Supererogation, wrongdoing, and vice: on the autonomy of the ethics of virtue (original) (raw)
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"On Widening the Moral Sphere" (published in Philosophy in the Contemporary World vol. 22 no.2)
Considerations of justice and rights are assumed to present problems for the idea that we should do, that which we take to be, supererogatory. I argue that careful consideration of how we think of justice and rights lead to the conclusion that “supererogatory” actions are actually better grouped within the class of acts we identify as moral requirements. My argument is based on our common understanding of justice as being incompatible with free-riding. Additionally, I focus attention on our implicit assumption that we possess the right to benefit by that which, we agree, is made possible from the willingness of others to go beyond perceived moral requirements. Thus, I conclude we should re-think where we draw the line demarcating the required from the saintly. Keywords: Justice, Rights, Supererogation, Heroism, Saintliness, Moral requirements, Free-riding
Supererogation, Wrongdoing, and Vice
The Journal of Philosophy, 1986
Gray for very helpful discussion on this and related topics. I am grateful to Laurence Thomas for suggesting to me the need for the comments at the beginning of section iv. Finally, I would like to thank Stephanie Talbott, without whose contributions this paper would not have been written. ' For want of a better term, I will use 'vicious' as the contrary of 'virtuous', as 'vice' is the contrary of 'virtue'. As I emphasize below in section iii, not every shortcoming in motivation is so great as to be vicious, any more than every shortcoming in character is so great as to be a vice.
Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 14, no. 2
2018
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Utilitarianism and the life of virtue
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At the Margins of Moral Personhood
Ethics, 2005
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Can Virtue Ethics Account for Supererogation?
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, 2015
In his classical article, ‘Saints and Heroes’, James Urmson single-handedly revived the idea of supererogation from it astonishingly long post-Reformation slumber. During the first two decades after its publication, Urmson's challenge was taken up almost exclusively by either utilitarians or deontologists of some sort. On the face of it, neither classical utilitarianism nor Kant's categorical imperative makes room for action which is better than the maximizing requirement, on the one hand, or beyond the requirement of duty, on the other. Nevertheless, both utilitarians and Kantians, as well as deontic logicians, offered more flexible and sophisticated versions of their respective theories which could accommodate supererogatory action. In my 1982 book on supererogation I tried to address the question whether virtue ethics could capture that new category of actions which are praiseworthy though not strictly required. But the focus of my discussion was mostly Aristotle (and Sen...
The Heythrop Journal, 2018
Following the work of MacIntyre, I call for a particularized approach to ethics. I do not base my argument on concrete situations, but rather, on the way virtue works. Following Aristotle's account, I contend that most people's conception of virtue, even abstracted from particular situations, misses something key: the ways of attaining virtue can be vastly different, and even diametrically opposed, for different people. This difference exists even without differences in external factors. People struggling with divergent vices will need to practice virtue in divergent ways. Therefore, I contend that we need to particularize the way we view the attainment of virtue, not just because each person is in a different situation or context, but because not every person approaches virtue from the same vice. I. INTRODUCTION: WHY PARTICULARIZE ETHICS? In Ethics in the Conflicts of Modernity, MacIntyre advocates a particularized approach to ethics. He critiques vast generalizations often made in ethics, remarking that they overlook diverse cultural, personal, and circumstantial factors, which influence both what is ethical and how one might discover what is ethical. 1 He discusses various narratives of how a human being may flourish, adding, 'What I emphasized then were differences that result from the particularities of the different cultures in which those lives lived out.' He continues that the distinctive feature among different lives is the individuality of each agent's desires and practical reasoning. He says, 'For it is one of the characteristics of a good practical reasoner to be able to identify the relevant particularities of her or his situation, what it is on occasion about the situation that makes it difficult to apply generalizations and dangerous to rely on precedents.' 2 Ethics must be particular because what constitutes flourishing will vary widely from person to person. Similarly, Foucault observes that actions must be considered, not only in light of circumstances, but also in light of one's intentions and the end of the action. He prescribes reflection upon one's own actions and consideration of the ends relevant to those actions, offering the example, 'When we argue with someone it is in order to convey a truth to him. So if I find myself again in similar situations, I must recall these different ends so that from then on my actions will be adapted to them.' 3 Actions must be evaluated in light of their ends, as well as in light of their effect upon others in the proximity and additional circumstantial factors. Aristotle further validates particularity in ethics, because statements about more particular acts are truer than generalizations. While he recognizes the value of certain ethical V C 2018 Trustees for Roman Catholic Purposes Registered.
2000
I owe tremendous debts to various persons and institutions without whose assistance this dissertation would not have been completed. Foremost among these is Fred Feldman, whose incisive criticism made this dissertation much better than it would otherwise have been. Fred's clarity of thought and relentless demand for excellence have improved the quality not only of the present work but of much of my philosophical writing. Any errors in the present dissertation are irrevocably mine.