The Slave's Work: Reading Slavery through Hegel's Master-Slave Dialectic (original) (raw)
Related papers
The Phenomenology of Hegel's Master-Slave Dialectic: The Servile Prerequisite for Freedom
2018
of Spirit, the confrontation between the 'Lord' and 'Bondsman' initially takes the form of a life-and-death struggle, where one of the subjects either ends up getting killed, subjugated, or abandoning the battle altogether. But the moment when the 'Bondsman'-the subject who eventually becomes subdued by the 'Lord'-begins to become aware of the fact that he does not necessarily have to engage in the life-and-death struggle, he/she becomes compelled to question his/her natural predisposition to engage in the fight altogether. Even if the Bondsman eventually becomes subjugated by the Lord, it is precisely the Bondsman's "_slavish consciousness_" that births a strife for freedom. Regardless of how the fight resolves, Hegel argues that the only manner in which freedom of conscious can arise, is through the confrontation of two subjects, where the outcome must necessarily be the subjugation of one by the other as a necessary prerequisite for the development of a free consciousness. This essay will attempt to demonstrate Hegel's argument which demonstrates how positive freedom-the "freedom to" something -can only arise as an idea out of the condition of subjugation.
A Critical Analysis of the Philosophical-Political Element of the Master-Slave Dialectic
The section “Lordship and Bondage” in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit offers us, through the criticism of slavery, some indications regarding Hegel’s conception of human nature. In this paper some consequences of this conception for Hegel’s political philosophy are identified and presented. The analysis shows problems may emerge when we analyze some fundamental Hegelian concepts – “recognition” and shows that some “men” – if we take into consideration the way these concepts were defined in the master-slave dialectic. In light of these problems it is pointed out that Hegel’s political philosophy, and also his position regarding slavery, become less cogent and more susceptible to criticism. The last part of the text analyzes some consequences of problems related to the possibility of defining the concepts “recognition” and “men” in terms of Hegel’s model of state.
Hegel’s grounding of intersubjectivity in the master–slave dialectic
Philosophy & Social Criticism, 2012
In this article I seek to explain Hegel's significance to contemporary meta-ethics, in particular to Kantian constructivism. I argue that in the master-slave dialectic in the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel shows that self-consciousness and intersubjectivity arise at the same time. This point, I argue, shows that there is no problem with taking other people's reasons to motivate us since reflection on our aims is necessarily also reflection on the needs of those around us. I further explore Hegel's contribution to the debate about internal and external reasons. I end by arguing that we should understand reasons as historically constructed in the sense that who counts as an intrinsic bearer of value changes over time. I thus argue that the struggle for recognition is in fact the beginning of the long march toward the idea of recognition and the Kantian kingdom of ends. This march, however, is driven by the need to overcome injustice as it is instantiated at the beginning of history by the master's absolute domination of the slave.
Hegelian Maneuvers: Analogizing Slavery
Critiques Hegel in the context of 18th and early 19th century bourgeois contestations of feudal oppression in the name of anti-slavery, based on a discussion of German theatre of the time.
Master-Slave Relationship in Hegel's Dialectic
'Recognition' is what Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind is mainly about. Its application in the objective basis for social life and history opens a new horizon for understanding of the historicity of human existence. But the complication, which arises here is that since recognition is reciprocal then it may render an impossible reality. This paper is concerned with this impossible possibility of recognition and argues that at the end of the dialectical process of master-slave relationship the recognition of the master by the slave is jeopardised. To begin with I prefer to discuss the concept of 'Time' in Hegel's philosophy, which provides a clue in understanding of the nature and structure of 'Consciousness'. In pursuing this, we need to make a distinction between temporality of consciousness and mathematical time of Being. Temporality determines the stream of " World-Spirit " or 'Consciousness' and by contrast, mathematical time deals with quantity and lifeless reality. Temporality of consciousness is qualitative and comprises of unbreakable and unrepeatable moments in which each new moment is richer in content than those antecedent to it. This concept of time is central to Hegel's philosophy and explicit references to this concept of time are found in the Phenomenology, for example Hegel states that, " Time appears as Spirit's destiny and necessity, where Spirit is not yet complete within itself. " [1] The revelation of consciousness in the self-formative process in human history takes place in two different ways. First, consciousness posits itself as something temporal and dynamic, and in the second, it objectifies itself and becomes a lifeless entity or something spatial rather than temporal. As we see, Hegel's view of time is distinct from that of Kant described in the first part of the Critique of Pure Reason. For Hegel, time and space are not subjective forms or conditions of sensory experience, but ontological. Time is the formative process of consciousness without which history is unthinkable. One could also argue that since all the categories in Hegel's logic are ontological and not epistemological and 'Time' is one of them, then 'Time' is ontological and has its own reality outside the domain of thinking. Temporality of consciousness draws a line of demarcation between human beings and the given objects. Consciousness, on this view, is temporality, and therefore, unlike a given object it is not identical to itself. In other words, consciousness is what it is not, because it is incomplete and dynamic and is in the state of constant change, striving to fulfil itself. This movement of consciousness is also self-determined, as the 'other' is nothing more than the externalisation of consciousness. For this reason, there is no distinction between externality and internality for consciousness. This significant characteristic of consciousness provides the ground for freedom, and is essential for understanding of the meaning of the category of 'True Infinite' in dialectical logic, where Hegel remarks, " The Being of spirit may be understood by a glance at its direct opposition-matter. As the essence of matter is gravity so on the other hand, we may affirm that the substance, the essence of Spirit is freedom. " [2] As I understand Hegel's notions of consciousness and temporality have had a profound impact on the philosophies of Heidegger and Sartre. Human existence (or Dasein), in Heidegger's
A Note on Some Contemporary Readings of Hegel's Master-Servant Dialectic
2016
Hegel's use of the master-servant relationship in the Phenomenology of Spirit sets the stage for the problem of recognition. Since Alexandre Kojève presented his lectures on Hegel, a long philosophical tradition has been isolating the fourth chapter of Phenomenology of Spirit as a freestanding essay on anthropology or social philosophy. However, I contend the account of recognition provided in this chapter does not ground Hegel's theory of ethical life. In this paper, I shall defend an allegorical reading of the master-servant dialectic that privileges Hegel's response to Kant. In doing so, I will take issue with McDowell's and Pippin's epistemological readings of this chapter. Both authors have argued that Hegel's strategy entails a critique of Kant's theory of apperception. While McDowell and Pippin have different views about the function of desire and the process constituting self-consciousness, I will object that both McDowell and Pippin fail to acknowledge the relevance of motivation and affectivity for self-consciousness. Hegel's phenomenological discourse takes place at the abstract level of consciousness, yet the fourth chapter of the Phenomenology (PhG) is one of the richest in offering practical situations and theoretical principles that are reciprocally intertwined. Under
Intellectual History Review, 2021
In this article, the master-servant figure in the Phenomenology of Spirit is analyzed against the background of Hegel’s ontology of life as an embodied process. It is therefore argued that the theme of this figure is the question of domination in general, understood as a social relationship of subjection that can take on different historical configurations. Domination is understood as a relationship of disparity of status between dominant and dominated subjects. Therefore, domination would have an intersubjective aspect, as constituted by asymmetric relations of recognition, and a material one, as this disparity in recognitive status enacts the extraction of physical and symbolic resources from subordinated subjects.
Hegel's Master-Slave Dialectic and The Relationship between God and Believer
In his Phenomenology, Hegel characterizes self-consciousness as desire and gives an account of master-slave relationship as an example of how consciousness is brought to the level of self-consciousness as a result of the interaction of two consciousnesses. In this paper, I will firstly try to explain master-slave dialectic, and then to analyze whether it can be useful to understand the relations between God and believer / man. Second, if this dialectic turns out to be useless in such an endeavour, I will try to explain why this is so. It should be said that Hegelian master-slave dialectic is very influential for an understanding of the nature of self-consciousness. It is also very helpful in engaging with the difficult questions both of religion and of philosophy: how is one related to many or how does divine interact with the world and human beings? However, Hegel's master-slave dialectic proposes an answer which has certain deficiencies, especially, in ex-plicating the nature of the relation between God and believer. I will to demonstrate why this dialectic can mislead us in understanding how God and believer interact.
In this paper, we explore some of the political implications of the ‘left-Hegelian’ revival set out in our book Revolutionary Recognition. We do so by addressing a topical theme, namely ‘abolitionism’, much discussed in recent social and political theory, where it is understood not just as referring to the 19th century campaign against black slavery, but as encapsulating contemporary struggles against the institutions of racial domination. We argue here that philosophical resources for understanding the radicality of today’s ‘abolitionist’ movement can be found in what for some people will be an unlikely place – namely in the work of Hegel. Hegel may seem an unlikely resource for thinking about abolitionism for one simple reason: the undeniably Eurocentric and arguably racist statements that appear in his (late) philosophy of history. We agree that these statements must be unequivocally condemned, but deny that this entails jettisoning Hegel’s political thought altogether. Indeed to do so would be misguided, since in Hegel’s (early) Phenomenology of Spirit we find a far-reaching and still relevant critique of slavery and – by implication – the institutions of today’s racial domination. Keywords: Hegel, abolitionism, anti-racism, anti-colonialism, Black Lives Matter, recognition, institutions