The Rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (original) (raw)
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The Rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac – Module A: The Conservatorships
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Two government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), dominated the secondary mortgage market during the US housing crisis, collectively holding or guaranteeing $5.3 trillion in mortgage assets by late 2007. As the crisis escalated, the two GSEs began to report substantial losses and their survival became uncertain. On September 6, 2008, the GSEs’ new regulator, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), placed the firms into indefinite conservatorships, one step of a four-part government intervention to stabilize the enterprises. This case study evaluates the purpose and efficacy of the conservatorships and finds that they accomplished their emergency goals of stabilizing the GSEs and allowing them to maintain the secondary mortgage market. However, the FHFA Office of Inspector General concluded that the agency could better accomplish its oversight mission by proactively exer...
The Rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac – Module Z: Overview
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In September 2008, as the financial crisis that had begun the previous year escalated, the US government appointed a conservator for two government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), that dominated the secondary mortgage market and were among the largest participants in the global capital markets. The conservatorships were the hallmark of a multipart rescue plan intended to save the firms from insolvency and a disorderly collapse and required the combined and coordinated efforts of several government agencies and instrumentalities. Ultimately, the government invested $191.5 billion into the firms and deployed a range of tools to stabilize them; this intervention was one of the largest undertaken by the government during the Global Financial Crisis and significant for being one of the few nonbank rescues that occurred. This paper looks at the rescue in totality and the reas...
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