The immobility paradox in Thailand’s southern border provinces (original) (raw)

The immobility paradox in Thailand’s southern border provinces

Chanintira na Thalang & Chontida Auikool

To cite this article: Chanintira na Thalang & Chontida Auikool (2018) The immobility paradox in Thailand’s southern border provinces, South East Asia Research, 26:4, 315-329, DOI: 10.1177/0967828X18808613

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1177/0967828X18808613

Published online: 11 Jan 2019.

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The immobility paradox in Thailand’s southern border provinces

South East Asia Research
2018, Vol. 26(4) 315-329
© SOAS University of London 2018
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/0967828×1880861310.1177 / 0967828 \times 18808613 journals.sagepub.com/home/year ©SAGE

Chanintira na Thalang

Department of International Affairs, Faculty of Political Science, Thammasat University, Thailand

Chontida Auikool

International Studies (ASEAN-China) Program, Faculty of Liberal Arts, Thammasat University, Thailand

Abstract

While the general literature analysing mobility patterns in Thailand’s southern border provinces largely indicates insecurity and violence as precipitating factors for migration, such explanations fail to fully explain why the majority of those who migrate do so within the conflict area rather than away from it. Based on fieldwork, this article argues that while a lack of security measures and higher levels of violence in rural areas have induced people to migrate to more urban areas, a variety of factors, including emotional attachment to homeland, and cultural and religious considerations have influenced peoples’ decision to stay. Most importantly, the accumulation of ‘insider advantages’, enable most to adapt and seek employment despite the present circumstances.

Keywords

Conflict, immobility paradox, location-specific insider advantages, migration, security, Thailand’s southern border provinces

Introduction

The relationship between migration and ethnic conflicts is complex in that one may be a causal factor of the other and vice versa. As a consequence, no single theory or specific discipline can explain the dynamics of this multifaceted and fluid relationship. While scholarly attention concerning Thailand’s southern border provinces has largely focused on the overall conflict (i.e. Alpern, 1974; McCargo, 2009; Nantawan, 1976, 1977; Suhrke 1970, 1975, 1977), security (Srisompob, 2012) and conflict resolution (Chaiwat, 2012; Srisompob and McCargo, 2008), there have been few attempts to study

[1]

1. Corresponding author:
   Chanintira na Thalang, Department of International Affairs, Faculty of Political Science, Thammasat University, Bangkok 10200, Thailand.
   Email: chanintira@hotmail.com ↩︎

migration patterns related to Thailand’s southern border conflict. Within this small body of literature, studies exploring patterns of migration before the conflict reemerged in 2004 have predominately focused on economic migration (Pornpan and Suparat, 2008; Supang, 2003; Suttiporn, 2011). Unsurprisingly, with tensions heightening and incidents of violence becoming a daily occurrence since 2004, there has been increasing interest in patterns of out-migration especially to the neighbouring province of Songkla during intervals of intensified conflict (i.e. Zakee, 2008). Though providing useful insights into the consequences of this new wave of violence, such studies only offer snapshots of the situation. Most importantly, much emphasis is placed on security as a precipitating factor for migrating to safer ground outside the conflict area.

To a certain extent, insecurity as a causal factor for migration has been reinforced by statistical data recorded by the household registration system (thabien rat). There has been an increase of 300-400 per cent in the number of those migrating from the area since the violence reemerged in 2004 (Kraiyos, 2015: 2-7). Although this suggests a strong correlation between the frequency of violence and out-migration, especially at the time when there was an upsurge in violence, patterns of migration have changed during the 14 years of conflict. As Kraiyos Patrawart illustrates (2015: 3−233-23 ), out of the total number of those who registered their move with the authorities from 2004 to 2014, close to 45 per cent moved within the same district, 26 per cent moved within the conflict area and only 29 per cent moved out of the conflict area. Among the three major ethnic groups, members of the Thai Buddhist and Sino-Thai populations are more likely to move away from the southern border provinces due to their status as minorities within an area that is 80 per cent Malay Muslim. The statistical data shows that the majority who registered their move have migrated within the conflict area, mostly to the provincial capitals (Mueang) of Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat as well as the commercial centre of Hat Yai in Songkhla. While Kraiyos’ insightful quantitative analysis illustrates that a lack of security is the main factor for migration regardless of whether it is within or away from Thailand’s southern provinces, there are two issues that still need to be addressed: 1) why people choose to remain in the southern border provinces; and 2) how people adapt and survive within a conflict area.

Existing studies show that there is a trend of out-migration from rural areas to the nearest urban areas (Kraiyos, 2015). According to the household registration system, since the reemergence of the violence in the period 2004 until 2017, Mueang Pattani has recorded the highest number of registered moves to the provincial capital. Furthermore, the registered number of outflows from Mueang Pattani and Mueang Narathiwat have been consistently lower than inflows to these respective provincial capitals. While generally the numbers of those moving to Mueang Yala have been higher than figures of those moving out, there was a reversal in migration patterns in 2005. Nonetheless, it must be noted that the highest number of attacks in the three southern border provinces was recorded in 2007 rather than 2005 (see Figure 1). In comparison, migration levels in and out of Mueang Narathiwat have not experienced much fluctuation (Department of Provincial Administration, 2017). Though official statistics do not account for all individuals and families who move, the figures provide a rough illustration of the patterns of mobility from and within Thailand’s southern border provinces. Furthermore, those who register their move with the authorities are more likely to make the move permanent by seeking permanent residence and employment. This differs from seasonal workers or economic migrants who migrate for relatively short periods of time with the intention of returning, which is conditioned by exogenous factors rather than factors deriving from the place they migrated from (Dustmann, 2000: 3).

Figure I. The number of deaths and injuries from 2004 to April 2018.
Source: Deep South Watch Database, 2018.

Paradoxically, while the number of those migrating to the provincial capitals is generally greater than those moving out, Mueang Yala and Mueang Pattani are among the top 10 districts in Thailand’s southern border provinces that have recorded the highest number of violent incidents in the past 13 years (2004-2017). It must be noted that insurgents are not responsible for all the violence in the south. Based on statistical data collected by the Deep South Watch (2017) during 2014-2017, 73 per cent of incidents of violence that occurred in 2017 are insurgency-related while 19 per cent are unknown. The rest are associated with crime, narcotics and political disputes, which contributed 4.7 per cent, 2.8 per cent and 0.4 per cent of the violence respectively. Geographically, Mueang Yala has experienced 1713 violent incidents, which is the highest number of incidents recorded according to district, while Mueang Pattani ranks in eighth place with 840 incidents. It must be noted that Mueang Narathiwat is not among the districts experiencing high levels of violence even though the entire province has seen the most violence with 6959 recorded incidents, or equivalent to 36 per cent of all the incidents occurring within Thailand’s southern border provinces since 2004. The majority of the remaining districts among the top 10 districts frequently targeted by violence are not only rural areas but also historical hotspots for rebellion against the Thai government. As history dictates, the former Sultanate of Patani was divided into seven cities including Mueang Pattani, Mueang Yala, Yaring, Ra-Ngae, Raman, Sai-Buri and Nong Chik under the reign of King Rama I and consequently placed under the administrative authority of neighbouring Songkla province.

Existing explanations that violence is a precipitating factor for out-migration from Thailand’s southern border provinces are too simplistic. As the statistical data illustrates, the majority who register their move do so within the conflict area rather than away from it. Based on data collection during 2016-2017, this article seeks to understand the immobility paradox in Thailand’s southern provinces by focusing on Mueang Yala and Mueang Pattani where migration inflows and the frequency of violence are high. It is argued that while a lack of security measures and higher levels of violence in rural areas induce people to migrate to more urban areas, a variety of factors,

including emotional attachment to homeland, cultural and religious considerations and, most importantly, the accumulation of ‘insider advantages’ that enables most to adapt and seek employment despite the present circumstances, have resulted in an immobility paradox for many of those living in the conflict area.

This study excludes 100,000 documented and undocumented temporary migrant workers who cross the Thai-Malaysian border seeking employment with the intention of returning to their homeland, many of whom are working for Tom Yum Kung restaurants in Malaysia (Nisakorn, 2013). Many use border passes, which limits their stay in Malaysia to 30 days. This type of mobility is largely dependent on ‘migrant networks’ consisting of social relationships between migrants in Thailand and Malaysia (Suttiporn, 2011: 39). While deciding against relocating permanently to Malaysia partially reinforces the argument of this article, the focus of this study is to understand 1) mobility within Thailand’s southern border provinces and 2) how locals navigate their lives and make a living within the context of conflict. To be clear, the aim of this article is to understand the immobility paradox in Thailand’s southern border provinces, not to provide an exhaustive account of how locals seek to adapt and survive under the present circumstances.

Theoretical explanations

Despite the proliferation of general literature analysing patterns of migration, theoretical explanations are less common due to the multiplicity of variables that induce people to migrate (King, 2012: 1). Much emphasis has been placed on a variety of causal factors, such as economic incentives (i.e. Borjas, 1990; Corry, 1996; Harris and Todaro, 1970) and a range of push-pull factors (Ravenstein, 1876), to name just a few. Within the nexus of migration and ethnic conflicts, various studies have also explored the impact of in-migration (both voluntary and involuntary) to specific areas inhabited by a specific ethnic group and subsequent conflict between immigrants and the existing population, as illustrated in cases such as Mindanao (Barter, 2016; De Koninck and Dery, 1997: 3). However, rarely has immobility in a conflict area been analysed, and this is the focus of this study. In an attempt to understand why mobility rates within Europe are low in spite of various incentives including decreasing transport and transaction costs as well as initiatives to remove obstacles to migration by the European Union, Peter A Fischer, Einar Holm, Gunnar Malmberg and Thomas Straubhaar (2000: 9-11) argue that accumulated knowledge over years contributes to the decision to stay in an area as well as determinations on how to make a living. This knowledge is otherwise termed ‘location-specific insider advantages’. More explicitly, Fisher et al. (2000: 13) identify various factors, including work-orientated insider advantages and leisureorientated insider advantages, as reasons why people decide against moving. Thus, the more location-specific insider advantages people accumulate over the years, the less transferable their skills are to a different setting and the more likely people will remain in their current location.

While the situation in Europe could hardly be more different from Thailand’s southern border provinces, the concept of insider advantages has useful implications for the lack of migration to destinations outside the conflict area. Location-specific insider advantages that pertain to making a living include specific knowledge about market preferences along with the requirements and habits of clients (Fischer et al., 2000: 10). Furthermore, making a living in a conflict area also necessitates building a client base and having an understanding of social relations within specific contexts that are non-transferable to other geographical locations. Moving away and settling down in a new area requires migrants to seek alternative accommodation and employment, make new friends and find suitable schools for their children. The tendency to move also decreases when language, cultural

and religious factors are involved. Learning a new language or adapting to a new culture are factors taken into consideration when deciding whether to migrate. In other words, people decide not to migrate ‘because the loss of location specific assets and abilities induced by migration would be too severe and because it is immobility which allows individuals to accumulate insideradvantages’ (Fischer et al., 2000: 10).

However, survival is not only dependent on an adequate income in the context of conflict but also on possessing knowledge of patterns of violence. As such, increased in-migration to Mueang Yala and Mueang Pattani generally differs to urbanisation in Thailand, which is largely driven by development and growing economic incentives in Thailand’s expanding cities. While better economic opportunities are reasons for the rural population to migrate to Mueang Yala and Mueang Pattani, the lack of security in the provincial capitals cannot explain why internal migration is higher than out-migration to other urban areas in Thailand’s south that are free from conflict. For those who make the decision to remain in Thailand’s southern border provinces, understanding the patterns of violence, including who the targets are and where the attacks happen, constitutes essential insider knowledge that residents use to navigate their daily lives under the present conditions of conflict. While the conflict in Thailand’s southern border provinces may seem irrational to an outside observer that views the violence as volatile and indiscriminate, the actors in the conflict have specific goals that conform to certain strategic patterns (Varshney, 2003: 86). Furthermore, conflictual relationships between governments and secessionist groups are defined by asymmetrical power and resources. States have armies at their disposal while secessionist movements have guerrilla fighters. On the one hand, states have the ability to collect taxes in order to finance their policies, to provide welfare for the population and to buy weapons to protect their sovereignty. On the other, secessionist movements rely on stolen and basic weaponry. Due to such limitations, strategic considerations such as planned attacks against the enemy become ever more important to an insurgency. In consequence, ethnic conflicts are likely to conform to loose patterns of violence. Patterns are ‘loose’ because, while fighting is based on ideological goals and a clear enemy, targets within a conflict area can never be completely controlled. At times, innocent bystanders can suffer injuries and fatalities because of large-scale attacks; meanwhile, rogue members of the insurgency can also divert from the original goals and strategic plans of the overall movement while opportunities for personal vendettas can also be pursued within the context of a conflict where there is a lack of rule of law. Despite the uncertainty of conflict, understanding patterns of violence equips those living in a conflict area with a certain level of information concerning dos and don’ts that enables them to avoid being potential physical targets. The longer people stay, the more insider advantages they possess and the more confidence they have regarding their survival in the conflict area. Thus, people are making a rational choice by not migrating away from the conflict in the south due to the accumulation of many ‘location-specific insider advantages’ over time.

Mobility from rural to urban areas in Thailand’s southern border provinces

Understanding the patterns of violence in Thailand’s southern border provinces is crucial to determining why people migrate, as the frequency of violence alone cannot explain why the majority of migrants choose to remain in the conflict area. Thailand’s three southernmost provinces (including Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat) are home to 1.3 million Malay Muslims. This is equivalent to 80 per cent of the population of the three provinces, but only accounts for two per cent of

Thailand’s total population, which is predominantly Buddhist (McCargo, 2012: 217). While ethnic discontent against the Thai state emerged shortly after the area was formally incorporated into Thailand as a result of the Anglo-Siamese treaty of 1909, armed rebellion intensified during the 1960s-1980s. However, after the implementation of various accommodative policies and an offer of amnesty, the violence subsided significantly towards of the end of the 1980s though it did not completely disappear. Unfortunately, the relative calm was short-lived and hostilities reemerged in 2001 as the number of small sporadic incidents increased. By January 2004, the conflict resurfaced in the form of well-coordinated attacks against an army camp in Narathiwat where a group of separatists made away with a cache of 400 weapons. Thereafter, the conflict in Thailand’s southern border provinces became a scene of daily violence. All told, almost 7000 people have been killed, with the majority being civilians. The violence has included shootings, bombings and arson attacks as well as deaths and injuries caused by security operations (Deep South Watch, 2017). Among the dead, Muslims have outnumbered Buddhists, although the latter have sustained a greater number of injuries. While the majority of violence has been confined to Thailand’s three southernmost provinces, the violence has occasionally spilled over into a few districts of the neighbouring province of Songkla, including Hat Yai, Chana, Na Thawi, Thepha and Saba Yoi. Very rarely do the insurgents operate outside the confines of Thailand’s southern border provinces. Nonetheless, in recent years there have been exceptions, including an undetonated bomb found in Phuket in 2013 and a car bomb in Koh Samui in 2015 that wounded seven people.

As mentioned in the preceding paragraphs, while Mueang Yala and Mueang Pattani have been high on the list of the most targeted districts, the majority of the violence occurs in rural areas. This is due to a lack of security, which in turn creates fear amongst the rural population as the conflict is largely driven by a village-based separatist movement (Engvall and Andersson, 2014: 187). Thai authorities have used a colour-coded system to categorise villages. In turn, villages are ranked in terms of the level of violence, ranging from high to moderate to no violence, and divided into red, yellow and green respectively. However, in 2014, this colour-coded system was replaced. As such, red zone villages were renamed ‘security promotion villages’, while yellow and green zones were termed ‘villages with accelerated development’ and ‘development promotion villages’ respectively.

In rural areas, the security measures and personnel in place are insufficient to respond to the violence, which has affected industries and agricultural production in rural areas in Thailand’s southern border provinces. The lack of security in the present significantly differs from the situation of the past. While levels of violence were quite high during the 1970s, the frequency of violence subsided towards the end of the 1980s. From 1993 to 2004, there were 2593 incidents of politically related violence; 71 per cent of these incidents occurred in 2004 alone, while the remaining 29 per cent of the incidents (or equivalent to 750 incidents) took place during 19932003 (Srisompob and Panyasak, 2006: 96). As a result, the increase in violence has signified a shift in migration patterns of the past. Existing studies indicate that migration patterns prior to 2004 were for economic reasons and were seasonal due to a large segment of the population working in the agricultural sector. In consequence, many would seek temporary work in Malaysia due to the demand for unskilled labour in various sectors such as construction (Khamnuan et al., 2008: 86-93).

However, insecurity in the present day has induced in-migration to the provincial capitals, many of which have made the move more permanent. Rubber tappers remain vulnerable to early morning attacks where such incidents are conducted mainly with the purpose of driving away Thai

Buddhist landowners. Malay Muslims working in these plantations have also been targeted by the insurgents (Human Rights Watch, 2012), especially those working in red zone areas. Not only have the insurgents targeted those working on plantations, but their attacks have also frustrated logistical efforts to transport rubber to factories. In consequence, the lack of security in rural areas has also made the logistical operations of certain industries untenable. According to a report by Official Statistics Thailand (2011), 30 per cent of rubber factories in Thailand’s three southernmost provinces have been put out of business. Based on interviews, industries operating in rural areas that remain in operation are afraid to develop or expand their businesses further due to the uncertainty of the situation. Furthermore, factory owners have had difficulty finding companies and mechanics based in neighbouring Songkla and Bangkok to deliver, maintain and repair factory equipment and machinery in rural areas in Thailand’s southern border provinces. Thus, transportation costs for any line of production in rural areas remain high due to the lack of people willing to take on such jobs. What is more, transportation of goods can only be done during the day for fear of attacks at night. The lack of security has not only had negative consequences for industries and the agricultural sector, it has also limited employment opportunities in rural areas which in turn has induced many to seek jobs in more urban areas. According to the National Statistical Office of Thailand (2015), even though the average household income in Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat is the lowest among Thailand’s southern provinces, it is higher than in many provinces in the north and northeast, which is one indicator that economic opportunities do exist. As Srisompob Jitpiromsri and Panyasak Sobhonvasu (2006) argue, while the local economies of Thailand’s southern border provinces have lagged behind the other southern provinces, the locals are not especially poor by Thai standards on the whole.

The violence in rural areas has caused in-migration to urban areas, particularly Mueang Pattani and Mueang Yala, for three reasons. Firstly, for the Malay Muslim population, certain religious requirements such as finding a place to pray or places that offer halal food would make daily living difficult in other provinces of Thailand which are predominantly Buddhist. As a consequence, Malay Muslims consider Thailand’s southern border provinces to be the place that best suits their cultural and religious needs because they can practice their own faith and beliefs without disruption. Additionally, language and education may also limit the outflows from Thailand’s southern provinces, especially amongst the rural Malay Muslim population. Although both local Pattani Malay (a highly divergent dialect of standard Malay but with similarities to the dialect spoken in Kelantan) and Thai are spoken throughout the three southern border provinces, many in rural areas are not proficient in Thai which limits their opportunities to receive a higher education or seek employment elsewhere. The standard of education and the lack of teachers in rural areas has compounded the problem. However, such limitations have not played a particularly significant role in inducing more permanent out-migration to Malaysia.

Secondly, because attachment to ancestral homelands is high in Thailand’s southern border provinces regardless of ethnicity and religion, many feel as though they have not left their ancestral homelands as residing in urban areas in Thailand’s southern border provinces is only a short distance away from their homes in rural areas. A Thai Buddhist family working on a plantation in Yarang, a district in Pattani that remains one of the top 10 districts targeted by the violence, noted that the family chose to migrate to Mueang Pattani for both economic and security reasons. However, they decided against selling their house in Yarang district in order to relocate there once the security situation improves (interview, 3 November 2016). Many, regardless of ethnicity and religion, also cite family ties and the need to look after the elderly as reasons for limiting their options for out-migration from Thailand’s southern border provinces.

Thirdly, while the violence has had many negative consequences for large businesses such as industries and agriculture in rural areas, it has had a negligible impact on small and medium-sized businesses in urban areas, which has influenced decisions to stay. Most commonly, those formerly working in the agricultural sector and industries have found jobs in Mueang Yala and Mueang Pattani in other growing sectors such as construction. While it does not guarantee immunity to attacks, migrating from rural to urban areas within Thailand’s southern border provinces is viewed as less costly. Therefore, possessing location-specific advantages including knowledge of the patterns of violence means that the locals have the basic knowledge necessary to avoid being targeted by the actors of conflict. Because insider advantages are non-transferable, the costs and the risks of migration out of Thailand’s southern border provinces would be too steep.

Location-specific advantages: Making a living in the South

While village-based violence explains migration patterns away from rural areas, various factors such as emotional attachment to one’s own homeland, job opportunities and insider knowledge of the patterns of violence contribute to why people choose to remain in Thailand’s southern provinces, with the majority of migrants moving to the provincial capitals. Insider knowledge of the conflict is essential as it enables the locals to navigate their daily lives within the conflict area without having to leave their family, community, homes and businesses behind. While various factors such as the conflict and Islamic revivalism may have strengthened ethnic boundaries between the groups, inter-ethnic relations have not deteriorated to the point of communal violence. As such, the effect on the inter-communal relations in urban areas among the locals who have resided in Thailand’s border provinces for generations is minimal. However, there have been incidents where the conflict has taken a toll on newcomers to the area, largely due to a lack of awareness of inter-cultural and religious relationships. Because communal relations are largely unaffected by the violence, other forms of socio-economic interaction within the community can function normally, such as business transactions and hiring people of a different ethnicity, to name just a few. Thus, remaining in one’s own homeland becomes more attractive than migrating to areas outside the conflict area.

While small business owners in Mueang Pattani and Mueang Yala have seen their profits decrease due to the conflict, many still believe that the advantages of staying outweigh the costs especially in cases where businesses are being passed on to second or third generations. This is partially due to business relationships and the existing client base that these businesses have developed over the years. Although the majority of the population in Thailand’s southern border provinces is Muslim and the rest Thai Buddhists and Sino-Thais, ethnicity and religion do not factor into business relationships. In fact, there is little evidence to suggest that there are tensions among these ethnic-religious groups in urban areas. In consequence, local business owners who were born and raised in Thailand’s southern border provinces, regardless of ethnicity and religion, possess cultural and market knowledge of local demands. Some have noted that ethnicity and religion are not a consideration when hiring staff. Moreover, businesses that have staff from different ethnic and religious backgrounds are usually sensitive to cultural and religious needs such as allowing Muslims to pray during the day (interview, 2 November 2016). Businesses owned by local Sino-Thais have found various ways to reach out to the Muslim population that makes up the majority. Some have suggested using Yawi script (written Pattani Malay) or learning how to speak Pattani Malay. However, based on fieldwork, the authors found that the older generation of SinoThais were more willing to learn local Malay than Thai Buddhists, who generally have the

perception that since they form the majority of the country there is no need to learn the language of the minority. In addition, the government provides tax incentives for those who decide to remain in the area, which makes the decision to stay a more attractive one. Another factor that has influenced people’s decision to stay is the belief that the economy is slowing down and profits have been decreasing due to the stagnant global economy in 2017 in general rather than the conflict. Therefore, moving anywhere, regardless of whether it is within Thailand or to Malaysia, would not necessarily mean an increase in income or economic opportunities.

The impact of the violence on businesses in Mueang Pattani and Mueang Yala varies. For example, small businesses selling household goods or basic necessities such as groceries, as well as food stalls, have not experienced much of a decrease in profits over the years. One local grocery store in Mueang Yala that has been affected by two violent incidents including a bomb and an arson attack decided to stay because profits have not dropped despite being directly impacted by the violence. On the contrary, the shop owner cited greater risks of moving away which include setting up a new business, insufficient knowledge of the market and developing a new client base (interview with a local Sino-Thai business owner in Mueang Yala, 25 February 2017).

Owners of coffee shops, which are an integral part of the local culture and a meeting place for those in the community, also noted that profits remain unchanged while insurance companies have seen an increase in profits. Small business owners who have seen their profits change have found ways to adapt. In some cases, business owners have sought ways to diversify in order maintain their profits. In different cases, other family members need to find alternative means of employment to ensure a steady income for the family (interview with a Thai Buddhist shop owner in Mueang Yala, 23 February 2017).

Like industries in rural areas, businesses in urban areas face logistical challenges when transporting goods within a conflict area. Such problems include stocking up on goods, which means persuading suppliers based outside Thailand’s southern border provinces to deliver to the area. By the same token, suppliers are most likely to make deliveries during the day rather than at night for safety reasons; therefore, it is not that goods cannot be delivered, it is more of a case that many suppliers are reluctant to make frequent trips to the south, forcing business owners in the south to plan their orders well in advance. However, some food and fruit vendors in the local market where goods and ingredients are bought by the business owner themselves reported that they travel with Muslim friends to buy goods from Songkla (interview, 15 November 2015). Because of the various limitations on travel within and out of Thailand’s southern border provinces, many small businesses selling goods such as textiles and small-sized products are increasingly selling their goods online. Although this works best for more tangible goods, service-orientated businesses such as coffee shops are also using social media to reach out to clients, not only to publicise their business but also to make clients aware of other activities and promotions.

Due to an increase in in-migration to urban areas, there has been an expansion of construction and property development, particularly in Mueang Pattani which remains the centre of development and education. This also coincides with wider government plans to develop the ‘Southern Economic Triangle’ covering Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat by the year 2020. Investment from both the government and the private sector combined is expected to be worth more than 30 billion baht (US 9696\96 96 million). This includes some 300 million baht (US 9.69.6\9.6 9.6 million) that has already been invested in 17 of 63 projects in 2017; meanwhile, the remainder should eventually be invested over the next two years. Projects include developing airports in Yala and Narathiwat, as well as plans to transform the Pattani Port into a more commercially viable one (Somluck, 2017). As a result, land prices are expected to rise by 2019 in Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat by 14.95, 24.46 and 1.84 per

cent respectively, compared to 2016 (Treasury Department of Thailand, 2017). One construction contractor in Pattani observes (interview, 5 November 2016) that many construction companies are able to profit from construction despite increased competition in the sector. However, it must be noted that construction projects are for the most part small and medium-sized projects (focus group discussion with local architects, 5 November 2016). If development continues and government plans materialise, while levels of violence remain the same the reasons for in-migration to provincial capitals are most likely to increase due to discrepancies in income between rural and urban areas.

Location-specific advantages: Navigating through the patterns of violence

The intensity of the conflict in Thailand’s southern border provinces has fluctuated over the years. Based on statistical data collected by the Deep South Watch (2017), the number of violent incidents between 2004 and 2007 averaged 1925 incidents per year. However, after 2007 the number of violent incidents dropped by more than 55 per cent. Many attribute this decrease in violence to increased militarisation in the area from the end of 2007 when General Anupong Paochinda became commander of the Royal Thai Army. As a result, 60,000 military personnel were stationed in the border provinces (Srisompob, 2012). By 2012, the overall number of security personnel posted in the area including professionals, paramilitary personnel and civilians reached as high as 163,422 . Around 40,622 personnel were professional and well-trained forces, including both military and police. At the same time, close to 85,000 were armed civilians trained by the military, which amounted to 8.2 per cent of the total population of two million (Srisompob, 2012: 44). However, the reduction in violence was only temporary and the number of recorded incidents began to rise from 2009 to 2013. Subsequently, there has been a steady reduction in the number of violent incidents.

It is important to note that while the frequency of violent incidents has varied after 2008, the percentage of casualties per violent incident has increased. This was due to the attacks becoming more sophisticated and effective in targeting victims than those that occurred during 2004-2007. During the period 2004-2017, 61 per cent of the casualties were soft targets, 37 per cent were hard targets, while the remainder were unknown (Deep South Watch, 2017). As such, despite the declining frequency of the attacks, a substantial majority of those killed because of the violence in Thailand’s border provinces have been civilians. The perpetrators of the violence not only include Thai security personnel and insurgents but also consist of various third parties including transnational criminal groups that capitalise on the lack of rule of law in the area.

During the initial period of the conflict, the majority of the targets were state officials or those perceived as working for the Thai state, such as officials working for Tambon (subdistrict) Administrative Organisations (TAO) and Provincial Administrative Organisations (PAO) (interview with Samatcha Nilaphatama, Deep South Watch Database, 6 September 2018). Though military personnel and police are also targets of the violence, their fatality rates are lower than other groups associated with the Thai government due to the armed protection they carry. The insurgents have also deliberately provoked violent reactions from the security forces not only to generate sympathy and support amongst the local population but also to legitimise their armed rebellion (Engvall and Andersson, 2014: 181).

Teachers responsible for teaching local children regardless of ethnicity have been perceived as undermining Malay identity and culture due to an emphasis on Thai history and the Thai language and, in consequence, have also been targeted by the violence. In general, there is a profound fear

among the Malay Muslim of losing their identity and being assimilated into Thai culture. Since the increase in the number of teacher fatalities, military personnel have been assigned to protect teachers and schools. However, as a result of these security measures, students have been caught up in insurgent attacks targeting security personnel (Human Rights Watch, 2012).

As one academic from the Deep South Watch Database has explained, the reduction in the frequency of violence since 2013 (see Figure 1) can be attributed to dialogue initiated with the insurgents since the Yingluck Shinawatra administration, though many hardliners continue to reject the dialogue as illustrated in the continuation of violence. Furthermore, there has been a decline in deliberate attacks on civilian targets (interview with Samatcha Nilaphatama, 6 September 2018), though the casuality rates among soft targets remain higher than those for hard targets. This is not to suggest that the insurgents no longer target civilians. In 2016, several civilian targets were attacked including the 13 March raid on a hospital in Cho Airong district, Narathiwat where 50 militants seized the hospital and detained staff for more than an hour. Another example is the series of bombings and arson attacks that occurred in August within and outside the confines of the southern border provinces that included many popular tourist destinations. While the targeting of civilians and the frequency of violence has decreased, violence is a means for the insurgents to communicate with the government. Political messages vary according to the incident (interview with Samatcha Nilaphatama, 6 September 2018). For example, reports suggest that the attacks on the hospital in Cho Airong were carried out to show opposition to the dialogue process and the unilateral designation of Cho Airong as a safety zone, whilst the August 2016 bombings reflected discontent towards the approval of the draft Constitution which placed special emphasis on protecting Buddhism (International Crisis Group, 2016). Because the conflict conforms to loose patterns of violence, with most of the incidents occurring in rural areas, the locals in Mueang Yala and Mueang Pattani believe that they are not potential targets of the conflict, which in turn influences their decision to stay. As such, there is a general belief that soft targets directly targeted by shootings but not associated with the Thai government are victims due to their involvement in the conflict. When normal citizens are victims of bombings, there is a perception that they were in the wrong place at the wrong time. As a consequence, many who decide to stay tend to adopt a more fatalistic attitude towards death. When asked why people decide to stay in Mueang Yala and Muaeng Pattani, the general answer received would be that ‘you can die anywhere whether it is in or outside the southern border provinces’. Because death is inevitable, many suggest that it is best to die at home rather than away from it, suggesting a strong emotional attachment to one’s homeland (interview, 28 February 2017).

This is not to suggest that the locals are ambivalent towards the situation. Based on interviews, locals have cited ways to adapt and survive under the circumstances. As the conflict conforms to loose patterns of violence, locals tend to avoid any association with these targets. Some have cited a fear of being seen in public talking to security personnel or even greeting military or police. Some who have acquaintances or friends who are security personnel even come to an understanding not to talk to one another in public (interview with a local ethnic Sino-Thai teacher, 24 November 2016). A local Malay Muslim (interview, 26 February 2016) who owns a coffee shop in Mueang Yala also noted that the presence of security officers in his shop makes his customers uncomfortable; thus, he is reluctant to serve such customers. One Thai Buddhist teacher even noted that she avoids driving too closely to any military vehicle on the road for fear of being a target of an ambush (interview, 24 November 2016). There is a general fear that anyone associated with the security apparatus of the state will sooner or later be targeted by the insurgents.

Furthermore, being associated with security personnel might also ignite mistrust within the community.

While the majority depend on their knowledge of the conflict, some have noted that instinct as well as noticing certain ‘signals’ before an attack also play a role in helping them navigate their lives within the conflict area. Some have suggested that electricity blackouts are indicators of an imminent attack. Quite a few have mentioned an informal warning system via Line messaging or word of mouth (interviews, 24 February 2017 and 3 March 2018); however, the reliability of these warnings is questionable. An insurance company representative based in Yala suggested that most tend to avoid leaving the house during the hours that incidents are most likely to occur, namely before 6 am and after 6 pm (interview, 20 February 2017). Many have noted that the streets are unusually quiet before an incident, which seems like the most common indicator of a possible attack. As mentioned earlier, while the conflict between the Thai government and the Malay Muslim insurgents is a long-standing one, it has had little effect on inter-ethnic communal relations. In consequence, while individual instincts and knowledge of the conflict equip the locals with an understanding of how to survive, a degree of community support does exist to help one another out in times of need.

Conclusion

The general notion that violence in Thailand’s southern border provinces is a precipitating factor for migration is too simplistic. This article argues that while statistical evidence and existing studies seem to suggest that people decide to move when violence is high, such conclusions generally ignore that mobility largely occurs within Thailand’s southern border provinces rather than away from it. In fact, Mueang Yala and Mueang Pattani illustrate this phenomenon well as migration inflows from rural areas are increasing while the frequency of violence in these areas remains high. Upon closer examination, while a lack of security measures and higher levels of violence in rural areas have induced people to migrate to more urban areas, there are a variety of factors that cause people to stay in the place they were born, including emotional attachment to homeland, cultural and religious considerations and, most importantly, the accumulation of ‘insider advantages’ of the situation which enables most to adapt and seek employment under the present circumstances.

As shown in the preceding sections of this article, insecurity has affected industrial and agricultural operations in rural areas in many ways. Due to the lack of security structures in place, locals working on rubber and rice plantations are frequently targeted. Logistics and transportation costs are high because drivers are unwilling to travel at night and factory owners are reluctant to further expand and develop their businesses due to the uncertainty of the situation. When industry and agriculture suffer limitations, employment opportunities decline which in turn precipitates outmigration from rural to urban areas.

In contrast, the violence has not significantly impacted businesses in Mueang Yala and Mueang Pattani. The continued existence of employment opportunities in the provincial capitals not only enables people from rural areas to seek employment within the southern provinces but also allows businesses based in urban areas to find ways of diversifying in order to retain a certain level of income. As a consequence, they can remain in their homeland. Most importantly, the possession of insider advantages and an understanding of the patterns of violence enable locals to make a living and navigate their lives within the conflict area.

Location-specific insider advantages may also have useful implications for understanding immobility in other conflict areas where the frequency of violence is not very high. Specifically,

such explanations may have useful implications for other low intensity conflicts similar to that of Thailand’s southern border provinces. It should be reiterated that insider advantages in any situation are unique and non-transferable to other geographical areas regardless of whether there is conflict or not. The most important insider advantage to possess is an understanding of the patterns of violence, as this enables locals to avoid being targets of the conflict and to identify prospects to make a living. However, once a conflict becomes an outright war, security becomes untenable and seeking employment is impossible. In such situations, locals will invariably be forced to migrate away from their homelands.

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions.

Declaration of conflicting interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: Data collection for this article was generously provided by Thammasat University 05/ 2559 .

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