Toward a Concrete Ontology of Practical Reason in Light of Heidegger's Lectures on Human Freedom (original) (raw)
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The Contingency of Freedom: Heidegger Reading Kant
International Studies in Philosophy, 2004
Let us not say that there are laws in nature. There are only necessities. Nietzsche, Joyful Wisdom § 1 Introduction This essay takes Heidegger's interpretation of freedom as a frame within which to outline a difficulty relating to praxis and the articulation of ontological difference. The difficulty takes the form of a constraint that Heidegger's account places on the idea of concreteness. The source of this constraint, I shall argue, can be traced back to his acceptance of Aristotle's rejection of the atomist thesis on chance and necessity. Its effect is to install in Heidegger's interpretation of freedom a distinction between autonomy and heteronomy that forecloses the possibility of a radical approach to the question of contingency. 1 In 'On the Essence of Truth' Heidegger elaborates a critique of the view that propositions are the original locus of truth. 2 What this view has long neglected to recognize, he argues, is that before we can say anything about a thing, it must first have shown itself to us. This prior disclosure is identified as a more original moment of truth: truth as unconcealment [aletheia]. Heidegger then goes further, declaring that even this prior disclosure in which a thing simply shows itself must in turn depend on our being open to such an event. This being'open to' is in turn called freedom; only because there is such freedom can anything show itself to us at all. Freedom in this ontological sense is distinct from any sense of subjective free will. In fact, such freedom does not belong to Dasein, but rather the reverse:
What Does it Mean to ‘Act in the Light of’ a Norm? Heidegger and Kant on Commitments and Critique
Transcending Reason, 2020
This paper examines Heidegger's position on a foundational distinction for Kantian and post-Kantian philosophy: that between acting 'in the light of' a norm and acting 'merely in accordance with it'. In section 1, I introduce the distinction and highlight several relevant similarities between Kant and Heidegger on ontology and the first-person perspective. In section 2, I press the Kantian position further, focusing on the role of inferential commitments in perception: this provides a foil against which Heidegger's account can be In section 3, I contrast this Kantian approach with Crowell's highly sophisticated reading of Heidegger on care: I argue that, subject to certain conditions on how we view explanation, the two approaches are compatible and indeed mutually supporting. I close in section 4 by addressing an importantly distinct dimension of normativity, that marked by critique, broadly construed. I argue that we ultimately need to locate Heidegger in a context that runs from Kant's 'What is Enlightenment' through Nietzsche's Genealogy.
The concept of the object of practical reason is key to the framework of Kant’s second Critique. Moral autonomy may only be justified if reason is capable of constituting of itself and a priori an object adequate to a morally determined will. Such an object is referred to as the good (das Gute). This paper comprises an argument in favour of the following two theses: (1) that there are two objects of practical reason (rather than only one), which defer to a dual order of subjective practical principles or maxims (Maxime and Gesinnung), and which depend on the two-fold level of the faculty of desire (choice and will), as well as the two senses in which Kant uses the term “practical freedom”; and (2) that the concept of the object of practical reason may only be coherently understood in relation to Kant’s thought regarding the categories of freedom and the typic of the pure practical faculty of judgment.
Tokyo Workshop Oct. 21, 2015: Sources of Rationality - Heidegger on Freedom and Normative Constraint
Tokyo Workshop: Sources of Rationality – Heidegger on Freedom and Normative Constraint Date: 21th of October 2015. Place: University of Tokyo, Komaba Campus. Room to be announced. Organizer: Dr. Rasmus Thybo Jensen and Dr. Kohji Ishihara. (Department of History and Philosophy of Science, University of Tokyo) In recent years a number of authors have engaged with Heidegger’s philosophy by placing it in the context of a broader, ongoing discussion concerning the nature of reasons (for judgement and for action) and the fundamental sources of normativity and rationality. In this workshop we focus on two texts by Heidegger that are particularly apt for bringing his thinking in contact with such ongoing discussions. The purpose of the workshop is to engage in detailed discussion of the issues at stake in these texts through a close reading of them. The contemporary debates will serve as a background for our discussion but our main focus will be on a critical engagement with the analyses, arguments and concepts present in the texts under scrutiny. The two presenters Dr. Wenjing Cai, Lecturer at Shanghai Jiao Tong University, School of Philosophy, Philosophy. (http://shss.sjtu.edu.cn/sites/jd/content2\_en.aspx?InfId=b89124c9-6aed-406a-bbf2-35b36001d6d8&CtgId=1a88c5cf-1cbd-49cc-a0fe-dc9777e8601e) Dr. Morten S. Thaning, Associate Professor at Copenhagen Business School, Department of Management, Politics and Philosophy. (http://www.cbs.dk/en/research/departments-and-centres/department-of-management-politics-and-philosophy/staff/mstmpp) The two texts 1. Heidegger, M., Being and Time, [Sein und Zeit], §§ 54-60. The chapter on conscience (Gewissen). Trans. Macquarrie and Robinson, Blackwell 1962. 2. Heidegger, M., On the Essence of Human Freedom: An Introduction to Philosophy [Vom Wesen des menschlichen Freiheit. Einleitung in die Philosophie, Gesamtausgabe, Band 31], §§ 26-30. Trans. Ted Sadler, Continuum 2002 Some relevant background literature Golob, Sacha, 2014, Heidegger on Concepts, Freedom and Normativity Crowell, Steven, 2013, Normativity and Phenomenology in Husserl and Heidegger, Cambridge University Press. Schear, Joseph K. (ed.), 2013, Mind, Reason, and Being-in-the-World: The McDowell-Dreyfus Debate, Routledge. Sebastian Rödl, 2007, Chap. 4 in Self-Consciousness, Harvard Uni. Press. McDowell, John 2009, ‘Self-Determining Subjectivity and External Constraint’. In Having the World in View, Harvard University Press. Korsgaard, Christine M., 1996, The Sources of Normativity, Cambridge University Press. Practical information The discussion will be based on the English translations of the two texts though if relevant some references to the original German version may occur. All participants will be given access to the texts prior to the workshop and it is expected that all have read the texts. Each session will begin with a short presentation by the invited speaker after which we will open up the discussion. The workshop is open for all, but MA students, PhD students and Postdocs will be given priority if there is shortage of seats. To sign up for the workshop please send an email to Rasmus Thybo Jensen (rasmusthybo@yahoo.dk). Please indicate whether you would like to participate in the workshop dinner.
In my paper I show how Heidegger interprets and reformulates Kant’s practical philosophy as an existential problematic, and I argue that by carefully considering this reformulation we are provided with a fuller understanding both of Heidegger’s own project as well as of the ontological dimension in Kant’s practical philosophy. In order to show this, I first explain Heidegger’s general concept of subjectivity and self-awareness, and second, the special status that affectivity has in his conception of self-awareness. I then show, more specifically, how Heidegger transforms Kant’s idea of respect (feeling) into his own idea of angst (disposition). Angst, I conclude, is the ontological interpretation of respect, which Heidegger tries to conceive as a mode of existence of the self, through which we appear to ourselves as self-determined, resolute beings, in the Kantian sense. I finally suggest that we could, in fact, use Heidegger’s analysis as a description of the moral actor who is presupposed in the Kantian theory.