Word for Hegel (original) (raw)
History of Philosophy. G.W.F. Hegel. His Life, Works and Thought.
2013
This e-book tries to describe fairly quickly, but at the same time precisely and in an articulated way, the structure in becoming of the thought of G.F.W. Hegel (1870-1831), an idealist German thinker. This work analyzes his thought from its first phase, animated by Jacobin and revolutionary ideals, similar to that ones of his friends Hölderlin and Schelling, to its conclusions, when the Hegelian thought seemed to accompany itself well - as ideological tool – to the movement of Restoration put forward by the regressive and authoritarian powers, imposed by the defeats of Napoleon and by the Nations that gathered themselves in the Congress of Vienna (1815). The text tries to analyze and to summarize the essential speculative elements of two of the most important Hegelian writings: The Phenomenology of Spirit (1807) and the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1816, 1827, 1830).
The Oxford Handbook of German Philosophy in the Nineteenth Century, 2015
In the first three decades of the nineteenth century, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel attempted to construct an idealist philosophy of breath-taking ambition. With its accounts of nature, society, history, art, religion and philosophy itself, it was meant to provide its audience-subjects of that peculiarly modern form of European life then coming into existence-with a complete account of the universe and its place in it. Yet how to regard this project is still in dispute. While at first glance it looks like a reversion to the kind of dogmatic metaphysics that Kant had urged his readers to abandon only a few decades before, some argue that Hegel's project is to be understood in the spirit of Kant's own. What philosophy is can only be understood in the light of a "phenomenological" examination of consciousness-a project that, like Kant's "critique", was meant to free readers from illusions pervading their own initial assumptions about reason and knowledge.
Situating Hegel: From Transcendental Philosophy to a Phenomenology of Spirit
The Palgrave Hegel Handbook, 2020
This chapter aims to situate Hegel’s philosophical outlook by illuminating it against the backdrop of Immanuel Kant’s transcendental philosophy, some early skeptical critiques of that philosophy, Fichte’s philosophy of freedom, and finally the Spinozistic thinking of Schelling and of Hegel himself.
German Philosophers: Kant, Hegel, Schelling, Nietzsche, and Heidegger.
By Daniel Fidel Ferrer. Includes bibliographical references. Index. 1. Ontology. 2. Metaphysics. 3. Philosophy, German. 4.Thought and thinking. 5. Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804. 6. Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von, 1775-1854. 7. Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 1770-1831. 8. Philosophy, Asian. 9. Philosophy, Indic. 10. Philosophy, Modern -- 20th century. 11. Philosophy, Modern -- 19th century. 12. Practice (Philosophy). 13. Philosophy and civilization. 14. Postmodernism. 15. Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm, 1844-1900. 16. Heidegger, Martin, 1889-1976. -- 17. Nagarjuna, 2nd cent. I. Ferrer, Daniel Fidel, 1952-. Table of Contents Preface (page 4). 1). Heidegger and the Purpose of Kanťs Critique of Pure Reason (p. 5 to p. 29). 2). Martin Heidegger's Encounter Methodology: Kant (p. 31 to p. 44). 3). Metahistories of philosophy: Kant and Nietzsche (p. 45 to p. 63). 4). Martin Heidegger and Hegeľs Science of Logic (p. 64 to p. 79). 5). Heidegger and Purpose of Hegeľs Phenomenology of Spirit (p. 80 to p. 102). 6). Analysis of the "Preface" to Hegeľs Phenomenology of Spirit (p. 103 to p. 110). 7). Hegeľs Dialogue with Lesser Known Philosophers (p. 111 to p. 121). 8). Heidegger's Encounter with F.W.J. Schelling: The Questions of Evil and Freedom, and the end of Metaphysics (p. 123 to p. 135). 9). Martin Heidegger contra Nietzsche on the Greeks (p. 136 to p. 148). 10). Martin Heidegger and Nietzsche on Amor Fati (p. 149 to p. 156). (1 1). Martin Heidegger's ontotheological problems and Nägärjuna solutions: Heidegger's Presuppositions and Entanglements in Metaphysics (p. 157 to p. 165). Index (p. 166 to p. 235).
The John Hopkins Guide to Critical and Cultural Theory
There is no better way to characterize G.W.F Hegel (1770-1831) than as a philosopher of truth. Like most classical and early modern thinkers, Hegel believed that the task of philosophy was to furnish as comprehensive and true an account of reality as possible. As in Aristotle or Spinoza, truth as a category implied extreme rigor, a uniquely wide breadth of scope-ranging from physics and ontology to politics and logic-and a capacity both to reflect the world as it actually is and to express it in the form of a system. Systematicity was for Hegel proof of thoroughness and of the muscularity of reason, but it also mirrored formally an important aspect of reality itself: the latter, he argued, was also a kind of system-an organized, deeply interconnected, and (to some extent) living (or at least dynamic) whole. From a Hegelian standpoint, truth exists not just in the sense that it is possible, that it can be grasped, shared, and made actionable by humans (or perhaps other rational creatures), but that it is fundamentally thisworldly or immanent, rather than other-worldly or transcendent. Truth was not, as in Platonic Idealism, something that hovered over or preceded the world in the form of a static essence. Nor was it contained, ready-made, in the mind of God, an eternal logic or law that only had to be humbly recited by humans to be known. These ways of understanding truth, thought Hegel, reduced humans to passive instruments of a reality they had no hand in making themselves. Instead, truth was best understood as back-bendingly difficult work-a process that could be understood as simultaneously discovery (of something objectively there in the world) and invention (something we ourselves create and wilfully sustain). Despite Hegel's reputation in some circles as an austere theologian of eternity it is important to keep in mind the deeply existential dimension of Hegel's work, one that helps to explain why he was taken up so readily
The Spirit of the Age: Hegel and the Fate of Thinking
Description ‘It belongs to the weakness of our time not to be able to bear the greatness, the immensity of the claims made by the human spirit, to feel crushed before them, and to flee from them faint-hearted.’ (Hegel’s Lectures on the History of Philosophy, v2, p. 10) Is it becoming more obvious today that the thinkers of the post-Hegelian era were/are not ‘able to bear the greatness, the immensity of the claims made by the human spirit’? Is our era the era of the ‘faint-hearted’ philosophy? Celebrating 200 years since the publication of The Phenomenology of Spirit this volume addresses these questions through a renewed encounter with Hegel’s thought. This book includes contributions from: H. S. Harris, John W. Burbidge, Paul Redding, Angelica Nuzzo, David Gray Carlson, Simon Lumsden, Karin de Boer, David Rose, Andrew Haas, Toula Nicolacopoulos, George Vassilacopoulos, Jorge Armando Reyes Escobar, Maria J. Binetti, Wendell Kisner, Paul Ashton and Robert Sinnerbrink. Authors, editors and contributors Paul Ashton NMIT and LaTrobe University Toula Nicolacopoulos LaTrobe University George Vassilacopoulos LaTrobe University
The Evolution of Consciousness and the Hegelian Dialectic in "Phenomenology of Spirit" G.W.F. Hegel's "Phenomenology of Spirit" is a seminal work in Western philosophy, exploring the evolution of consciousness and self-consciousness through various stages, culminating in the realization of absolute knowing. This text is crucial for understanding Hegel's philosophical system and his concept of the dialectic. In this essay, we will examine key ideas from the books of author D.P. Verene, as well as look at the main concepts surrounding Hegelian philosophy, including the notion of Geist, the master-slave dialectic, the Hegelian dialectic, and the transition to Absolute Spirit, demonstrating how these concepts contribute to a comprehensive understanding of human consciousness and historical development, leading finally to the development of self-consciousness and the realization of the Absolute.
Rosenkranz\u27s Report on Hegel\u27s Phenomenology of Spirit: A Short Analysis
2021
Karl Rosenkranz was the editor-in-chief of Hegel's Collected Works, vols. 1-12(1832-44). He wrote Hegel's Life (1844) as a supplement to these Works. 1 He has an advantage over most other commentators on Hegel. Not only did he speak with Hegel about his philosophy, but he also had access to his manuscripts, letters, and the recollections of students, family members, and acquaintances. Rosenkranz was himself an adept and prolific philosopher. He is remembered primarily today for his work on Hegel, but in his own right he is still considered for his Encyclopedia of Theological Sciences (1831), Pedagogy as System (1848)-which was translated into English under the title Philosophy of Education (1886)-Aesthetics of the Ugly (1853) and the Science of the Logical Idea (1858). 2 By virtue of his close ties to Hegel and his own philosophical abilities he appears able to understand and express the complexity and subtly of Hegel's philosophical thought. His report, while informative and carrying weight, should be read, however, with caution when it comes to Hegel's formative years. He is describing events and compositions that occurred forty years before his report was written, and about a time where the principal proponents of the system of idealism, namely, Hegel and Schelling, later in life did not agree on what had transpired or been intended. 3 Rosenkranz, at times, seems loose with his descrip
The Intimate Practice of Self-knowing in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit
2013
The Intimate Practice of Self-Knowing in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit Joseph Arel Advisor: University of Guelph Dr. John Russon The following work will be an examination of self-knowledge in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. My main thesis is that self-knowledge is a practical, intersubjective phenomenon. This means that the sense we have of ourselves and our ability to live with a practical understanding of ourselves is an achievement that requires the participation of others. Each chapter will develop my thesis by highlighting the intersubjective character of the nature of the self and the structure of self-knowledge. I do this by analyzing self-consciousness as such, our ability to know others and for others to know us, and the nature of the “inner” self. After having given what I take to be Hegel’s argument concerning the self and self-knowledge, I present an argument taken from Hegel’s texts regarding the practical implications of his discourse on self-knowledge. I conclude t...
The Phenomenology of Spirit or Transcendental Idealism à la Hegel
In the present text I will attempt to give the main thrust of what I am convinced can be called Hegel’s re-presentation of transcendental idealism, by means of a general sketch of the Phenomenology of Spirit, in order that one may see that at bottom Hegel’s project is precisely that of elevating the reader into the self-same Kantian insight that—in its Fichtean formulation—one cannot go beyond the I or egress from the I, Knowing or representation and arrive at something wholly independent of it.
The Beginning Before the Beginning: Hegel and the Activation of Philosophy
This paper suggests that it is not enough to simply account for the lsquo;beginningrsquo; in Hegelrsquo;s philosophy. To capture the speculative depth of Hegelrsquo;s thinking one must also account for the beginning of philosophy as such. That is, how or why the philosopher begins or lsquo;the beginning before the beginningrsquo;. The question of the activation of the philosophical project itself is explored through Hegelrsquo;s notion of the lsquo;need of philosophyrsquo; and the fundamental relation between the historical event of the French Revolution and philosophical thinking. This question is explored through a critical discussion of those thinkers who are also concerned with the philosophy/revolution relation but are critical of Hegelrsquo;s approach. It is suggested that these critical readings employ a thematic approach to both Hegel and philosophy more generally. This approach renders them unable to appreciate Hegelrsquo;s philosophy speculatively and as a consequence the relation between philosophy and freedom, via the revolution, is misconstrued. In contradistinction to these readings the question of how one encounters Hegelrsquo;s thought non-thematically is explored through an analysis of the willingness of the would-be philosopher to activate themselves into the philosophical project and dwell with Hegel in the lsquo;wersquo;. Rather than providing answers to the questions raised, this paper seeks to act as a provocation for a renewed encounter with Hegelrsquo;s philosophy
Rosenkranz's Report on Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit: A Short Analysis
Academia Letters, 2021
Karl Rosenkranz was the editor-in-chief of Hegel's Collected Works, vols. 1-12(1832-44). He wrote Hegel's Life (1844) as a supplement to these Works. 1 He has an advantage over most other commentators on Hegel. Not only did he speak with Hegel about his philosophy, but he also had access to his manuscripts, letters, and the recollections of students, family members, and acquaintances. Rosenkranz was himself an adept and prolific philosopher. He is remembered primarily today for his work on Hegel, but in his own right he is still considered for his Encyclopedia of Theological Sciences (1831), Pedagogy as System (1848)-which was translated into English under the title Philosophy of Education (1886)-Aesthetics of the Ugly (1853) and the Science of the Logical Idea (1858). 2 By virtue of his close ties to Hegel and his own philosophical abilities he appears able to understand and express the complexity and subtly of Hegel's philosophical thought. His report, while informative and carrying weight, should be read, however, with caution when it comes to Hegel's formative years. He is describing events and compositions that occurred forty years before his report was written, and about a time where the principal proponents of the system of idealism, namely, Hegel and Schelling, later in life did not agree on what had transpired or been intended. 3 Rosenkranz, at times, seems loose with his descrip
Young Hegelian sources for a conception of the self
Dissertatio, 2019
Young Hegel’s writings has been a source for many endeavours aiming at extracting edifying resources for contemporary ethical and political debate. In this paper, I focus on Hegel’s earliest writings stemming from the periods of Stuttgart, Tubingen and Bern in search for elements that can propel a conception of self. By endorsing an ethical and political stance of young Hegel’s writings, I oppose those who see in these writings concerning the essence of religion a mystical pantheistic thesis. Instead, I argue that Hegel is more concerned with a Republican view of religion, one that is very close to French political thought, such as Rousseau and Montesquieu. Just as much, the practical grounds for addressing ethical life and assessing Modernity’s capacity for the latter is rooted on a Hellenistic ideal. The Greek sources derive from young H Hegel's reading of the tragedies as comprising three notions: origin, simplicity and exteriority. I explore some features relating the notions of origin and simplicity as dating back to monastic life and the works of Winckelmann and Schiller. These elements are constantly intertwined in Hegel’s opposition to the rationalism of Enlightenment, mainly of Kant, as well as his adherence and reformulation of universal reason. Relying on these sources, I divide the paper into three sections: the enlightened self, the sensible self and the simple self. I conclude with the idea that Hegel envisaged a kind of sensible reason he often referred to by “heart”, by which he meant an originating and simple experience of the world through nature and the community that achieve s universal practical reason by comprising socially shared perceptive, affective and imaginative resources at play at the moment of a putative moral action.
Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit: A Critical Rethinking in Seventeen Lectures
2013
A Critical Rethinking in Seventeen Lectures provides a clear and philosophically engaging investigation of Hegel's first masterpiece, perhaps the most revolutionary work of modern philosophy. The book guides the reader on an intellectual adventure that takes up Hegel's revolutionary strategy of paving the way for doing philosophy without presuppositions by first engaging in a phenomenological investigation of knowing as it appears. That preliminary investigation observes how the prevailing view of knowing that condemns cognition to operating with presuppositions proves unable to justify its own knowledge claims and ends up undermining the distinction between knowing and its object on which that view depends. Unlike other studies of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, the work rethinks the entire argument with sustained attention to the project that gives the work its revolutionary significance. Free of unnecessary jargon and always focusing on clearly unraveling the argument in its entirety, Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit: A Critical Rethinking in Seventeen Lectures, will be indispensable to undergraduate and graduate students of philosophy, Hegel scholars, and anyone interested in tackling the radical project of doing philosophy without foundations.
units.muohio.edu
The absolute Idea has shown itself to be the identity of the theoretical and the practical Idea.…The Notion is not merely soul, but free subjective Notion that is for itself and therefore possesses personality... but which, nonetheless, is not exclusive individuality, but explicitly universality.... All else is error, confusion, opinion, endeavour, caprice and transitoriness; the absolute Idea alone is being, imperishable life, self-knowing truth, and is all truth.
Hegel and Phenomenology: Introduction
Hegel Bulletin, 2017
Reaction against Hegel-which leads back to Hegel. How?', we read in Merleau-Ponty's course notes from the Collège de France (Merleau-Ponty [1954-55] 2010: 63). This interrogative marks the whole history of twentieth-century phenomenology, which is clearly indebted to Hegel's thought in significant ways. Husserl's concern with the historical and cultural life-world in the Crisis of European Sciences; Heidegger's ontological interpretation of logic and concern with the historicization of human existence; Merleau-Ponty's dialectic of the visible and invisibleall involve an implicit return to Hegelian themes and strategies. Surprisingly, however, such affinity was not acknowledged by most of the representatives of the phenomenological movement. 1 At the dawn of the phenomenological movement both Husserl and Heidegger were deeply influenced by Franz Brentano, who was virulently anti-Hegelian. In his Four Phases of Philosophy of 1895, Brentano theorized that philosophy progressed in four phases, including alternating phases of abundance and different stages of decline. Brentano diagnosed his own age as one of decline, hence he advocated a renewal of philosophy as rigorous science. According to his periodization, all great periods of growth in philosophy are characterized by the preponderance of the purely theoretical interest and develop a method proper to the subject matter (Brentano 1968: 9). In this first stage philosophy is pursued as a theoretical science. After a while, theoretical activity inevitably weakens and practical interests begin to dominate, e.g., the Stoics and Epicureans in the post-Aristotelian period. This applied phase is followed by a third phase when scepticism grows, counterbalanced by the construction of sects and dogmatic philosophies (among which he included Kant). Finally, in a fourth phase, mysticism, intuitionism and irrationalist world views, 'pseudo-philosophy', and religious Schwärmerei proliferate (e.g., Plotinus; Schelling and Hegel in recent times), leading to moral and intellectual collapse (Brentano 1968: 58). Hegel, then, was seen by Brentano as a Romantic mystic who betrayed the true spirit of scientific philosophy. Husserl rarely refers to Hegel. In the 1900 Prolegomena to his 1901 Logical Investigations he repeats the common prejudice against Hegel that he rejected the Principle of Non-Contradiction (Husserl 1975: §40). The early Husserl in his