Risk Assessment of Malicious Attacks Against Power Systems (original) (raw)
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A game-theoretic approach for power systems defense against dynamic cyber-attacks
International Journal of Electrical Power & Energy Systems, 2020
Technological advancements in today's electrical grids give rise to new vulnerabilities and increase the potential attack surface for cyber-attacks that can severely affect the resilience of the grid. Cyber-attacks are increasing both in number as well as sophistication and these attacks can be strategically organized in chronological order (dynamic attacks), where they can be instantiated at different time instants. The chronological order of attacks enables us to uncover those attack combinations that can cause severe system damage but remained unexplored due to the non-existent dynamic attack models. Motivated by the idea, we consider a game-theoretic approach to design a new attacker-defender model for power systems. Here, the attacker can strategically identify the chronological order in which the critical substations and their protection assemblies can be attacked in order to maximize the overall system damage. However, the defender can intelligently identify the critical substations to protect such that the system damage can be minimized. We apply the developed algorithms for these models to the IEEE-39 and 57 bus systems based on the attacker/defender budgets. Our results show the effectiveness of these models in improving the system resilience under dynamic attacks.
Approaches to the Security Analysis of Power Systems: Defence Strategies Against Malicious Threats
2007
This report is intended to provide a conceptual framework for assessing the security risk to power systems assets and operations related to malicious attacks. The problem is analysed with reference to all the actors involved and the possible targets. The specific nature of the malicious attacks is discussed and representations in terms of strategic interaction are proposed. Models based on Game Theory and Multi Agent Systems techniques specifically developed for the representation of malicious attacks against power systems are presented and illustrated with reference to applications to small-scale test systems. The mission of the JRC is to provide customer-driven scientific and technical support for the conception, development, implementation and monitoring of EU policies. As a service of the European Commission, the JRC functions as a reference centre of science and technology for the Union. Close to the policy-making process, it serves the common interest of the Member States, whi...
Vulnerability analysis of power systems based on cyber-attack and defense models
2018 IEEE Power & Energy Society Innovative Smart Grid Technologies Conference (ISGT), 2018
Reliable operation of power systems is a primary challenge for the system operators. With the advancement in technology and grid automation, power systems are becoming more vulnerable to cyber-attacks. The main goal of adversaries is to take advantage of these vulnerabilities and destabilize the system. This paper describes a game-theoretic approach to attacker / defender modeling in power systems. In our models, the attacker can strategically identify the subset of substations that maximize damage when compromised. However, the defender can identify the critical subset of substations to protect in order to minimize the damage when an attacker launches a cyber-attack. The algorithms for these models are applied to the standard IEEE-14, 39, and 57 bus examples to identify the critical set of substations given an attacker and a defender budget.
Vulnerability of interconnected power systems to malicious attacks under limited information
European Transactions on Electrical Power, 2008
Malicious attacks against critical infrastructures, and power systems as well, became a key-concern in recent years. The attacks may be both ''physical,'' directed towards system components, and ''cyber,'' against the information/communication system; simultaneous attacks to different components, both physical and cyber, may be possible. In this context, the assessment of the vulnerability of a given interconnected power system, in terms of the possibility to keep it feasible after a defined attack, w.r.t a limited number of information available (both due to attacks or a regulatory rule) is of the utmost importance. In this paper, we propose a game model, based on the socially rational multi-agent system (MAS) and fictitious play, which can be used to assess the sensitivity of the system structure and operational state to various availabilities of network information. From the model both a ranking of the critical information and a strategy of network reinforcement to decrease system vulnerability can be derived. The proposed model and methods are applied to a 34-buses test system for illustrative purposes.
The paper provides a conceptual framework for assessing the security risk to power systems assets and operations related to malicious attacks. The problem is analysed with reference to all the actors involved and the possible targets. The specific nature of the malicious attacks is discussed and representations in terms of strategic interaction are proposed. Models based on Game Theory and Multi Agent Systems techniques specifically developed for the representation of malicious attacks against power systems are presented and illustrated with reference to applications to small-scale test systems.
Cascading Failure Attacks in the Power System: A Stochastic Game Perspective
IEEE Internet of Things Journal
Electric power systems are critical infrastructure and are vulnerable to contingencies including natural disasters, system errors, malicious attacks, etc. These contingencies can affect the world's economy and cause great inconvenience to our daily lives. Therefore, security of power systems has received enormous attention for decades. Recently, the development of the Internet of Things (IoT) enables power systems to support various network functions throughout the generation, transmission, distribution, and consumption of energy with IoT devices (such as sensors, smart meters, etc.). On the other hand, it also incurs many more security threats. Cascading failures, one of the most serious problems in power systems, can result in catastrophic impacts such as massive blackouts. More importantly, it can be taken advantage by malicious attackers to launch physical or cyber attacks on the power system. In this paper, we propose and investigate cascading failure attacks (CFAs) from a stochastic game perspective. In particular, we formulate a zerosum stochastic attack/defense game for CFAs while considering the attack/defense costs, budget constraints, diverse load shedding costs, and dynamic states in the system. Then, we develop a Q-CFA learning algorithm that works efficiently in power systems without any a priori information. We also formally prove that the convergence of the proposed algorithm achieves a Nash equilibrium. Simulation results validate the efficacy and efficiency of the proposed scheme by comparisons with other state-of-the-art approaches. Index Terms-Cascading failure attacks (CFAs), Nash equilibrium, Q-CFA learning algorithm, stochastic games. I. INTRODUCTION E LECTRIC power systems are critical infrastructure and the failure of these systems can lead to severe economic, social, and security consequences. Thus, the security Manuscript
Defending Mechanisms for Protecting Power Systems against Intelligent Attacks
The power system forms the backbone of a modern society, and its security is of paramount importance to nation's economy. However, the power system is vulnerable to intelligent attacks by attackers who have enough knowledge of how the power system is operated, monitored and controlled. This paper proposes a game theoretic approach to explore and evaluate strategies for the defender to protect the power systems against such intelligent attacks. First, a risk assessment is presented to quantify the physical impacts inflicted by attacks. Based upon the results of the risk assessment, this paper represents the interactions between the attacker and the defender by extending the current zero-sum game model to more generalized game models for diverse assumptions concerning the attacker's motivation. The attacker and defender's equilibrium strategies are attained by solving these game models. In addition, a numerical illustration is demonstrated to warrant the theoretical outcomes.
In the analysis of power systems security recently a new concern related to possible malicious attacks caught much attention. Coordination among different system operators (SO) in an interconnected power system to counteract such attacks has become an important problem. This paper presents a specific model for the analysis of information impacts in handling on-line security after a malicious attack. The model is based on the socially rational multi-agent systems and the equilibrium of a fictitious play is considered to analyze the impacts of various levels of information available to the interconnected system operators on the outcomes of the decision making process under attack. A 34-buses test system, with three systems interconnected by tie-lines, is presented to illustrated the model and compare the impacts of different information scenarios.
Stochastic Games for Power Grid Protection Against Coordinated Cyber-Physical Attacks
Owing to the critical nature of the power grid, coordinated cyber-physical attacks on its critical infrastructure can lead to disastrous human and economic losses. In this paper, a stochastic game-theoretic approach is proposed to analyze the optimal strategies that a power grid defender can adopt to protect the grid against coordinated attacks. First, an optimal load shedding technology is devised to quantify the physical impacts of coordinated attacks. Taking these quantified impacts as input parameters, the interactions between a malicious attacker and the defender are modeled using a resource allocation stochastic game. The game is shown to admit a Nash equilibrium and a novel learning algorithm is introduced to enable the two players to reach such equilibrium strategies while maximizing their respective minimum rewards in a sequence of stages. The convergence of the proposed algorithm to a Nash equilibrium point is proved and its properties are studied. Simulation results of the stochastic game model on the WSCC 9-bus system and the IEEE 118-bus system are contrasted with those of static games, and show that different defense resources owned lead to different defense strategies.