The Role of External Actors in the Unmaking of the Egyptian Revolution (original) (raw)

Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Egypt: The Role of External Actors

Turkish Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 2020

In 2013, Egypt's first democratically elected president Mohammed Morsi was overthrown by a military coup. Since then the country has undergone serious setbacks in terms of democracy, individual freedoms, and social justice. Egypt's failed revolution and the military coup could not be thought independently from the role of external actors-either directly or indirectly involved in this process. Despite their political rhetoric emphasizing democracy promotion and political reforms, both the US and the EU failed to pursue consistent and contributory policies in promoting democratic transition in Egypt out of fear that the electoral victory of Islamist groups would harm their interests in the region. On the other hand, the Gulf Monarchies played a pivotal role in the entrenchment of the military rule by providing financial and political support to the military-backed government as a shield against the democratically elected government in Egypt. This article investigates how the policies adopted by Egypt's key allies, the European Union, the US and the Gulf Monarchies, impacted the trajectory of Egypt's political transition in the face of the January 25 revolution and 2013 military coup. The main thesis of the article is that the policies pursued by external actors created a political environment unfavorable for democratic change in Egypt.

The role of global actors on the failed transition to democracy in Egypt 1

The role of globalactors on the failed transitionto democracyin Egypt, 2018

The paper aims to roles of the global actors on the failed transition to democracy in Egypt. In this study, the negative political influence of powerful states on Egypt evaluated in terms of democracy. The current social inequality in the region continued to increase in the 2000s. Egypt's authoritarian leader were not able to establish the relations between state structures and citizens in the last decade. The global actors had crucial roles on the continuation the authoritarian regime in Egypt. They were easily able to get their demands from Hosni Mubarak. When the time was at the end of 2010, the popular uprising movements affected the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region deeply. Egypt was one of the most remarkable countries in the region where Hosni Mubarak ousted. The people in Egypt wanted to have a democratic rule in order to have solutions to the social inequality, favoritism, and corruption. Normally, the powerful global actors should have played positive role so as to enable democratic transition. The United States of America and the European Union needed a more proactive policy along with the acceptability of a democratic criteria. Unfortunately, external actors were silent in the following the process in the first place because they were caught unprepared for the Arab Spring and did not expect such a result. Later on, foreign powers supported the counter-revolution in Egypt when they saw that the things did not go as they would have liked. They expressed their support most clearly in the post-coup statements discussing military and financial issues.

The role of global actors on the failed transition to democracy in Egypt

Journal of Human Sciences, 2018

The paper aims to roles of the global actors on the failed transition to democracy in Egypt. In this study, the negative political influence of powerful states on Egypt evaluated in terms of democracy. The current social inequality in the region continued to increase in the 2000s. Egypt's authoritarian leader were not able to establish the relations between state structures and citizens in the last decade. The global actors had crucial roles on the continuation the authoritarian regime in Egypt. They were easily able to get their demands from Hosni Mubarak. When the time was at the end of 2010, the popular uprising movements affected the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region deeply. Egypt was one of the most remarkable countries in the region where Hosni Mubarak ousted. The people in Egypt wanted to have a democratic rule in order to have solutions to the social inequality, favoritism, and corruption. Normally, the powerful global actors should have played positive role so ...

External Actors and Post – January 25 Egypt

2015

The unpredictability of the Arab uprisings in general and the Egyptian one in particular lies at a much deeper level about the nature of Egypt's international relations both regionally and globally. This paper attempts to decipher the driving force of foreign policy formulations of the Western world, represented by the US and the EU, and the Gulf monarchies' reaction to the geostrategic transformations that could possibly culminate from regime changes in Egypt over the period 2011-2013.

EU’s democracy promotion in Egypt before and after Arab uprisings

Review of Economic and Political Science, 2019

Purpose-The purpose of this paper is to outline how the EU figures out the importance of strengthening its relations with Egypt as one of the most strategic countries in the region to keep the union secured and stable. The paper also assesses to what extent the EU succeeds to promote democracy in Egypt. Design/methodology/approach-The EU pursues its policy through a series of both bilateral and multilateral agreements with Egypt aiming at positioning their relations in a strategic context. The research adopted different approaches as descriptive and analytical ones. Findings-Following the Arab uprisings, the EU was caught by surprise and announced a paradigm shift in its relations and introduced a set of policies to foster democracy promotion that witnessed some successes but with extremely modest results in some areas compared to the costs of the process. The EU succeeded in important reforms in trade liberalization while it did not bring clear changes in the political arena in Egypt. Originality/value-The findings of this paper convey that the Arab uprisings were a wake-up call for the EU. It was the right time for the EU to conduct such a strategic and sincere reflection based on the role it wants to play in the changing region. In addition, findings prove that the EU's response to revolutionary events has been weak and hesitant, and the EU has not an effective role in promoting democracy in Egypt.

Egypt's Coup and Future of Democracy in Post Arab Spring Middle East [GeoPolitica. Annual XIII, No. 60, (2/2015)]

GeoPolitica (Romania), 2015

The initial optimism that a democratic regional order would emerge as a consequence to the sweeping Arab Spring in Middle East and Africa has gradually faded away. The revolutionary, but generally peaceful and smooth, changeover from long autocracy of Mubarak was again quickly reversed by the Egyptian military and lately been been endorsed by the US and EU. The reaction from the Brotherhood, which had been a mainstream political party, was mixed. As the violence and terrorism take over the Egyptian political landscape, there is little hope that Egypt would return to normal. Military takeover in Egypt marks marks the end of Arab Spring along with the peaceful transition from despotism to democracy. The dream of democracy coming to Middle East is virtually dead making radical militants the biggest beneficiary of the military takeover and sectarian divide.

EU AND EGYPT 30TH OF JUNE REVOLTS: A NORMATIVE POWER LENS"

2014

The study of EU as an international actor comes usually with an emphasis on its distinct nature as a relevant actor in global politics, whose power and influence are not so much based on military might and other coercive means as on the attractiveness of its example or derived from something other than its material resources. In this regard; the paper adopted Manners notion of normative power in understanding the international role of the EU in democracy promotion in Egypt the January 2011 revolution with a special emphasis on the 30th of June revolts from the normative power perspective. Manners defines ‘Normative power’, as “a power that is able to shape conceptions of the normal’’ Democracy comes as one of the core norms the EU seeks to promote. The EU has expressed its commitment to respect, promote and protect human rights and democratic principles as a key element of the European Community's relations with third countries. EU’s normative power stems from six factors shaping norm diffusion in international relations. They include: EU attempts to present itself as a ‘virtuous example’ that can be exported to other regions; Informational diffusion through the range of strategic communications developed by the EU; Overt diffusion related to the actual physical presence of the EU in third actors; institutionalizing the relationship between the EU and a third party; norm diffusion in third states and organizations through learning and adaptation. And most important is the Transference diffusion or the “Carrots and sticks” policy. Several conditions and circumstances play an important role in shaping and influencing the EU normative power and its ability to "normalize its norms" in different regions and in different policy areas. The paper worked on analyzing these determinants and factors applying on the EU normative power in democracy promotion in Egypt after the January 2011. To conclude; it is evident that most of these determinants operate towards hindering an effective EU democracy promotion policy in Egypt. The first internal factor is related to the internal capabilities of the EU itself; the incentive the EU could offer to Egypt to induce political reforms. While this determinant is among the most influential determinants given the economic and financial leverage the EU enjoys. This determinant was crucial in encouraging the Central and Eastern European countries to undertake vast economic and political reforms. However; the absence of the big carrot "EU membership" and the limited economic assistance and benefits the EU offered within the framework of the "new" revised EU neighborhood policy act as another restrain on the EU normative role in democracy promotion in Egypt. On the EU internal level as well; the level of cohesion among the EU member states affects clearly the EU foreign policy towards Egypt. The dilemma of democracy vis-à-vis EU security and political interests has been always a determinant factor governing the EU role in democracy promotion in Egypt before and after the 25th of January. The third conditioning factor relates to the external environment in which EU actor operates. While the EU is still a major influential player in its southern neighborhood; however; it has been facing increased competition from many actors (including besides U.S.A, Russia, China, Turkey, Saudi 3 Arabia and the GCC)who have been more interested in influencing the political scene in the region as well as in Egypt. This multiplicity and competition created more complexities for EU roles especially with the problematic nature of US image (as a traditional EU partner), and the diverse motivations and tools associated with other actors. At the end; the paper concludes with few policy suggestions aiming at enhancing the EU role in democracy promotion in Egypt. The main recommendations mainly revolve around The importance of developing a more concrete and a more comprehensive European approach towards Egypt and the region in general. This would entail setting a stronger incentive system; better EU coherent stance towards the transition phase in Egypt and the region in general as well as building on EU expertise in supporting reforms in critical areas needed by Egypt and other Mediterranean countries such as institution building; reconciliation, capacity building for civil society organizations.. etc

EU AND EGYPT 30TH JUNE REVOLTS: A NORMATIVE POWER LENS

The study of EU as an international actor comes usually with an emphasis on its distinct nature as a relevant actor in global politics, whose power and influence are not so much based on military might and other coercive means as on the attractiveness of its example or derived from something other than its material resources.

Overcoming the Regional Stalemate: Understanding the Politics of the Gulf States and Turkey during the Egyptian Coup

The Egyptian revolution faced its “counter-revolutionary moment” when Abdal Fattah Al-Sisi initiated the military coup that toppled the democratically elected president, Muhammad Morsi. In this counter-revolutionary moment, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates were the two major actors that supported the military coup. In contrast, Turkey and Qatar strongly opposed and positioned themselves against the coup and its supporters. Recent leadership changes in Saudi Arabia and Qatar’s new strategy of softening its position toward its Gulf neighbors created a new political atmosphere in which the two competing camps could overcome difficulties and reach a compromise. Keeping this political environment in mind, this study aims to explore the policies of these four countries toward the military coup in Egypt. In order to better understand the pro/anti-coup positions, the study will focus on the dynamics and motivations that determine the decision-making of Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

International dimensions of authoritarian rule: the case of Egypt

APSA Annual Meeting , 2002

It is my contention in this paper that in the Egyptian context the peace process has been the principle issue that has divided regime and opposition over the past three decades. The peace process is to the Egyptian context what populism was to many Latin American countries: the issue that polarized society and made political compromise untenable. This is further complicated by the prominence of international actors—especially the United States—in Egyptian domestic politics. The United States is the principle patron of the incumbent regime. American support for the Egyptian regime is conditional on its commitment to its treaty obligations vis-à-vis Israel. The position of the Egyptian opposition on the issue of Israel renders American support for genuine political reform in Egypt highly unlikely. In what follows I will argue that contrary to the conventional wisdom, political Islam is not the most divisive issue in the Egyptian polity and that one can envision a democratic coalition of secularist forces that can counter-act the Islamist challenge. The issue of peace with Israel unites secularists and Islamists in the opposition and pits them against the incumbent regime and its American patron, greatly complicating the prospects of democratic coalition building. Moreover, the failure of the peace process to yield the promised economic prosperity, regional stability, a sovereign Palestinian state, and the recovery of Arab territories occupied in 1967, has weakened the Egyptian peace camp, invalidated its arguments in support of the peace process, and limited its popular appeal. In the first part of this paper, I will briefly lay out the relevant aspects of the transitions literature, specifically the issue of ideological polarization and its impact on the prospects of authoritarian breakdown and transitions to democracy. In the second part, I will discuss and critique existing applications of the transitions model to the Arab context for their exclusive focus on the polarizing issue of political Islam. I will then propose a modified and expanded application of the model that takes account of two other divisive issues: economic reform, and Israel. I will argue that while it is possible to envision ways of building democratic coalitions for economic reform and against the proposed Islamic state, the polarization over peace with Israel renders political reform an unlikely prospect. In the third section, I will trace the development of the debate over peace with Israel in Egypt over the past three decades in an attempt to highlight the changing fortunes of the accommodationists and the confrontationists. In the concluding section, I will provide a brief speculative analysis of the prospects of political change Egypt in light of five alternative scenarios.