The 1973 Yom Kippur war and the reshaping of Israeli civil-military relations (original) (raw)

Uri Bar-Joseph, Lessons not Learned Israel in the Post-Yom Kippur War Era, Israel Affairs, 2008, Vol. 14, No.1, pp. 70-83

Israel Affairs, 2008

Despite being the most traumatic event in Israel's history and despite its enormous impact on Israeli strategic thinking, the 1973 Yom Kippur War has never been investigated thoroughly and professionally by any of the Israeli military or civilian organs that participated in it. Consequently, many lessons learned from the war were based on intuition rather than method. This article focuses on three main aspects of the failure on the part of actors to learn from the experience of the war: 1) The intelligence domain. Following the war, the principal effort was invested in the intelligence community's reorganization, with insufficient attention being paid to other causes for the intelligence failure. These include the personal managerial styles of senior intelligence officers; norms of relations between intelligence and decision makers; and the suitability of Military Intelligence to serve as the national intelligence estimator. 2) The massive IDF buildup in the decade following the war. This buildup was motivated by the belief that Israel was not strong enough in 1973, as policymakers ignored the major impact that the intelligence fiasco had on the IDF's ability to meet the Arab challenges during the war's first days, as well as various indicators of Arab (especially Egyptian) inclination to put an end to the conflict with Israel. The magnitude of the buildup contributed significantly to Israel's economic crisis of the early 1980s. 3) The belief that it was the war's outcome which enabled Sadat to launch his peace initiative. Policy-makers who propagated this thesis ignored the Egyptian attempts to reach a political settlement with Israel prior to the war. The article concludes by examining the impact that the lessons that were not learned in 1973 had in shaping Israel's strategy during the al Aqsa Intifada.

British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies In the shadow of the 1967 war: Israel and the Palestinians

The 1967 war in the Middle East has had major ramifications on the entire region, and one of most important ones concern Israel. Three of the major long-standing ramifications are, firstly the change in the demographic balance between Jews and Palestinians west of the Jordan River, secondly the challenge that the military regime imposed on the Palestinians in the newly occupied Palestinian territories (OPTs) poses regarding the nature of the Israeli regime as a whole and thirdly the reconnecting of Palestinians citizens of Israel with their fellow Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and from there with the entire Arab world. The following analysis focuses on the interrelationship between these ramifications. It demonstrates how Israeli policies towards Palestinians have had major ramifications on the disposition of the Palestinian community inside Israel in the broader Israeli-Palestinian relations. It demonstrates how the coming together of Israeli policies, changes in Palestinian struggle for independence and social transformations inside the Palestinian community in Israel have led to the rise of three different strategies among them to face their in-between reality.

The Arab-Israeli Conflict: A Political, Social, and Military History. 4 vols. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2008. xxviii + 1554 pp. ****Award-winning title, 4 awards

The Encyclopedia of the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A Political, Social, and Military History. 4 vols.

Editor (with Spencer Tucker et al.), author of 14 short articles, editor/compiler of Vol. 4 (Documents Volume). [“Adenauer. Konrad,” 1:32-34; “Bevin, Ernest” (with Chris Tudda), 1:214-216; “Dulles, John Foster,” 1:308-309; “Eisenhower, Dwight David,” 1:329-331; “France, Middle East Policy,” 1:370-374; “Johnson, Lyndon Baines,” 2:555-557; “Kissinger, Henry Alfred,” 2: 584-586; “Lloyd, Selwyn,” 2:644-645; “Marshall, George Catlett,” 2:666-668; “Nixon, Richard Milhous,” 2:740-742; “Reagan, Ronald Wilson,” 3:852-854; “Rogers, William Pierce,” 3:874-875; “Roosevelt, Franklin Delano,” 3:876-878; “Shultz, George Pratt,” 3:921-923] Named Outstanding Reference Source, 2008, by RUSA-American Library Association; Distinguished Achievement Award for Social Studies Instruction (Reference Category), June 2009; Editors’ Choice, 2008, Booklist; Best Reference Choice, 2008, Pennsylvania School Librarians Association. This exhaustive work offers readers at multiple levels key insights into the military, political, social, cultural, and religious origins of the Arab-Israeli conflict. • With more than 750 alphabetically organized entries covering everything from important people, places, and events to a wide range of social and cultural topics―each entry featuring cross references and suggestions for further reading • A separate documents volume offering an unprecedented collection of more than 150 essential primary sources • Over 500 images, including maps, photographs, and illustrations • A comprehensive introductory overview by retired general Anthony Zinni