Augustine and the Dialogue (original) (raw)
Related papers
Cicero, Augustine, and the Philosophical Roots of the Cassiciacum Dialogues
ABSTRACT : To fully understand St. Augustine’s Cassiciacum dialogues, one must understand how they relate to the philosophical works of Marcus Tullius Cicero. Contrary to recent opinion, Cicero was a serious philosopher whose modification of the Platonic dialogue and public embrace of Academic skepticism successfully introduced the quest for wisdom into Roman life. No one was more acutely aware of this fact than Augustine, which explains why his first works after his conversion were designed to respond to (and in some ways to usurp) the Ciceronian legacy. Specifically, Augustine’s Contra Academicos is a response to Cicero’s Academica ; and his De ordine is a response to Cicero’s De finibus and Tusculanae disputationes ; and his De ordine is a response to Cicero’s trilogy on providence, the De natura deorum, De divinatione, and De fato. Recognizing the connection between these works sheds new light on the meaning and importance of the Cassiciacum dialogues. RÉSUMÉ : Pour apprécier les dialogues de Cassiciacum, il est important de comprendre leurs rapports avec l’œuvre philosophique de Cicéron. Contrairement à ce que certains ont pu penser, pour Cicéron, l’activité philosophique est capitale. Les modifications qu’il fait subir au dialogue platonicien et son adhésion ouverte au scepticisme académique ont aidé à introduire la recherche de la sagesse dans la vie romaine. Saint Augustin, plus que tout autre, était conscient de ce fait, ce qui explique pourquoi les premières œuvres qui ont suivi sa conversion avaient pour but de répondre (et, d’une certaine façon, d’usurper) l’héritage cicéronien. Plus spécifiquement, son Contra Academicos est une réponse à l’Academica de Cicéron. Son De beata vita est une réponse au De finibus et aux Tusculanae disputationes. Et son De ordine est une réponse à la trilogie cicéronienne sur la providence, les De natura deorum, De divinatione et De fato. La reconnaissance de ces rapports jette un jour nouveau sur le sens et l’importance des dialogues de Cassiciacum.
Cicero and Augustine on Grasping the Truth
In this article the ways in which the Stoics and Cicero talk about cataleptic impressions are examined, specifically the fact that in Greek such impressions grasp, or afford a grasp of, objects in the world, whereas Cicero seems to express himself as if it is impressions which are themselves being grasped. It is then shown how Augustine uses Ciceronian expressions in order to convey the view, never held by the Stoics or Cicero, that human being can hope for a secure grasp only of logical and mathematical truths, as well as of immediate experiences. This paper started out as a section of 'To see and to be seen' and is a companion piece to it.
Master's Thesis, 2008
This study examines the problem of why two of Cicero's later philosophical works on the topic of religion, De Natura Deorum and De Divinatione, subject the topic to much greater skepticism than had his earlier works, De Republica and De Legibus, in which he had only touched on the topic. After surveying and rejecting a number of theories previously set forth to account for this apparent shift in Cicero's philosophic perspective, this study proceeds to establish the agonistic literary context in which Cicero was writing as a backdrop against which it is possible to discern his intentions for De Natura Deorum and De Divinatione. The study concludes that Cicero's aim in these works is to construct religion as a discourse that reveals the shortcomings of Epicureanism and Stoicism and that justifies his own philosophical school, Academic skepticism.
Philosophy in Cicero's Letters
« Philosophy in Cicero's Letters », in J.W. Atkins& T. Bénatouïl (eds.), Cambrige Companion to Cicero's Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2021
While the renewal of scholarly interest in Cicero's philosophy over the last thirty years has extended to virtually all of his corpus, his letters have received comparatively less attention. They are often quoted only as a source providing either chronological details for the composition of Cicero's major philosophical works or insights into his translation of Greek concepts in his dialogues. The letters are therefore a corpus still partly unexplored from a philosophical angle. Scholars who, after M. T. Griffin's groundbreaking works, have recently analyzed the philosophy in Cicero's letters, have concentrated their studies on a few texts which deal openly with Stoic, Epicurean, Aristotelian, or Academic theories, but they have left aside discreet and fragmentary allusions to philosophy. In this chapter, I approach the topic of philosophy in Cicero's letters by examining such allusions, which are important because they highlight the experimental aspect of most philosophical doctrines in this corpus. From this point of view, the letters are a laboratory in which the origins and development of Cicero's thought appear more clearly than in his later works. In this impressive, though incomplete, corpus of letters, philosophy is everywhere, but in a fragmentary form. Both striking and allusive, serious and pleasant, its treatment is in keeping with the spirit of sermo, a "conversation between absent friends" (amicorum colloquia absentium), as Cicero himself defines the epistolary exchange (Cic. Phil. .). Many philosophical topics are dealt with, ranging from logic and physics to ethical doctrines, which are predominant in Cicero. Behind these Lévy a; Powell a; Woolf . Boes ; Baraz ; McConnell ; Gilbert ; Fletcher ; Cappello : -. See Griffin ; Griffin a. See, above all, Cic. Fam. . on Stoic theory of language; for shorter philosophical arguments, see, e.g., Fam. .- (letters to Paetus about Epicurean philosophy); Fam. . (letter to Varro about the Master argument of Diodorus Cronos); Fam. . and . (letters to Cassius after his conversion to Epicureanism).
2023
In this chapter I discuss how Cicero’s Academic identity shapes the discussion of appropriate actions in De officiis, focusing primarily on how Cicero applies the Academic principle of persuasiveness (probabile) in this work and on the use of Academic dialectical methodology for the discussion of the Stoic theory on appropriate actions, especially in the third book of De officiis.