Syllabus: Israeli Territorial Politics: Between Security & Identity (original) (raw)
Related papers
From national to post-national territorial identities in Israel-Palestine
2004
Territory remains a central component of national identity in the contemporary political discourse between Israelis and Palestinians, both populations opposing power sharing within the same space, for fear of the other's domination. The contemporary political discourse relates to conflict management and the desire for separate spaces within which national identities are strengthened through territorial/national homogeneity. The Zionist national ideology of most Jewish citizens of Israel has strong territorial roots; hence they reject the post-Zionist post-nationalist ideology, regardless of whether they accept the possibility of change in Israel's territorial configuration or of a diminishment in the importance of the territorial dimension of national struggle. The rights of residency and citizenship even of second and third generation Jewish citizens remain linked with the territorial configurations of a State that will continue to be called Israel and have a national anthem expressing the aspirations of a single, exclusive, national group. But within territorial readjustment, issues of configuration may become less relevant and in it is this sense that post-Zionism focuses on a discourse of territorial pragmatism, rather than the disappearance of territory from the nationality-citizenship debate altogether. It is part of a process of re-territorialization and spatial reconfiguration of political and national identities, not a reversal of territorialization, if only because there is no such thing as a post-territorial notion of the organization of political power. The boundaries of national identity become more permeable, more inclusive, but they do not disappear altogether.
Territory as the Kernel of the Nation: Space, Time and Nationalism in Israel/Palestine
Geopolitics, 2002
The article deals with the relations between time and space in the making of modern nations, focusing on conditions of territorial conflicts in general, and on expansionist 'ethnocratic' societies in particular. Under such conditions, it is argued, territory (the 'where' of the nation) becomes a most vital 'kernel' of national mobilisation, while the history of national origins (the 'when') tends to become mythical and homogenous, used chiefly to boost the territorial struggle. A geographical critique of dominant theories of nationalism is presented, focusing on their 'spatial blindness' and analytical fusion of nation and state. These deficiencies are conspicuous in ethnocratic societies, where the 'national project' does not aspire to merge nation and state, but on the contrary, to essentialise and segregate group identities. While the 'when' and the 'where' of the nation are still intimately intertwined, it is the latter that provides the core of nation-building. The claim is substantiated through a detailed account of Zionist and Palestinian nationalisms. In recent decades, the struggle over land has shaped the two national cultures as intensely territorial, with a wide range of symbols, values and practices intimately attached to settlement and land control, pitting Jewish hitnahalut (settlement) verses Palestinian sumud (steadfastness). Territorial issues, however, remain the 'kernel' of Zionist and Palestinian national mobilisation. The Land of Israel was the birthplace of the Jewish people. Here its spiritual, religious and political identity was shaped. Here it first attained statehood, created cultural values of national and universal significance ... After being forcibly exiled from their land, the people kept faith with it throughout their Diaspora and never ceased to pray and hope for their return By virtue of our natural and historic right we hereby declare the establishment of a Jewish state in the Land of Israel
International Journal of Middle East Studies, 2015
Depending on who is speaking, the tipping point beyond which a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict becomes impossible is approaching, imminent, or passed. Raja Khalidi, in the opening to his chapter in One Land Two States, writes "[it] does not take an expert to recognize that a partition of territory and sovereignty on the basis of geo-demographic realities today is most likely not a viable solution." A binational or civic one-state democracy seems remote and undesirable, or else a formula for entrenched apartheid. As a result, those who believe the conflict must be resolved and not just managed are increasingly exploring ideas that acknowledge both the need for separation, but accept that the land is small and the populations increasingly inextricable. One Land Two States is one of the only book-length works to explore a specific separate-buttogether model in theoretical and practical depth. It adds to a slow but steady growth of academic literature considering confederal proposals for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. One Land Two States grew out of the "Parallel States Project," a group of prescient academics who began their discussions in 2008; the chapters in this edited collection were written by participants in that project. The academic interest complements a similar flurry of activity on the ground. Local civil society efforts have yielded confederal projects with similar names, such as Two States, One Homeland and Two States, One Space. Benjamin Netanyahu's recent re-election in March gives the issue new urgency. The fallacy of a status quo has been shattered by a trio of wars in Gaza and Netanyahu's election-eve rejection of the two-state concept, as well as more aggressive Palestinian activity in the international arena. Israel is deepening its grip on "Area C"-60 percent of the West Bank-and coalition partner Naftali Bennett, among others, has called openly for annexation. Strict two-staters have argued that confederal approaches are unrealistic slogans. But radical political changes can indeed start as broad ideas, fleshed out over time by new proponents. This book advances that process, through theoretical discussions of sovereignty, elaborate proposals for security and economy, law, and even the role of religion. It is comprehensive, detailed, and confronts problems at every step; accusations of sloganism or naiveté do not apply. Several chapters are devoted to disaggregating the elements of sovereignty and putting them together again differently. Jens Bartelson summarizes the main criticisms of traditional sovereignty, then ups the ante: if we accept that classic territorial inviolability has been breached over history, if political ownership is increasingly delinked from land, then what? That's when the authors take the leap, in proposing sovereignty based on identity, rights, individuals, and law. The result is a tantalizing proposal for "parallel states" (which could more accurately be called layered states, since "parallel" implies side-by-side but never touching). The two states would be defined by citizenship rather than geography or borders. "Heartland" areas dominated by one of the national groups would be small and limited-all the rest is open season: "Two parallel state structures, both covering the whole territory, with one answering to Palestinians and one to Israelis regardless of where they live" (p. 2). What can this putatively simple formulation mean? Can two different governments on the same land be a fair and functional way of managing life for two integrated but hostile populations? The authors do not underestimate the theoretical challenge, calling it "conceptually demanding." Mossberg, a former diplomat, proposes that sovereign powers can be divided between shared and
Changing nationalism and Israel's “open frontier” on the West Bank
Theory and Society, 1984
Israel generally has not been thought of as exhibiting the dynamic typical to frontier societies. On the general historical plane, Jewish and European frontier ventures did not take place contemporaneously. By the time Jewish immigration to Palestine began, Turner concluded that the zone of “free land” in the continental United States was exhausted and, with the exception of the feeble attempt to settle in Kenya, no new targets were selected by Europeans.58 As far as Israeli history is concerned, after the War of Inde-pendence of 1948 it seemed that frontier expansion had halted. Since the Six Day War, however, and more dramatically since the major settlement drive of 1981, Lamar and Thompson's contention that “probably the nearest contemporary approach to the kind of frontier ... where rival societies compete for control of the land, is to be found in Israel”59 seems to be born out. The emphasis on the continuous formative impact of the frontier situation provides, therefore, a theoretical framework for the study of Israeli society and national identity. The pattern of frontier movement as the basis of nation-building was typical of the Palestinian Jewish community and has not been discarded since. The question now being debated by the major political camps, each one of which is involved in a different phase of settlement in the West Bank, concerns the extent of expansion that is wise to undertake and the appropriate goals of this expansion. Settlement is the “heroic” aspect of Israeli nationalism, and therefore a major route for the acquisition of hegemonic influence, elite position, and prestige. The compelling character of the formative national experience is still very much alive, and therefore it is justified to see Israel as similar to other frontier societies. At the same time the forces and interests favoring the expansion of settle-ment across the 1948 borders have been much weakened. Israeli society has become considerably more urban as the cities absorbed the largest part of the immigrant population. Even rural settlements now mix agriculture with industry. Not surprisingly then, no spontaneous mass movement of colon-izers, similar to the Stockade and Watchtower settlers, have emerged. For some fifteen years, only an unsubstantial migration, motivated by the rela-tively weak momentum of intergenerational change, has taken place. Until the end of 1983 only about 0.9 percent of Israeli Jews had moved to the West Bank. Only in late 1981 has a government policy, by turning construction and settlement into a profit-making capitalist venture, created the potential for making a dent in the solid Palestinian Arab demographic composition of the West Bank. The process of massive settlement is still in its preliminary stages and may be slowed down, arrested, or reversed by a number of external factors. Even if the “One-Hundred-Thousand Plan” will be carried out, that number would involve only about 3 percent of Israel's Jewish population, and leave a ratio of 7:1 Arabs for each settler on the West Bank. But numbers alone are not the sole decisive factor. The emergence of a regional interest, translated into electoral strength through the agency of the Techiya Party (founded by members of Gush Emunim and the Movement for Greater Israel), which, according to Goldberg and Ben-Zadok, is in “active opposition toward the larger society's culture,”60 could make territorial withdrawal or compromise unlikely, if not impossible. I have undertaken this study with the intention of contributing a case study to the evolving field of comparative frontier research. Simultaneously I examined the impact of the second period of frontier expansion on Israeli nationalism. To this I will now turn. There are three potential trends or dangers to which I am able to point: In adopting the “religious” and later the “economic frontier,” Israel has diminished the primacy of its long-range security considerations. Arab opposition to the “military frontier” on the West Bank might be less severe, because of the different balance of forces, than it was in the Sinai. But whatever might be the case in regard to the “military frontier,” there is no doubt that each additional stage of frontier expansion intensifies the frontier conflict, raises the stakes involved, and makes it less likely for either one of the sides to back down from their positions. The increased demographic pressures of the Jewish population might, in certain constellations such as renewed frontier warfare, bring about the forcible, although not necessary planned, expulsion of the Palestinian popu-lation or part of it. As we are not dealing with a pre-political frontier, but one that is modern in its passions and conflicting national identities, the possibili-ty of assimilating the Palestinians into Israeli society, and thus transforming them while being transformed in the process, looks too formidable to contemplate. The existence of two societies that mix no more than oil and water enhances the danger of such removal. The character of Israeli nationalism has been transformed bit by bit from its liberal beginnings to the beginning of an integral nationalism. Zionism, in the estimation of Weissbrod, “has turned full circle.”61 Israel's two periods of frontier settlement - from the 1880s to 1948 and from 1967 on - are different, but contain many similarities. Just as the frontier situation changed so did Israeli nationalism, while remaining tied to its frontier circumstances. In the first era, Jewish-Arab relations were essentially mediated by the central authority of the British Mandate; in the second, both the colonial and the settlers' roles were played out by the same national group, giving Israeli-Palestinian confrontations on the West Bank particularly ominous contours. The pre-state Jewish community operated from a position of weakness and its dominant sectors were predisposed toward compromise with the Palesti-nian national movement. Today, Israeli strength has led to intransigence. Jewish-Arab conflict in Palestine flared up at times of massive influx of Jewish refugees. Currently this is scarcely so. Finally, Jewish pioneers, like other brands of revolutionary nationalists experimented with novel forms of social organization and relations. No more. Turner concluded that popular democracy was the outcome of the frontier situation of the United States. In Israel, I believe, the erosion of the demo-cratic structures is hinted at by her frontier processes. There already exists a dual legal system: Israeli settlers are adjudicated under Israeli law and the Palestinian Arabs live under military law that has for all practical purposes revised the previous Jordanian legal system out of existence.62 In addition there is a stringent enforcement of the law against its Arab violators and often benign neglect of Jewish offenders, especially in matters concerning land ownership.63 But the question concerning the impact of the increased demographic, and ultimately cultural and political, pressures of the growing settler population on the Palestinians, and the latter's potentially more embittered and militant defensive and offensive practices, on the internal democracy of Israel proper, also must be raised. Can the Israeli personality, institutions and forms of domination created in the West Bank, be prevented from filtering through into the mainstream of Israeli society, and subverting the spirit, even if not necessarily the formal expressions, of its democracy? Should democracy give way under the demand for “unquestioning assent to governmental decisions” then the third of Hayes's criteria of integral nationalism would have been implemented.
This article examines the effects of the 1967 war on the national discourse of the Palestinian intellectuals in Israel. It analyses the articulation of the meaning of " homeland " and " citizenship through a comparative analysis of the Palestinian poets and writers' works 3 before and after the 1967 war. The central aim is to illustrate how the national discourse of Palestinians in Israel went through a major transformation after the 1967 war. The paper shows that whereas the first generation following the nakbeh was concerned with articulating the meaning of homeland and national identity in a context of a colonizing state, the generation that followed the 1967 war was more concerned with articulating the meaning of citizenship within such a state. In this regard the relation to Israel became no longer based on it being a colonial entity, which needs to be dismantled, but as an occupier state, one that transgress international laws and needs to be challenged. The national task of the Palestinians in Israel thus transformed from one that refutes the state to one that seeks to negotiate with it. This transformation, though, has not been without its contradictions; the Palestinians inside Israel needed to deal with a state that gave them citizenship but defined itself as the state of the Jewish people. It thereby excluded them from it. At the same time, the 1967 war and its aftermath revealed the resilience of the State Israel and the inevitability of working within it. This became all the more salient as soon as the Palestinians national struggle, as led by the PLO, shifted its call for the creation of a secular democratic state to the creation of a Palestinian state within the West Bank and Gaza. The Palestinians inside Israel were thereby trapped between a state that gave them limited citizenship but negated their national identity and a Palestinian national movement that de facto excluded them. It was only towards the ends of the eighties and 1 Published at The Electronic Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, MIT, spring 2008 2 Post doctoral fellow at the Centre for Middle Eastern Studies, Harvard University. 3 I use the term Intellectual here in its wide meaning as define by Bryan (2001:1). The term referes to all those whose main occupation involves " producing or distributing culture ". In this article, the term includes poets, journalists, novelists and other persons of pen.
Originally, the “Israeli experience” was born from the womb of the Holy Land, even when the “children of Israel” lived in diaspora; the “Land” is everything for all Israelis, as it represents the homeland, religion and history, the Promise of the Lord, the people’s dream, Jerusalem, the Wailing Wall, and other holy sites. Therefore, to the Jews, there is nothing comparable to the “Holy Land or Eretz Ysrael”. Similarly, as history supports, several peoples have populated the land of Palestine, not just Arabs and Jews. Moreover, they used to live together, intermix, intermarry, and merge, and so on. Geo-politically the land of “Palestine/Eretz Israel” was known as “Greater Syria” before being divided by the then “Great Powers” into four countries, two small cantons, and five nationalities. On today’s world map, these are known as Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Israel, and the Palestinian territories. However, this study aims to argue the development of this land from a historical and geopolitical point of view up until 1947; the names and borders, the holiness of the land to the Palestinians and Israelis, the land without a state that was waiting for the Lord’s promise for the people without a homeland. Moreover, this study concludes that on the modern map, one would have great difficulty finding a country labeled “Palestine.” It is not until 1922 that the name Palestine emerged with any “official” status, so what is all this talk about Palestine? Furthermore, whereas the Israelis could easily prove their historical and religious right to the holy or sacred land, it would be very hard for the Palestinians to do so. Finally, there are reasonable doubts about certain facts, and, so far, nobody has been able to provide a logical answer to such questions as, who is fighting who exactly? These facts are discussed from a historical and geopolitical perspective in the “Israeli Experience”.