Experimental Evidence on Deceitful Communication: Does Everyone Have a Price? (original) (raw)
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Deceitful Communication in a Sender-Receiver Experiment: Does Everyone Have a Price?
Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, 2019
This paper introduces a new task to elicit individual aversion to deceiving, based on a modi…ed version of the Deception Game as presented in Gneezy (Am. Econ. Rev. 95 (1): 384-395: 2005). A multipleprice-list mechanism is used to determine the deception premium asked by an individual to switch from faithful to deceitful communication. The results show that, depending on payo¤s, 71% of the subjects will switch at most once. Among them, 40% appear to be either "ethical" or "spiteful". The other 60% respond to incentives in line with the cost of lying theory; they will forego faithful communication if the bene…t from deceiving the other is large enough. Regression analysis shows that this deception premium is independent of the risk aversion and social preferences of the subject; it would thus capture an inner preference for behaving well.
The costs of deception: Evidence from psychology
Experimental Economics, 2002
Recently, it has been argued that the evidence in social science research suggests that deceiving participants in an experiment does not lead to a significant loss of experimental control. Based on this assessment, experimental economists were counseled to lift their de facto prohibition against deception to capture its potential benefits. To the extent that this recommendation is derived from empirical studies, we argue that it draws on a selective sample of the available evidence. Building on a systematic review of relevant research in psychology, we present two major results: First, the evidence suggests that the experience of having been deceived generates suspicion that in turn is likely to affect the judgment and decision making of a non-negligible number of participants. Second, we find little evidence for the reputational spillover effects that have been hypothesized by a number of authors in psychology and economics (e.g., Kelman, H.C., 1967. Psychological Bulletin. 67, 1-11; Davis, D.D. and Holt, C.A., 1993. Experimental Economics. Princeton University Press, Princeton). Based on a discussion of the methodological costs and benefits of deception, we conclude that experimental economists' prohibition of deception is a sensible convention that economists should not abandon.
Experimental Economics, 2018
We experimentally investigate the relationship between (un)kind actions and subsequent deception in a two-player, two-stage game. The first stage involves a dictator game. In the second-stage, the recipient in the dictator game has the opportunity to lie to her counterpart. We study how the fairness of dictator-game outcomes affects subsequent lying decisions where lying hurts one's counterpart. In doing so, we examine whether the moral cost of lying varies when retaliating against unkind actions is financially beneficial for the self (selfish lies), as opposed to being costly (spiteful lies). We find evidence that individuals engage in deception to reciprocate unkind behavior: The smaller the payoff received in the first stage, the higher the lying rate. Intention-based reciprocity largely drives behavior, as individuals use deception to punish unkind behavior and truth-telling to reward kind behavior. For selfish lies, individuals have a moral cost of lying. However, for spiteful lies, we find no evidence for such costs. Taken together, our data show a moral cost of lying that is not fixed but instead context-dependent.
Social Science Research Network, 2017
We introduce a novel decision problem to experimentally study situations where people know that they can lie, but do not initially know the economic consequences: they have to invest time to find them out. We report numerous findings, the most intriguing of which is that, in our setting, people can be divided in three types: the Good, who act honestly independently of the corresponding payoff; the Bad, who maximize their payoff without even checking the payoff for telling the truth; the Angry, who first look at the payoff for telling the truth and then lie only if that is low.
This paper studies lying in a novel context. Previous work has focused on situations in which people are either fully aware of the economic consequences of all available actions (e.g., die-under-cup paradigm), or they are uncertain, but this uncertainty cannot be cleared in any way (e.g., sender-receiver game). On the contrary, in reality, people oftentimes know that they will have a chance to lie, they are initially uncertain about the economic consequences of the available actions, but they can invest resources (e.g., time) to find them out. Here we capture the essence of this type of situations by means of a novel decision problem. Two experiments provide evidence of four empirical regularities regarding the distribution of choices, and suggest that participants vary along two dimensions: the moral cost of lying, and the cost of investing time to find out the payoffs associated to the available actions. Taking inspiration from these observations, we introduce a model that is cons...
Do liars believe? Beliefs and other-regarding preferences in sender–receiver games
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2013
We examine subjects" behavior in sender-receiver games where there are gains from trade and alignment of interests in one of the two states. We elicit subjects" beliefs, risk and other-regarding preferences. Our design also allows us to examine the behavior of subjects in both roles, to determine whether the behavior in one role is the best response to the subject"s own behavior in the other role. The results of the experiment indicate that 60 percent of senders adopt deceptive strategies by sending favorable message when the true state of the nature is unfavorable. Nevertheless, 67 percent of receivers invest conditional upon a favorable message. The investing behavior of receivers cannot be explained by risk preferences or as a best response to subject"s own behavior in the sender"s role. However, it can be rationalized by accounting for elicited beliefs and other-regarding preferences. Finally, the honest behavior of some senders can be explained by other-regarding preferences. Thus we find liars do believe, and individuals who care about the payoffs of others tend to be honest.
A neuroeconomic theory of (dis) honesty
Journal of Economic Psychology
We develop a theory of dishonesty based on neurophysiological evidence that supports the idea of a two-step process in the decision to cheat. Formally, decisions can be processed vía a costless "honest" channel that generates truthful behavior or vía a costly "dishonest" channel that requires attentional resources to trade-off costs and benefits of cheating. In the first step, a decision between these two channels is made based on ex-ante information regarding the expected benefits of cheating. In the second step, decisions are based on the channel that has been selected and, when applicable, the realized benefit of cheating. The model makes novel predictions relative to existing behavioral theories. First, adding external complexity to the decision-making problem (e.g., in the form of multi-tasking) deprives the individual from attentional resources and consequently decreases the propensity to engage in dishonest behavior. Second, higher expectations about the benefits of cheating results in a higher frequency of trial-by-trial cheating for any realized benefit level. Third, multiplicity of equilibria (characterized by different levels of cheating) emerges naturally in the context of illegal markets, in which expected benefits are endogenous.
We studied decision making in situations in which there is a monetary incentive to take risk, and in which the risk tak-ing option sometimes involves deception. We conducted a within participant experiment in which we compared risk tak-ing in deception conditions to pure (non-deceptive) gambles with equivalent risks and outcomes. We confirmed the four-fold pattern of risk attitudes in both conditions. We found that participants chose fewer risky options when the risky option was associated with deception, but that those who deceived more in the deception condition also took more risks in the gamble condition. We conclude that people who tend to take risks in gambles, also take them when it involves deception, although to a lesser extent.
Deception and Confession: Experimental Evidence from a Deception Game in Japan
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2010
This study investigated lying behavior and the behavior of people who are deceived by using a deception game (Gneezy, 2005) in both anonymity and face-to-face treatments. Subjects consist of students and non-students (citizens) to investigate whether lying behavior is depended on socioeconomic backgrounds. To explore how liars feel about lying, we give senders a chance to confess their behaviors to their counter partner for the guilty aversion of lying. The following results are obtained: i) a frequency of lying behavior for students is significantly higher than that for non-students at a payoff in the anonymity treatment, but that is not significantly difference between the anonymity and face-to-face treatments; ii) lying behavior is not influenced by gender; iii) a frequency of confession is higher in the face-to-face treatment than in the anonymity treatment; and iv) the receivers who are deceived are more likely to believe a sender's message to be true in the anonymity treatment. This study implies that the existence of the partner prompts liars to confess their behavior because they may feel remorse or guilt.
Sse Efi Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance, 2007
We experimentally investigate the effect of cheap talk in a bargaining game with one-sided asymmetric information. A seller has private information about his or her skill and is provided an opportunity to communicate this information to a buyer through a written message. Four different treatments are compared; one without communication, one with free-form communication, and two treatments with pre-specified communication in the form of promises of varying strength. Our results suggest that lying about private information is costly and that the cost of lying increases with the size of the lie and the strength of the promise. Freely formulated messages lead to the fewest lies and the most efficient outcomes.