Intellectual virtue and its role in epistemology (original) (raw)

INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES AND THE EPISTEMIC VALUE OF TRUTH

Synthese, 2019

The idea that truth is the fundamental epistemic good is explained and defended. It is argued that this proposal has been prematurely rejected on grounds that are both independently problematic and which also turn on an implausible way of understanding the proposal. A more compelling account of what it means for truth to be the fundamental epistemic good is then developed, one that treats the intellectual virtues, and thereby virtuous inquiry, as the primary theoretical notion.

Epistemic Agency and the Intellectual Virtues

Southern Journal of Philosophy, 2001

Taking a cue from Aristotle’s writings on ethics, an epistemology centered on the intellectual virtues has become popular recently. This type of virtue epistemology is motivated at least in part by its ability to account for epistemic agency (the capacities and practices involved in the pursuit of knowledge), so in the first section of this paper it is broadly sketched how such a view compares to the resources some other positions have for explaining agency. Section II takes up the relation of the virtues to other basic epistemological concepts (knowledge, most importantly). A schematic principle connecting the virtues to knowledge will be presented. Such a principle may be taken either as a criterion for knowledge or as an analysis of knowledge. In the third section, several problem cases will be posed that force amendments to the basic principle. In the fourth section, I will argue that, when amended to deal with these cases, an account based on the virtues becomes inadequate as an analysis of knowledge and of limited use as a criterion for knowledge. Finally, in section V the framework of a more complete theory of agency is outlined, as well as the implications of such a theory for the analysis of knowledge. Although the account is not entirely centered on them, the intellectual virtues may still be shown to play a vital role in our epistemic lives.

For the Sake of Knowledge: The Epistemic Value of Other-Regarding Epistemic Virtues

Acta Analytica, 2024

This paper examines the epistemic value of other-regarding epistemic virtues, challenging the common view that these virtues are primarily moral in nature. To this end, it proposes a new framework to explain the role of epistemic virtues: the Epistemic Social Environment (ESE). It is argued that the value of an epistemic virtue stems from its contribution to a healthy ESE. This approach enables a broader and unified theory of epistemic virtues, emphasising their role in the communal production of knowledge. Ultimately, the paper aims to reconcile virtue epistemology with insights from social epistemology, offering a comprehensive account of the epistemic value of sharing knowledge.

Epistemic Virtues and their Limits

Analytica - Revista de Filosofia, 2015

I. Virtue Epistemology proposes to shift the focus of justification from the properties of beliefs to the believer himself. Sosa has developed a perspectivist virtue theory according to which a belief is justified if it is grounded in an intellectual virtue, conceived as a reliable ability or power to form beliefs, such as accurate perception, good reasoning, clear memory, etc., together with another belief that would indicate that the belief in question was formed from an intellectual virtue. This view takes the believer to be reliable in forming his or her beliefs. Further developments of virtue epistemology, though, understood that what constitutes intellectual virtues are not abilities or powers but personality traits such as intellectual courage, open-mindedness, rigor and things of the kind, and this opened the door to subsume intellectual virtues to the moral ones. This view, on its turn, takes the believer to be responsible in forming his beliefs.

Epistemic Virtue and Epistemic Responsibility

Dialectica, 2005

Virtue epistemology construes intellectual virtue as a reliable ability to form true beliefs. Responsibilist versions seek to substitute for the passive, reliabilist model of the knower, that of an active subject who deliberately and purposefully exercises traits of character which tend to result in true beliefs. On these views, the disposition to exercise these epistemic virtues gives rise to notions of epistemic duty. In this paper, I propose a principle of doxastic rationality based on Bernard Wi l l i a m s ' a rgument against doxastic voluntarism. This principle, I go on to show, undermines a number of notions of epistemic duty which have been put forth within the framework of virtue t h e o r y. I then suggest an alternative formulation which remains within the bounds of rationality allowed for by my principle. In the end, I suggest that the failure of the earlier formulations and the adoption of the latter tend to vindicate the initial grounding of virtue epistemology in reliabilist intuitions.

Intellectual Virtue and Knowledge

Virtue epistemology defines knowledge in terms of intellectual virtues. Virtue-Reliabilists, led by Ernest Sosa, argue that intellectual virtues are reliable dispositions. Virtue-Responsibilists, led by Linda Zagzebski, argue that they are acquired character traits for which the agent is (partly) responsible. This chapter contends that Sosa's definition of knowledge, in terms of Reliabilist virtue, is better-suited to analyze passive knowledge, while Zagzebski's definition, in terms of Responsibilist virtue, is better-suited to analyze active knowledge. It also argues that virtue epistemology has already begun to expand the way we analyze knowledge. Breaking with mid-and late-twentieth century analytic epistemology, it puts active knowledge back on the epistemological map, and encourages us to explore probabilistic connections between active knowledge and intellectual virtue.

Introduction: Epistemic Virtues in the Sciences and the Humanities

Epistemic virtues offer a promising angle for studying interaction between fields of research conventionally classified under the " sciences " and the " humanities. " Given that virtues like objectivity, honesty, and accuracy are not confined to specific disciplines, they allow for comparative historical research between scientific fields as well as for histories of transfer, borrowing, and adaptation between disciplines. Such research, however, requires ample attention to what scientists in specific settings understood epistemic virtues to mean.