Why the debate about composition is factually empty (or why there’s no fact of the matter whether anything exists) (original) (raw)
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Metaphysics, Sophistry, and Illusion, 2021
Chapter 4 provides an argument for a non-factualist view of the composite-object question; i.e., it argues that there’s no fact of the matter whether there are any such things as composite objects like tables and rocks and cats (where a composite object is an object that has proper parts). In addition, this chapter explains how the argument can be extended to establish the much more general (and much more radical) conclusion that there’s no fact of the matter whether there are any material objects at all—including mereological simples (i.e., objects that don’t have any proper parts). The argument proceeds by undermining the necessitarian and contingentist views of the composite-object question; so, roughly speaking, the idea is that there isn’t a fact of the matter about the existence of composite objects like tables because there isn’t a necessary fact about this and there also isn’t a contingent fact about it.
A Physical Argument Against Composition
Philosophical Writings, 2011
Following the lead of Hud Hudson and Yuri Balashov, I formulate an argument against the thesis that objects arranged in a particular way compose a further object. I present a number of assumptions from the areas of physics, ontology and mereology. I then argue on the basis of a thought experiment that these assumptions yield a contradiction. I suggest that the best way to avoid this contradiction is to deny that simple objects ever compose anything. We should accept the thesis of mereological nihilism.
An Assessment of the Metaontological Debate Concerning Composition
Res Cogitans, 2010
I. Introduction: From Ontology to Metaontology a. First-Order Ontological Debate Ontology, as a field of inquiry, concerns existence. When we speak of what exists it is natural to use 'objects' as a fundamental unit. Thus, in ontology, questions about the nature of objects are of great importance. One such question contemporary ontologists grapple with is: "Are there composite objects?" meaning, objects which are composed of, but are not identical to, their constituent parts. Proposed answers to this question are part of first-order ontological debate. In order to lead us to an understanding of secondorder ontological debate, or metaontology, let us first briefly discuss the composition debate. Consider a possible world containing two chairs and nothing else. In the material composition debate, ontologists disagree as to how many objects exist in this world. Some say that in addition to the two chairs, this world contains a third object which is jointly composed by the two chairs. These mereological universalists propose that any two objects, regardless of whether they are in any way similar or causally-related, always jointly compose a third distinct object. By contrast, others deny that there are any chairs at all in this world. These 'mereological nihilists' propose that the only things that exist are simples-presumably indivisible subatomic particles-which may be arranged 'x-wise' (Sider pp. 384). For instance, in this possible world the nihilist would say that there are only 'simples arranged chair-wise'.
Against Universal Mereological Composition
This paper opposes universal mereological composition (UMC). Sider defends it: unless UMC were true, he says, it could be indeterminate how many objects there are in the world. I argue that there is no general connection between how widely composition occurs and how many objects there are in the world. Sider fails to support UMC. I further argue that we should disbelieve in UMC objects. Existing objections against them say that they are radically unlike Aristotelian substances. True, but there is a stronger objection. This is that they are characterized by no properties, and so fail to be like anything -even themselves.
In Defense of Composite Factualism
In this paper I will be arguing that non-factualism concerning the composition- al nature and existence of physical objects is implausible, if not necessarily false. I will primarily be interacting with the work of Balaguer (2018), who claims that there is no fact of the matter whether composite objects like tables or cats exist. From this he argues for the more radical conclusion that there is no fact of the matter whether there are any physical objects exist at all. I will be responding to this argument in the following man- ner: (a) if the hylomorphic account is at least possible, then non-factualism is false, (b) if we can exhaust the possible ways in which the world can be described, then non-factual- ism is false, and (c) the unified nature of experience demonstrates that non-factualism is false. Each of these arguments make non-factualism at the very least implausible, but to- gether they arguably make non-factualism necessarily false or highly implausible.
The Controversy over the Existence of Ordinary Objects
Philosophy Compass, 2010
The basic philosophical controversy regarding ordinary objects is: Do tables and chairs, sticks and stones, exist? This paper aims to do two things: first, to explain why how this can be a controversy at all, and second, to explain why this controversy has arisen so late in the history of philosophy. Section 1 begins by discussing why the 'obvious' sensory evidence in favor of ordinary objects is not taken to be decisive. It goes on to review the standard arguments against the existence of ordinary objects-including those based on problems with causal redundancy, parsimony, co-location, sorites arguments, and the special composition question. Section 2 goes on to address what it is about the contemporary approach to metaphysics that invites and sustains this kind of controversy, and helps make evident why debates about ordinary objects lead so readily to debates in metametaphysics about the nature of metaphysics itself.
Philosophical Explorations, 2024
In this paper, we propose an account of how perceptual evidence might allow us to draw justified conclusions about the existence of composite objects. We call the thesis at issue PERCEPTUAL ADEQUACY, and argue that a specific, naïve realist picture of the phenomenal character of perception provides us with a straightforward way to defend it. The claim that we have empirical evidence for the existence of macroscopic composites cannot be propped up merely by the plausible claim, granted by many, that our perceptual experiences have composites- presenting phenomenology. Rather, a specific account of the nature of the phenomenology is needed so that it can provide the required evidence. We propose a way to accomplish this: one on which in the good cases it would be constituted by the presentation of the truth-makers of the relevant ontological claims. We argue, further, that this potential defence of a feasible empirically-informed approach to metaphysics is preferable to the best alternative, one based on an object-dependent version of intentionalism about perceptual consciousness.
METAPHYSICAL ARGUMENTS AGAINST ORDINARY OBJECTS
Philosophical Quarterly, 2006
Several prominent attacks on the objects of ‘folk ontology’ argue that these would be omitted from a scientific ontology, or would be ‘rivals’ of scientific objects for their claims to be efficacious, occupy space, be composed of parts, or possess a range of other properties. I examine causal redundancy and over determination arguments, ‘nothing over and above’ appeals, and arguments based on problems with collocation and with property additivity. I argue that these share a common problem: applying conjunctive principles to cases in which the claims conjoined are not analytically independent. This unified diagnosis provides a way of defending ordinary objects against these common objections, while also yielding warnings about certain uses of general conjunctive principles.