is often wrong, because they search for infallible solutions amid unavailable, hidden, ambiguous, and imperfect information, and competing goals and preferences. Physicist John R. Pierce warned against this search for infallibility-a constant in the national security community-when he noted, "Novices in mathematics, science, or engineering are forever demanding infallible, universal, mechanical methods for solving problems." My intent in this book is to show these two audiences that while there is no infallible method to achieve innovation, the prospects for successfully implementing innovation in the Department of Defense (DoD) may be enhanced. I shall do so by examining, comparing, and analyzing how previous large-scale changes in military capability-what we now call "transformations"-took place and then drawing inferences from that analysis to current and future questions of military transformation. Public servants charged with the responsibility of designing, managing, and overseeing national security programs are rightly concerned about the prospects for innovation and learning within the DoD. There are real national security threats to the United States, and the costs of failure are high if public servants improperly prepare for and conduct military operations and postwar reconstruction. U.S. military organizations have learned and innovated, and they can do it again. To understand how military organizations can learn and innovate, the reader will have to follow, at times, a complex argument. The unique value of this study is its use of multilevel analysis. Most historians and social scientists studying military innovation examine historical case material at a single level of analysis, that is, by looking at the actions of significant individuals or at the interactions of people within an innovating organization. Indeed, examining innovation from the perspective of an individual or a single organization has generated useful insights. Yet, this perspective has been unable to generate effective broad policy guidelines for future innovation. In the real-life world of people in organizations considering military problems, nothing is simple. People have to deal with "solutions" to previous problems that are proposed for new or poorly understood issues. Risk, uncertainty, and ambiguity are constant companions. Individuals and organizations interact in varied and complex ways. Hence, the real key to unlocking the process of innovation is attention to multiple sets of relationships among individuals, organizations, and multiorganizational systems. This book will show that many opportunities exist for strategic leadership-even within an organization as large and complex as the DoD. When properly arranged, interaction among groups of organizations enables effective innovation by enhancing the application of evidence, inference, and logic.
Military Transformation, Past and Present (2007). Chapter 1
2 military transformations past and present organizations are flawed, so there has been little coherent thought about the organizational and operational implications of new weapons technologies. 4 This book is written for two very different audiences. First, the officers and civilians who make important decisions now or who may make them soon. Second, the members of the military policy analysis community who try to define and solve problems for the civilians and officers. The latter group is often wrong, because they search for infallible solutions amid unavailable, hidden, ambiguous, and imperfect information, and competing goals and preferences. Physicist John R. Pierce warned against this search for infallibility-a constant in the national security community-when he noted, "Novices in mathematics, science, or engineering are forever demanding infallible, universal, mechanical methods for solving problems."
2013
ABSTRACT: For all the attention paid to partnering, too little goes into what "partnering" might mean from ostensible partners' points of view. In the 21st century, sensitivities and sensibilities matter. So do economic realities. The US military should make better strategic use of military advisors to help foreign security services professionalize--something the United States can only do if foreign militaries are willing to engage in civic action themselves. ********** In the wake of resurgent terrorism, withdrawals from Iraq and Afghanistan, and massive budget cuts, defense intellectuals and members of the military alike increasingly discuss the need to shape, partner, and advise foreign forces. (1) Or, as LTG Charles Cleveland and LTC Stuart Fails write, "America's land forces should look to develop a global landpower network. This network would consist of allies, expeditionary global and regional partners, and host-nation forces." (2) The goal? To sec...
The Revolution in Military Affairs: Prospects and Cautions
2013
: A characteristic of the American way of war is our fascination with technology and the search for that technological 'silver bullet' that will deliver victory quickly and with a minimum of loss of life. The current Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) is driven by rapid technological advance fostered by the advent of the microprocessor and by decreased defense spending. It operates against the background of a historical watershed brought about by the end of the Cold War. The RMA has been embraced by all the United States' military services; especially the Air Force and the Army. As the Army downsizes it is seeking to change itself into Force XXI; a strategic force, trained and ready, to fight and win the nation's wars in the 21st century. That we are in the midst of a true revolution in military affairs is evident. What it may mean for the Army and the nation is not so evident. This monograph outlines where the Army is going as it seeks to define change rather than...
PKSOI Papers FINDING THE BALANCE: U.S. MILITARY AND FUTURE OPERATIONS
Finding the Balance, 2011
This monograph examines the U.S. Military’s struggle to find the correct balance between conventional and counterinsurgency/stability approaches. The author uses history to remind us that at the end of wars, Armies often “throw the baby out with the bathwater” and revert to a default position for organization and doctrine instead of inculcating those lessons learned in the recent wars. History shows us that we do not maintain capabilities and capacity to conduct operations in complex environments.
The Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) became a common term in military and defence circles in the early 1990s when the Gulf War seemed to indicate a dramatic shift in the nature of modern warfare. This idea has roots in the concept of the Military Revolution (MR) which was used by historian Michael Roberts in the 1950s to describe phenomena dating to the 16 th C. Although the exact nature of RMAs was debated over the course of the 1990s, the concept itself quickly gained widespread acceptance. The questions were more about how RMAs could be exploited and controlled rather than whether the phenomenon itself holds weight at all. Before engaging in debates as to the peculiarities of MRs or RMAs, one must first determine the validity of the concepts themselves. This is especially true for those interested in policymaking where real world decisions must be made based, in part, on historical trends and observable facts. Perhaps the most important question in assessing the validity of such military change is whether it occurs in revolutionary spasms or as incremental evolutions. Understanding these issues, as well as what conditions drive certain kinds of change, is incredibly valuable for defence policy-makers attempting to assess current and future strategic positions. This paper does not seek to weigh in on the particular debates surrounding these concepts but attempts to examine the literature in an effort to understand their true value as explanatory tools in the history of military change.