Stevens' Wars of Cadence, 1-303: A Review of Carol B. Stevens' "Russia's Wars of Emergence, 1460-1730" (original) (raw)
Related papers
The Military Revolution in Russia, 1550-1682
The Journal of Military History, 2004
Much has been written about the Military Revolution, a series of changes in tactics and strategy, the scale of warfare, and the impact of warfare on society in the late sixteenth century and the first third of the seventeenth century. However, most of the discussion of the Military Revolution has centered on Western Europe. The Military Revolution in Eastern Europe and Russia is often poorly understood. From the mid-sixteenth to the late seventeenth century, the Russian armed forces underwent changes in tactics and organization that were truly revolutionary in their impact on Russian society and helped make Russia a significant power in Northern and Eastern Europe, laying the groundwork for the changes that Peter the Great was to bring about.
Gunpowder Weaponry and the Rise of the Early Modern State
War in History, 1998
S ince the 1988 publication of Geoffrey Parker's The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500-1800, the term 'Military Revolution' has become common parlance and accepted scholarship among military historians. 1 Recent books and collections of articles by Brian M. Downing, Weston F. Cook Jr, David Eltis, Clifford J. Rogers, and Andrew Ayton and J.L. Price have even incorporated the term in their titles. 2 All these works agreed that a revolution in military tactics and strategy had been effected by the innovation of gunpowder weaponry. And while it is true that the 'Military Revolution' thesis has had its critics, these, like Jeremy Black, John A. Lynn, Bert S. Hall and myself, have specifically targeted Parker's ideas of technological determinism. 3 1 G. Parker, The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500-1800 (Cambridge, 1988). The idea of the Military Revolution originated with Michael Roberts's 1955 lecture at Queen's University, which was printed the next year as a pamphlet under the title The Military Revolution, 1560-1660 (Belfast, 1956) and later reprinted in a collection of Roberts's articles, Essays in Swedish History (London, 1967), pp. 195-225. Roberts, however, does not discuss the aspect of the Military Revolution at issue in this article.
The Replacement of the Composite Reflex Bow by Firearms in the Muscovite Cavalry
The Muscovite cavalry went over to carbines and pistols during the course of the 17th century, yet firearms were not better handheld weapons than the composite reflex bow that the cavalry had been using. The carbine was a light form of musket that could be used on horseback, 1 but it had a very short range. 2 To reload the carbine on a horse was tricky, and a cavalryman had to bring his horse to a more or less full stop or dismount. In the heat of battle, the carbine was just dropped in its sling so the cavalryman could use his sword. 3 Likewise, a cavalryman could get off only one shot with a pistol (two shots if he had two pistols) and was effective only at very close range. 4 In contrast, mounted archers could get off anywhere from 6 to 15 shots a minute, and their bows had an effective range of from 350 to well over 500 yards, depending on the quality of the bow, the arrows, and the skill of the bowman. In the hands of truly expert bowmen using flight arrows, distances My thanks to Brian Davies, Chester S. L. Dunning, Robert I. Frost, Russell E. Martin, and Kira Stevens for providing constructive criticism of drafts of this article and to Davies, Richard Hellie, and Stevens for answering my questions about particular military matters in Muscovy. 1 Terminological precision in distinguishing arquebuses (hackbutts) from muskets is impossible for this period. Initially "musket" was a larger form of arquebus that required a stand, but soon "musket" was used as a generic term for both.
2017
Empire and serves as a starting point for what would later become the Eastern Question. It was during this period that France, England, Austria, Russia and the Ottoman Empire for the first time became engaged in both diplomatic and military terms in order to secure the balance of power in Southeastern Europe and West Asia. Before reviewing the other sources, which will be used to describe the separate campaigns, an important work by the Russian historian Tatarnikov must be noted. His outstanding research on Russia's army armament between 1700 and 1730 presents a combination of all available sources on the matter. His precise, step by step description of the separate regiments troops and the artillery accurately depicts the way Russia's army looked during the reign of Peter I. 20 The combination of this material with the excellent analysis by Brian Davies in his study on Russo-Ottoman relations during the eighteenth century will provide the required theoretical framework, upon which the thesis is constructed. 21 When speaking of Brian Davies' profound study, a side note is necessary. Prof. Davies' book is the latest study on Russia's Southern Campaigns that has been, to my knowledge, published in any language. This fact makes it a benchmark on which any further work, such as the current, should be measured. So what would this dissertation offer, which is not covered in Brian Davies' work? First and foremost, Davies' study focuses not so much on the military performance of the Russian forces, but rather-on the social cost of Peter's (and his successors') military policy. What Davies' book clearly lacks is the evaluation of field performance of the tsarist forces in the context of the military transformations during the Petrine age. Furthermore, the Azov Campaigns and the Persian Campaign, which are instrumental in the development of the Russian army, are not included in Davies' study. It is these gaps in his, otherwise, concise work that the following thesis will exploit to its fullest. Regarding Russia's first campaigns in the south, the research relies on three primary sourcesthe letters and papers of Peter the Great, the campaign journal for 1695-1704 and the personal diary of General Patrick Gordon, who commanded one third of the entire army in 1695 and 1696. 22 All documents include dispatches between Peter I and his generals, as well as a description of army numbers, the countryside, and the weather conditions. The campaigns are followed in detail in Ustryalov's work on Peter's rule, as well as the narrative of Lieutenant General P. Bobrovskiy in his history of the 13 th Guards regiment. 23 The perspective of the Soviet historiography is clearly outlined in the work of 20
US Publications (2000-2020) on Muscovite History, 1462-1689
2021
Between 2000 and 2020 historians and philologists in the US published a considerable number of books and articles on Muscovite history from 1462 to 1689. On nearly all major issues there is no consensus, so it is impossible to speak of a "US school" of Russian historiography. This survey, organized thematically, will reference thirty-three books and approximately 350 articles. In each rubric authors are listed alphabetically and their publications chronologically. The survey selectively mentions unstudied topics or topics that require further study and briefly summarizes differences of opinion.
Mongolica: An International Journal of Mongol Studies, 2017
In the 17th century, the Zunghar branch of the Oirat Confederation pioneered the local manifestation of the ‘Military Revolution’, which was sweeping the wider world. This revolution had begun a century earlier when important innovations related to firearm technology effectuated large-scale modifications to military tactics and strategy. These innovations and modifications resulted in the pronounced increase in the sheer scale of warfare, and perhaps most importantly, in the greater impact of war upon society in terms of its destructiveness, economic costs, and growing administrative challenges for governments. Improvements in musket and cannon technology allowed some empires, including the Tsardom of Russia and the Great Qing, to attain their ends more easily than in the past, while at the same time putting new insuperable obstacles in the path of the smaller and weaker nomadic polities situated on the steppes. Nomadic polities entered a period of unceasing decline, primarily owing to fundamental changes in military technology. The notable exception to this larger trend was the nomadic Zunghar, who were able to indigenously produce and incorporate large quantities of muskets and cannons into their armed forces.