Contesting liberal internationalism: China’s renegotiation of world order (original) (raw)

Current Liberal Global Order and Beijing Reaction

Current Liberal Global Order and Beijing Reaction, 2022

This paper mainly focuses on rejecting the much-upheld view regarding the rise of China as a global power. It is widely believed that China being a socialist polity will try to overthrow the liberal world order. The paper tries to establish the view that China because of its political priorities will uphold the current system and will emerge as what the Singaporean political analyst, Mahbubani has called the "Asian Inheritors of Western Legacy". The paper explores China's economic engagement with the rest of the world according to the rules of the liberal multilateral world order. It also discusses China's role as a "responsible player" in world affairs. The conclusion arrived at rejecting the position of China as a revisionist power.

Rethinking the Rise of China and Its Implications on International Order

Chinese Journal of International Review, 2020

The rise of China has become a central debate in the academic field of international relations. In the Western world, the scholars within this debate can roughly be divided into the 'pessimists' and the 'optimists'. The pessimists see in the rise of China an inevitable hegemonic war, or at least prolonged and intense zero-sum competition, with the US as it will seek to replace the latter and overturn the existing liberal international order. The optimists, on the other hand, see an opportunity for sustained Western dominance through selective accommodation of China in exchange for Chi-na's acceptance of the existing norms and values of the liberal international order and continued US dominance. In this paper, we maintain that both perspectives in the debate are misleading. We argue that China seeks to push for a multipolarized world rather than replacing the US, and that Beijing prefers the relations between the great powers within a multipolar order to be based on the conception of a 'community of common destiny for human-kind'. We also argue that China is unlikely to accept the existing norms and values of the liberal international order as they reflect and reinforce Western dominance. Rather, China has become an 'order-shaper' seeking to reform the existing institutions to better reflect the interests of the 'Rest', and establish

US–China relations and the liberal world order: contending elites, colliding visions?

International Affairs

Naná de Graaff and Bastiaan van Apeldoorn 114 International Affairs 94: 1, 2018 that China will come to act as what Schweller and Pu have called a 'spoiler' of the system, seeking to overthrow the rules-based liberal world order. 6 Others, however, have highlighted the fact that to date China has actually been largely adapting to the liberal rules of the game as formulated within US-dominated global institutions rather than challenging them, acting as a supporter of the current system. 7 China's compliance with WTO rules is a case in point. 8 The question thus remains to what extent and how China is adapting to or confronting the liberal order-and US power and position within that order-which in turn is both influenced by and shaping the way in which the United States itself is responding to China's rise. We identify three scenarios regarding the evolution of the US-China relationship and its implications for world order. The first scenario is one of (inevitable) conflict. The realist version presents this in balance-of-power terms, with China's emergence as a global Great Power threatening America's position as hegemon. While some realists view American decline as inevitable and advocate accommodation to China's rising power, 9 most argue that the United States should and will resist this challenge by pursuing a 'containment' strategy, leading to a new Cold War or even open military conflict. 10 Others look more at the illiberal nature of China's domestic regime, and the threat its authoritarian and statist version of capitalism might pose to the West and the liberal order. 11 To the extent that China does not want to be part of this liberal sphere under US leadership, US-China confrontation becomes more likely. In the second scenario, that of co-optation, China will let itself be incorporated into the liberal order. In this scenario, what we describe below as America's strategy of 'liberal engagement' will pay off: China, taking into account its own self-interest and the deepening interdependence between the world's two largest economies, will choose to adapt to what the Obama administration called the 'rules of the road'. This would also imply a gradual abandoning of its 'statist' model of economic and political governance. This scenario, associated above all with liberal theorists, might unfold even in the case of America's relative hegemonic decline, simply because, it is argued, the liberal order is so attractive: it has low costs of entry, while participating in it brings great benefits in terms of prosperity and legitimacy. 12

China’s rise in a liberal world order in transition – introduction to the FORUM

Review of International Political Economy, 2020

In a time of great uncertainty about the future and resilience of the liberal world order this Forum focuses on China’s rise and interplay with the foundations of that liberal order. The key question is the extent to and variegated ways in which China - with its (re)ascendance to power and potential global leadership – is adapting to and perhaps even strengthening liberal institutions and rules of the game, confronting them, or developing alternative paths. In this introduction to the Forum we advance three key points based on the contributions. First, contrasting the orthodox binary scenarios of either inevitable conflict or co-optation offered in the mainstream IR debate, the Forum highlights the possibility of a third scenario of China’s interplay with the liberal world and its key actors, institutions, and rules. A hybrid and variegated scenario that entails both conflict and adaptation, differently entangled in different issue areas. Second, it stresses the need to conceptualize and empirically comprise the essentially interlinked nature of domestic state-society models and the global political economy. Third, we argue for a perspective that incorporates underlying economic and social structures and the power relations embedded therein.

The Great Rejuvenation? China’s Search for a New ‘Global Order’

This Asia Paper explores how China, a ‘partial’ global power, can set the agenda and determine the rules in a global order dominated by a declining yet unyielding global power. In exploring this question, we present the argument that building ‘alternative’ regional and global institutions might be a safer strategy for China. Further, it examines how China is through institutions, such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) incrementally delimiting its sphere of influence and shaping other states’ actions in Asia.

After Unipolarity: China's Visions of International Order in an Era of U.S. Decline

International Security, 2011

The emerging transition from unipolarity to a more multipolar distribution of global power presents a unique and unappreciated problem that largely explains why, contrary to the expectations of balance of power theory, a counterbalancing reaction to U.S. primacy has not yet taken place. The problem is that, under unipolarity and only unipolarity, balancing is a revisionist, not a status quo, behavior: its purpose is to replace the existing unbalanced unipolar structure with a balance of power system. Thus, any state that seeks to restore a global balance of power will be labeled a revisionist aggressor. To overcome this ideational hurdle to balancing behavior, a rising power must delegitimize the unipole's global authority and order through discursive and cost-imposing practices of resistance that pave the way for the next phase of full-fledged balancing and global contestation. The type of international order that emerges on the other side of the transition out of unipolarity d...

The crisis of the “Liberal International Order” and the challenges from China and Russia

2020

The concept of “Liberal International Order” (LIO) is one of the most popular in contemporary international relations. LIO received global recognition and became a key factor of international politics after the Second World War. Studies of the LIO have gone through periods of peaks and valleys since the Second World War. Nowadays, the studies are once again at the epicenter of political discussions. Academic studies of the LIO face difficult challenges since the concept has found itself in a ‘grey zone’ between two well-established disciplines — political science and economics. Two factors, which signaled a deep crisis of the LIO are: 1) disaffection of people living in Western democracies in multiple negative effects of globalization; 2) the progressive rising of powers such as China and Russia, whose political regimes are currently defined as illiberal. For many states in different parts of the world, the LIO did not generate prosperity for a majority of their population. Rather ...