Psychology and Classifications of the Sciences (original) (raw)
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The Classification of Psychology among the Sciences from Francis Bacon to Boniface Kedrov
Journal of Mind and Behavior, 1984
The central purpose of this essay is to synthesize the history of the various attempts made to develop systems of classification of the sciences-with special emphasis upon the problem of the classification of psychology among the sciences. The general principles which have guided the major contributors in the field since its origin, are outlined. An analysis of the status and position of psychology within the major systems of classification follows. A critical summary of Piaget's circular system of classification of the sciences and of Kedrov's triangular system of classification of the sciences are presented. Piaget's and Kedrov's conceptions of the importance of psychology within the system of the sciences are also analyzed.
The central purpose of this essa y is to synthesize the history of the various attempts made to develop systems of classification of the sciences-with special emphasis upon the problem of the classification of psychology among the sciences. The general principles which have guided the major contributors in the field since its origin, are outlined. An analysis of the status and position of psychology within the major systems of classifica, tion follows. A critical summary of Piaget's circular system of classification of the sciences and ofKedrov's triangular system of classification of the sciences are presented. Piaget's and Kedrov's conceptions of the importance of psychology within the system of the sciences are also analyzed.
Scientific Psychology in the 18th Century: A Historical Rediscovery
Perspectives on psychological science : a journal of the Association for Psychological Science, 2016
As early as 1783, the almost forgotten philosopher, metaphysicist, and psychologist Ferdinand Ueberwasser (1752-1812) designated himself "Professor für empirische Psychologie und Logik" (professor of empirical psychology and logic) at the University of Münster, Germany. His position was initiated and supported by the minister and educational reformer Franz von Fürstenberg (1729-1810), who considered psychology a core scientific discipline that should be taught at each school and university. At the end of the 18th century, then, psychology seems to have been on the verge of becoming an independent academic discipline, about 100 years before Wilhelm Wundt founded the discipline's first official laboratory. It seems surprising that Ueberwasser's writings-including a seminal textbook on empirical psychology-have been almost entirely overlooked in most historical accounts. We focus on this important founding moment of psychological science and on the circumstances that ...
Probing the Boundary between Knowledge and Science in the History of Psychology
The period of transition from classical antiquity to the Middle Ages, known as late antiquity, gave rise to some of the elements that have since constituted the identity of the Western self, alongside new lines of psychological investigation. This article seeks to show that these developments constitute an important stage in the history of Western psychology. It argues, moreover, that without these developments there could be no modern discipline of psychology. Psychology, however, did not exist in the ancient world as an independent science, nor was a distinction drawn between scientific and moral or religious elements of psychological knowledge. Accordingly, this important source of evidence has been neglected by scholars investigating the history of Western psychology, who have tended to focus on the 19th-century roots of scientific psychology. While this is, indeed, the only part of the history of psychology that has a relatively un-problematical subject matter, this article argues for the need to broaden the focus on the history of the discipline of psychology to include the history of psychological knowledge, and seeks to make this important source of evidence available for scholars other than historians of late antiquity.
Scientificity of Psychology in the Context of Science Philosophy
Journal of education, teaching and social studies, 2023
Meaningfulness for the mind is being able to think, live and fight for the higher values that it knows and adopts. When the meanings we create are not produced enough, they turn into a burden over time. The only thing we can be sure of by looking at scientific advances is that we are past the point of error more and more. In this way, we hope that we have gradually reduced our old ignorance and, therefore, come closer to the truth. But knowing this does not give us any information about how far we are from reality. For much of psychology, practice is more theoretical or systematic, and psychology is public rather than private. Today's psychology studies the human being, which we define as a social being. Much of the origins of scientific psychology are in everyday life and emerged from knowledge of such things as temperament, children's resemblance to their parents, and the expression of emotions. It is because psychology that claims to be scientific has often progressed through practice rather than research in the name of research. In this study, the formation of modern psychology in the context of philosophy of knowledge has been taken with a critical eye.
Defining psychology: What can it do for us?
Journal of Clinical Psychology, 2004
Psychology," like many abstract terms, is difficult to define precisely. Henriques' (this issue, pp. 1207-1221) argument that psychology, though unified and coherent, actually spans two realms-psychological formalism ("the science of mind," this issue, p. 1211) and human psychology ("the science of human behavior at the individual level," this issue, p. 1208)seems likely to improve the clarity of the concept. The strongest contribution of his analysis may be its placing "psychology" in the larger conceptual framework of the Tree of Knowledge taxonomy.
A New Scholarly Imaginary * for General Psychology
Review of General Psychology, 2020
Editorial More than 20 years ago, the founding editor of Review of General Psychology (RGP), Peter Salovey, articulated a vision for this journal that it would "publish innovative theoretical , conceptual, or methodological articles that cross-cut the traditional subdisciplines of psychology. .. or that focus on topics that transcend traditional subdisciplinary boundaries." As the journal's new co-editors, we seek to refresh this vision while also extending it in new directions. We appreciate the journal's reputation for publishing provocative articles that stimulate new connections across the many subdisciplines of psychology while also striving to connect with cognate disciplines. It is our hope that these signature characteristics of the journal endure and thrive to maintain the possibility of communication even as the broader discipline of psychology becomes increasingly hyperspecialized. There is historical evidence that the decline of the general can be traced to the 19th century in epistemology. In that period, philosophers proposed a system model of science (Hegel) that attempted a general capture of the totality of reality in a conceptual system, as distinguished from a research model of science that was successfully applied in the natural sciences of physiology, physics, chemistry, and so on, with the goal of understanding reality by first focus-ing on particularities. The research model of science spread into many other disciplines with the goal of being analytic, examining parts of reality (in the case of psychology it was expressed as subdividing mental life into smaller bits and pieces), and privileging narrow expertise over general intel-lectuality while the idea of a general system declined. Over time, students in psychology have become increasingly unaware that such a field as general psychology exists or has ever existed. From a historical point of view, the fragmentation of psychology into more and more specialties and the creation of an apparently endless variation of professional areas have undermined the project of a general psychology. Specialization, now embodied in the educational practices of many graduate programs in psychology in North America (NA) and elsewhere, and a research model that has been focused on understanding details of the psychological have made it difficult to support the idea of a general psychology. Along with the difficulties of communication and cooperation among areas of psychology and with cognate disciplines that hyperspecialization in psychology has created, the inter-nationalization and globalization of psychology, with their recognition of indigenous knowledges predicated on different intellectual and experiential bases, have generated theoretical critiques that call into question the ontological and epistemo-logical bases of psychology, general or specialized. Once these bases are questioned, then, by necessity, critiques arise. Yet, our basic assessment means that we understand the historical transformation of general psychology not only as a problem but also as an opportunity. The problems presented to a general psychology by fragmentation, globalization , and theoretical critique are real, but they also present an opportunity to rethink , re-envision, and re-calibrate general psychology. We accept the challenges of doing so in and through RGP. As we seek to extend and refresh RGP, we begin by embracing a broad scientific and intellectual approach that acknowledges psychology as having its roots and foundation in the sciences and the humanities. Thus, we will re-center the journal to draw upon, and recreate where necessary, its linkages with both its scientific heritage and its older origins in what are now called humanities. Doing so opens new possibilities for a general psychology that is more than another specialty and which is capable of incorporating multiple ontological, epistemological, method-ological, and even ethical bases. The particularization of the psychological at the same time necessitates, from a scientific or intellectual point of view, the project of a general psychology that provides an 901799R GPXXX10.1177/1089268020901799Review of General PsychologyPickren and Teo editorial2020 *A scholarly imaginary is the default sense of what defines and guides a scholarly field. Here, we use the term to indicate a new approach to understanding and enacting general psychology (see Taylor, 2002).
Looking in History for Novel Integrated View on Psychological Science and Method
Psychology in Brazil, 2019
The field of psychology in Brazil characterizes by a multivariate and pluralistic understanding of science and profession, by influences received at different times from Europe and North America. Brazil was a pioneer in the recognition of psychology as a profession, although a research-supported education occurred more slowly. My career developed in the period between the pioneering effort of the first Brazilian psychologists from the first half of the twentieth century and the new generation of highly qualified professionals and researchers from the beginning of the twenty-first century, forged in postgraduate studies. I could describe my career as being direct to help consolidate postgraduate studies in the last three decades of the twentieth century. My interest was to increase the publication of journals according to international scientific standards, to insist on indexing of national journals, and to reinvigorate the study of the history of psychology, considering its philosophical and cultural influences. In research, I looked at a combined and reversible interplay between qualities and quantities, guided by four logics: abduction (the power of creativity), induction (the exercise of invention), deduction (the rigor of analyses), and adduction (the critical necessity). Psychological science stems from a long history in philosophy, developing in the midst of bitter theoretical disputes, but bringing advances in research methods along with advances on application effectiveness. Many misunderstandings persist about psychological science among students, anti-scientific segments, and people in general. Thus, it is easy to understand why Stanovich (2004) begins his popular book How to Think Straight About Psychology stating: "There is a body of knowledge that is unknown to most people...Surprisingly enough, this unknown body of knowledge is the discipline of psychology" (p. ix). This situation is even more serious in Brazil, where the profession grew rapidly, in contrast to the science that had a slow
TOWARD A PHILOSOPHICAL HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGY: AN ALTERNATIVE PATH FOR THE FUTURE
Recent transformations in the history and philosophy of science have led historians of psychology to raise questions about the future development of their historiography. Although there is a dominant tendency among them to view their discipline as related to the social turn in the history of science, there is no consensus over how to approach methodologically the history of psychology. The aim of this paper is to address the issue of the future of the historiography of psychology, by proposing an alternative, yet complementary path for the field, which I call a philosophical history of psychology. In order to achieve this goal, I will first present and discuss the emergence of the social turn in the history of psychology, showing some of its problems. Then I will introduce the contemporary debate about the integration of the history of science and the philosophy of science as an alternative model for the history of psychology. Finally, I will propose general guidelines for a philosophical history of psychology, discussing some of its potentials and limitations. Keywords: history of psychology; history of science; philosophy of science.