Conceptualising a protection of liberal constitutionalism post 9/11: an emphasis upon rights in the social contract philosophy of Thomas Hobbes (original) (raw)
Related papers
Freedom’s Threat: A Conceptual Analysis of the Liberty-Security Problem
In The Trouble with Terror, Tamar Meisels argues that liberal democracies should adopt a Hobbesean standpoint on the relationship of liberty to security where dire emergencies (e.g., violent terrorism) are concerned, and a Lockean one on such normal security problems as violent crime. A key premise in her argument is the claim—which she attributes to both Thomas Hobbes and John Locke—that security is a necessary condition for liberty; and, from thence, she infers that security always has priority over liberty. My paper contests, first, that the classical contractualists do not and cannot take this view; and, second, that, if they did, their positions (and, therefore, Meisels’ own) would be seriously confused.
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Liberty and Counter-Terror Law Since 9/11
The Keele Law Review, 2021
The international community has struggled to adopt a cohesive response to Islamist terrorism since the late 1990s. Member states of the United Nations have, therefore, been accorded significant discretion in how they react to terror threats. The United Kingdom, for example, has embraced a pro-security agenda in the number of legislative responses it has enacted, together with the breadth of criminalisation these statutes employ. The theory of the social contract is particularly applicable to the difficulties modern countries face in drawing the line between liberty and security. Thomas Hobbes and John Locke traditionally theorise opposing ends of this spectrum. But contemporary security discourse has often overlooked the philosophical contribution of another theorist of the same era as Hobbes and Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Where does Rousseau present on the liberty/security divide? Do his writings represent a theoretical model for the UK's pro-security response since 9/11? These are the questions this piece seeks to answer.
Terrorism, Security, and Liberty
2009
Concentrating specifically on terrorism in the United Kingdom, this dissertation seeks not to answer the question of security versus liberty, but to negate it. Using the judicial tests of necessity and proportionality, it assesses the case for the introduction of the recent counter-terrorism legislation, with comparison to existing criminal laws. It then turns to the treatment of terrorist suspects, to examine whether certain rights really are inalienable and universal, or whether exceptional circumstances determine differing prerogative. Finally, there is an examination of the everyday freedoms that terrorism legislation restricts, and an assessment of what extent the counter-terrorism measures themselves could pose a threat to democracy.
Democracy and Security, 2024
John Locke was a social contract theorist. He envisaged that individuals had domiciled in a state of nature, enjoying natural rights. But because of the insecurities of the natural state, individuals transitioned to the stability of civil society, guaranteed by a sovereign. There were fetters on the sovereign, however, such as passing laws for the public good. Is modern legislation to counter terrorism for the public good? Locke also expressly granted a right of resistance on the people. But is this right terrorism? Reflecting on these principles, this study examines counter-terror statutes and determines whether Locke would support them.
Liberty "versus" security? A human rights perspective in times of terrorism
Anuario Español de Derecho Internacional
sumario: 1. introduction. 2. a GeneraL HuMan riGHts PersPective on LiBerty VeRsus security. 3. LiBerty VeRsus security?-tHe FraMeWorK oF tHe euroPean convention on HuMan riGHts. 4. LiBerty versus security?-tHe euroPean court oF HuMan riGHts and tHe Move toWards tHe doMestic sPHere. 5. concLudinG evaLuation.
Counter-Terrorism, Human Rights and the Rule of Law: Crossing Legal Boundaries in Defence of the State (Aniceto Masferrer & Clive Walker, eds.), Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013
This study is divided into three parts. The first part presents a brief description of the false dichotomy that has arisen between the need for security and the protection of human rights within the context of the fight against terrorism. The second part contains a short account of the origins of modern constitutionalism in the Western tradition, placing particular emphasis on the evolution of both the exercise of State power and the limits placed upon it by the human rights of the individual, with special attention being given to constitutional rights. The third part examines the fragility of human rights in the origins of the modern constitutionalism, trying to describe some of the relevant reasons which led to the progressive weakness of fundamental rights in Western constitutionalism. The chapter ends with some concluding considerations.
CALL FOR PAPERS SECURITY AND FREEDOM: " NEW " DEMOCRATIC PARADOXES IN THE WAR ON TERROR
The PhD Program " Pluralismi giuridici: prospettive antiche e attuali " of the University of Palermo organizes the workshop "Security and freedom: new democratic paradoxes in the war on terror" which will be held on 26 th and 27 th September 2016, at the Faculty of Law of Palermo. The workshop will be focused on the democratic paradoxes generated by the adoption of the defensive tools corresponding to incisive limitations to the rights and fundamental freedoms in the name of what seems to have become nowadays a key value within constitutional systems, i.e. national security. We are witnessing the establishment of a regime of exception, made of exemptions and suspensions to the standards of protection of freedom and human rights that pose problems not easily solvable: is it still possible to talk about a state of exception when the interventions have the form and the force of the legal rule? What are the derogations to the institutional order provided by the different legal systems and which are the legal sources that regulate its use? What kind of mutual control between powers is necessary in order to protect the constitutional legality and individual rights during emergency situations? How is it possible to ensure the appropriateness and the proportionality of the restrictions of fundamental rights and liberties in respect to the extent of the current threats to international and national security? How can we balance security with individual rights and fundamental freedoms?