How does banking market power affect bank opacity? Evidence from analysts' forecasts (original) (raw)
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2007
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The 2007–2009 financial crisis and bank opaqueness
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The Market Reaction to the Disclosure of Supervisory Actions: Implications for Bank Transparency
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Economic and Policy Review, 2004
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The authors suggests that banks that are more forthcoming on basic balance-sheet items exhibit lower stock price volatility. About 600 banks in thirty-one countries over the 1993-2000 period are covered. The authors find that higher values of their disclosure index are associated with significantly lower stock return volatility and that volatility is also negatively associated with most of the individual items in the index, and conclude that increased disclosure may benefit bankers and bank supervisors.
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Market evidence on the opaqueness of banking firms' assets* 1
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