A Bioeconomic Analysis of the Duration of Conservation Contracts (original) (raw)
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Optimal contract length for biodiversity conservation under conservation budget constraint
Forest Policy and Economics, 2013
We examine the optimal length of a contract period in a conservation program with payments for ecosystem services aiming at protecting biodiversity on privately owned forests. The government chooses the number of stands and the length of contracts so as to maximize biodiversity benefits under a binding conservation budget. We examine the implication of two alternative budgets: a separate budget for each period (periodic budget) or one budget that to be used in all periods (intertemporal budget). The impact of the budget type shows up in the fact that with intertemporal budget choice set is larger and more high quality stands are available for contracting. Based on theoretical characterization we conduct a numerical landscape-level analysis. We find that both short and long conservation contracts are used to protect privately owned forest land. Transactions costs tend to reduce the number of short contracts. A budget increase results in a use of longer contracts.
Ecological Economics, 2013
Spatially heterogeneous costs of securing conservation agreements should be accounted for when prioritizing properties for conservation investment. Most researchers incorporating conservation costs into analyses have relied on estimates of landowners' opportunity costs of accepting a conservation agreement. Implicitly assumed in such studies is therefore that those who "produce" biodiversity (landowners) receive none of the surplus available from trade. Instead, landowners could use their bargaining power to gain profits from conservation investments. We employ game theory to determine the surplus landowners could obtain in negotiations over conservation agreements, and the consequent effects on conservation outcomes, when enrolment decisions are governed by continuous variables (e.g. the proportion of a property to enrol). In addition, we consider how landowner uncertainty regarding the opportunity costs of other landowners affects these outcomes. Landowners' ability to gain surplus is highly variable and reflects variation in the substitutability of different properties for achieving a specified conservation objective. The ability of landowners to obtain profits from conservation agreements results in conservation outcomes that are substantially diminished relative to when landowners accept investment at opportunity costs. Uncertainty increases landowner profits, leading to a greater diminution in conservation benefits.
Exploring the permanence of conservation covenants
Conservation on private land is a growing part of international efforts to stem the decline of biodiversity. In many countries, private land conservation policy often supports in perpetuity covenants and easements, which are legally binding agreements used to protect biodiversity on private land by restricting activities that may negatively impact ecological values. With a view to understand the long-term security of these mechanisms, we examined release and breach data from all 13 major covenanting programs across Australia. We report that out of 6,818 multi-party covenants, only 8 had been released, contrasting with approximately 130 of 673 single-party covenants. Breach data was limited, with a minimum of 71 known cases where covenant obligations had not been met. With a focus on private land conservation policy, we use the results from this case study to argue that multi-party covenants appear an enduring conservation mechanism, highlight the important role that effective monitoring and reporting of the permanency of these agreements plays in contributing to their long-term effectiveness, and provide recommendations for organizations seeking to improve their monitoring programs. The collection of breach and release data is important for the continuing improvement of conservation policies and practices for private land.
Conservation Agreements: Relational Contracts with Endogenous Monitoring
Journal of Law Economics & Organization, 2020
Author(s): Gjertsen, Heidi; Groves, Theodore; Miller, David A; Niesten, Eduard; Squires, Dale; Watson, Joel | Abstract: Abstract This article examines the structure and performance of conservation agreements, which are relational contracts used across the world to protect natural resources. Key elements of these agreements are (1) they are ongoing arrangements between a local community and an outside party, typically a nongovernmental organization (NGO); (2) they feature payments in exchange for conservation services; (3) the prospects for success depend on the NGO engaging in costly monitoring to detect whether the community is foregoing short-term gains to protect the resource; (4) lacking a strong external enforcement system, they rely on self-enforcement; and (5) the parties have the opportunity to renegotiate at any time. A repeated-game model is developed and utilized to organize an evaluation of real conservation agreements, using three case studies as representative examples...
An Equilibrium Model of Habitat Conservation Under Uncertainty and Irreversibility
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000
In this paper stochastic dynamic programming is used to investigate habitat conservation by a multitude of landholders under uncertainty about the value of environmental services and irreversible development. We study land conversion under competition on the market for agricultural products when voluntary and mandatory measures are combined by the Government to induce adequate participation in a conservation plan. We analytically determine the impact of uncertainty and optimal policy conversion dynamics and discuss different policy scenarios on the basis of the relative long-run expected rate of deforestation. Finally, some numerical simulations are provided to illustrate our findings.
Monitoring of compliance in Australian conservation contracts
2008
Government and non-government conservation agencies have long-term goals and objectives to provide environmental services, such as conserving the biodiversity of Australian native vegetation. In addition to national parks and reserves, private lands are often included in conservation programs to achieve these objectives. Formal contracts are entered into between the private landholder and the conservation agency to provide environmental services, or more commonly to provide inputs that are likely to lead to environmental services. The paper examines the costs and benefits of monitoring these conservation contracts when biodiversity change is stochastic.
Ecological Economics, 2015
A key prerequisite for Payment for Ecosystem services to be effective is that the management measures which landowners are paid to undertake are in fact additional to status quo and hence bring about a change in provision. We investigated Danish forest owners' preferences for conditional contracts for provision of ecosystem services in Natura2000 policies, in a sample which covers 12.5% of the total private forest area. This involves leaving old trees for natural decay, setting aside untouched forest areas, accepting a fixed percentage of broadleaves in the forest and increased access on foot for the public. Forest owners may already provide some of these, e.g. if they derive private benefits from them, hence additionality becomes an issue. This study investigates the link between forest owners' current management practices and their WTA payments for providing specific ecosystem services by eliciting current practice prior to a Choice Experiment on contracts. For most of these ecosystem services, owners differentiate their WTA significantly according to the current management on their property. For example, owners who did not provide extended access had a mean WTA of 14€/ha and year for accepting access up to 15 meters from roads and paths and 28€ /ha and year for accepting access everywhere in their forest. However, forest owners who already allow extended access have a mean WTA around zero.
A Contract-Theoretic Model of Conservation Agreements”, mimeo
2010
We model conservation agreements using contractual equilibrium, a concept introduced by Miller and Watson (2010) to model dynamic relationships with renegotiation. The setting takes the form of a repeated principal-agent problem, where the principal must pay to observe a noisy signal of the agent’s effort. Lacking a strong external enforcement system, the parties rely on self-enforcement for their relational contract. We characterize equilibrium play (including how punishments and rewards are structured) and we show how the parties ’ relative bargaining powers affect their ability to sustain cooperation over time. We argue that the model captures important features of real