Cultivating Success and Failure in Policy: participation irrigation management in Nepal (original) (raw)
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Participatory irrigation management
2011
In most developing countries, irrigation development project and their operation and management are heavily dominated by the public sector. Conventional wisdom once assumed that only the state was capable of handling large modern projects requiring heavy capital investment, complicated technical inputs, and the legal mandate to distribute water, and collect fees. Recent experience in many countries has over tuned these assumptions. Government-operated irrigation systems are often poorly maintained with steadily deteriorating infrastructure. Yet some of these same systems have shown dramatic improvement when their management was transferred farmer groups who entered into contracts with the government for operating and maintaining portions of the irrigation system. For the past two decades most countries have adopted policies to encourage greater involvement of farmers on irrigation O&M but only recently has this trend gained momentum to transfer the balance of responsibility from gov...
2000
Propositions 1. Any intervention that does not recognise the centrality of the social actors in development programs is bound to clash, rather than to fit, with the natural dynamic of socioeconomic processes. (Michael M. Cernea, 1991) 2. Experience shows that the self-reliance and motivation of indigenous management groups can easily be undermined by too much external assistance, and that is a real danger in the present situation of growing international interest in small scale systems. (H.W. Underhill, 1984) 3. Intervention processes consist of a complex set of interlocking arenas of struggle, each characterised by specific constraints and possibilities of manoeuvre. (Norman Long, 1997) 4. Where external assistance occurs without corresponding local investment (such as in labour, materials and knowledge), dependency is reinforced and the benefits of the external investment are not sustained. (Douglas J. Merrey, 1997) 5. It is now generally acknowledged that the 15 billion dollars that used to be poured into the irrigation sub-sector in less-developed countries annually have not produced more than 50 percent of tire anticipated output. (G. Diemer and F.S. Huibers, 1996) 6. The degree of people's interest in, commitment to and willingness to invest in irrigation will depend on how it is perceived to enhance or diminish their lives. (I. Guijt and J. Thompson, 1994) 7. Before intervention farmers were able and willing to maintain their irrigation system without outside support. However, after interventions there is growing dependency on external resources for the maintenance of irrigation system. (This thesis) 8. The changes effected by the irrigation intervention in the governance structure contributed to the increasing anarchy in rules-in-use. (This thesis) 9. The changes in physical infrastructure due to the introduction of new technology after intervention effected changes in the organisational control related to irrigation tasks. (This thesis) 10. Not only the irrigation interventions, but also broader changes in political, social, economic and administrative set up have effected changes in the existing irrigation institutions. (This thesis) 11. The institutions created by the interventions are not functioning after the intervention due to lack of a clear perception of their role by the government and the users. (This thesis) 12. The simple technical design facilitated a strong communal linking loop in the interfaces among the users and they had a greater role in the decision for the design of the technology. (This thesis) 13. The intervention for the construction of a new irrigation system has wider implications in terms of introduction of new technologies, financial resources and institutional requirement as compared to rehabilitation and improvement. (This thesis) 14. The interface between the actors facilitated the strengthening of the 'communal linking loops' for the initiation of the intervention, which was not always very transparent due to the different and hidden agendas of all the actors involved. (This thesis) Contents Table of Contents vii List of Tables xi Maps and Figures xi Glossary xii List of Acronyms xiii Preface and Acknowledgements xv 2.2.5 Intervention and knowledge 11 2.2.6 Intervention and agency 2.2.7 Intervention and project environment 12 2.3 Institutions 13 2.4 Institutions, organisations and the process of irrigation 2.4.1 Governance and property rights 15 2.4.2 Management of irrigation tasks 2.4.3 Water control 21 2.4.4 A framework to study irrigation processes and interventions in the hills of Nepal 2.5 Research questions 2.6 Methodology 2.6.1 Introduction 2.6.2 Unit of observation 2.6.3 Unit of analysis 2.6.4 Methods and techniques of information generation 2.7 Method of analysis 2.8 Selection of study area and sites 2.9 Execution of the research Notes 30 3. An overview of the country and its development policies 3.1 The country and the study area 3.1.1 Location 31 3.1.2 Population, ethnicity and religion 32 viii INTERVENTION PROCESSES AND IRRIGATION INSTITUTIONS 3.1.3 The economy 33 3.1.4 The landownership, land tenure and water rights 3.2 The hill farming system 35 3.3 The hill irrigation systems 36 3.3.1 Classification of hill irrigation systems 36 3.4 The districts of research sites 3.4.1 Area, population and ethnicity 3.4.2 Labour use pattern 38 3.4.3 Land ownership and land tenure 38 3.4.4 Food grain production 38 3.5 The institutional landscape 39 3.5.1 The poUtico-administrative structure 39 3.5.2 Agencies and programmes directly involved in irrigation support 3.5.3 Internationally funded research programmes 3.6 The planned development policies and programme approaches 45 3.6.1 Development plans (1956-1975) 45 3.6.2 The Fifth-Five year plan (1975-80) 3.6.3 The Sixth-Five year plan (1980-85) 3.6.4 The Seventh-Five year plan (1985-90) 3.6.5 The Eighth-Five year plan (1992-1997) 51 3.6.6 The ninth five year plan and the Agricultural Perspective Plan (APP) 3.7 Summary Notes 4. Chaurasi Kulo and Annapurna Kulo Parti General description of the village 4.1 Introduction 4.2 The environment of the system and context of the interventions 4.2.1 The general environment Part II Chaurasi Kulo 4.3 Environment of the irrigation system 4.3.1 The Irrigation system 4.3.2 The irrigated land and its distribution by ethnicity 4.4 The process of interventions and change 4.4.1 Irrigation under the Ditthawal up to 1960 68 4.4.2 Irrigation under the Village Panchayat from 1964 up to 1990 4.4.3 The irrigation under the (VDC) since 1992 4.5 The intervention in irrigation system 4.5.1 The intervention of 1962 4.5.2 Ongoing intervention in 1998-1999 4.6 Management of irrigation tasks 4.6.1 Water acquisition, system development and system water allocation 4.6.2 User allocation, system operation and water distribution 77 4.6.3 Conflict management Contents ix 4.6.4 Resource mobilisation 83 4.6.5 System maintenance 86 4.7 Governance and property rights 87 4.8. Water control 4.9 Analysis and conclusions 89 Timesheet 94 Part III Annapurna Kulo 4.10 Environment of the irrigation system and context of intervention 4.10.1 The irrigation system in 1997 4.10.2 The irrigated land and its distribution by ethnicity 4.11 The intervention in irrigation system 4.11.1 First efforts of the farmers 4.11.2 Intervention under Hill Irrigation Project 4.11.3 The issues of management transfer to the farmers after intervention Ill 4.12 The Water User's Society (WUS) of Annapurna Kulo 4.13 Management of irrigation tasks 4.13.1 Water acquisition, system development and system water allocation 4.13.2 User allocation, system operation and water distribution 4.13.3 Conflict management 4.13.4 Resource mobilisation 4.13.5 System maintenance 4.14 Governance and property rights 4-15 Water control 4.16 Analysis and conclusions: Timesheet 135 Notes 138 5. Ghachowk irrigation system 7.2.2 Water control 244 7.3 Conclusions 246 References 253 Summary/Samenvatting 263 Appendix 269 Curriculum vitae 286 65 4.2 Layout of Chaurasi and Annwpuma Kulo irrigation systems 66 4.3 Layout of Annapurm Kulo irrigation system 102 4.4 Organogram of Annwpuma Kulo Water Users' Society 117 5.1 Layout of Ghachowk irrigation system 151 6.1 Layout of Tarkughat irrigation systems 205 Appendix I Constitution of Hemja Irrigation System Water Users' Society 269 Glossary of local terms used
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The World Bank Institute (incorporating the former Economic Development Institute (EDI)/Learning and Leadership Center) was established by the World Bank in 1955 to train officials concerned with development planning, policymaking, investment analysis, and project implementation inmemberdeveloping countries. Atpresentthe substance ofthe WBI 's workemphasizes macroeconomic and sectoral economic policy analysis. Through a variety of courses, seminars, and workshops, most of which are given overseas in cooperation with local institutions, the WBI seeks to sharpen analytical skills used in policy analysis and to broaden understanding of the experience of individual countries with economic development. Although the WBI's publications are designed to support its training activities, many are of interest to a much broader audience. This report has been prepared by the staff of the World Bank. The judgments expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of the Board of Executive Directors or of the governments they represent. The material in this publication is copyrighted. The World Bank encourages dissemination of its work and will normally grant permission promptly.
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