Virtue and Respect for Nature: Ronald Sandler's Character and Environment (original) (raw)
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A critique of Environmental Virtue Ethics with reference to the work of Ronald L. Sandler
The focus of this paper is environmental virtue ethics as presented by Ronald Sandler. I shall examine how Sandler’s account compares to other environmental virtue approaches, paying particular attention to the relative strengths and weaknesses of the scientific naturalist basis of his work, his moderate plurality in dealing with questions about moral considerability, how to define relationships between human and non-human entities, and how to characterise an environmental virtue. There will be an examination of Sandler’s claim that his account is able to generate norms regarding environmentally sensitive action. I will conclude that Sandler’s outline of a theory, which entails a variety of principles rather than establishing a single code, is a largely successful application of virtue theory to environmental ethics. There are aspects of his account however, including his treatment of value and meaning, species neutrality, ecosystems, and how institutional structures impinge on environmental virtue, that all need to be developed further.
Human Virtues and Natural Values
Environmental Ethics, 2006
In several works, Holmes Rolston III has argued that a satisfactory environmental ethic cannot be built on a virtue ethical foundation. His first argument amounts to the charge that because virtue ethics is by nature ‘self-centred’ or egoistic it is also inherently ‘human-centred’ and hence ill-suited to treating environmental matters. According to his second argument, virtue ethics is perniciously human-centred since it ‘locates’ the value of a thing, not in the thing itself, but in the agent who is ‘ennobled’ by valuing it. I argue that these charges, though illuminating, are not in the final analysis compelling. The first, I suggest, misconceives the role of motivation in virtue ethics, while the second ultimately rests on a misunderstanding of the place of the human perspective in ethical considerations.
What Makes a Character Trait a Virtue?
The Journal of Value Inquiry, 2007
A widely held account of what makes a character trait a virtue is that the virtues are character traits that a person needs to flourish or live well. Let us accept, provisionally, this eudaemonistic account of virtue. In an attempt to provide content to this general account, Rosalind Hursthouse, building off of work by Philippa Foot, argues that the evaluative structure of claims about good human beings is analogous to that of claims about good members of other species, so that ''when we talk about ethically good human beings, we have not suddenly started to use the word 'good' in a totally new 'moral' or 'evaluative' way.'' 1 According to this natural goodness approach, scientific naturalism provides a distinctive evaluative structure for assessing the goodness of a living thing as a living thing, as well as the premise that humans are to be evaluated as a type of living thing. Foot summarizes the view as follows: ''Judgments of goodness and badness...[have] ...a special 'grammar' when the subject belongs to a living thing, whether plant, animal, or human being....'[N]atural' goodness...which is attributable only to living things themselves and to their parts, characteristics, and operations, is intrinsic or 'autonomous' goodness in that it depends directly on the relation of an individual to the 'life form' of its species.'' 2 Hursthouse proposes that when it comes to plants, evaluations of goodness are made according to how well their parts and operations serve the ends of survival and continuance of their species. An oak tree with shallow roots and a rhododendron that never flowers are defective. They are in those respects poor specimens of their kind. But when it comes to species whose members have greater psychological sophistication, there is often more to living well than mere survival and contributing to species continuance. There is also the avoidance of pain and the experience of pleasure, as well as being a member of a well-functioning social group. Moreover, how adept an individual is at realizing the naturalistic ends
Environmental Ethics, 2009
An argument is made that to further develop the field of environmental virtue ethics it must be connected with an account of environmental sentiments. Openness as both an environmental sentiment and virtue is presented. This sentiment is shown to be reflected in the work of Barbara McClintock. As a virtue it is shown to a mean between arrogance and the disvaluing of individuals, a disposition to be open to the natural world and the values found there. Further development of EVE is then shown to require a connection with an account of environmental wisdom.
Is Environmental Virtue Ethics Anthropocentric
Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics (2018) 31:723–738, 2018
Virtue ethics (VE), due to its eudaimonistic character, is very anthropocentric; thus the application of VE to environmental ethics (EE) seems to be in contradiction with EE's critical opinion of human centeredness. In the paper, I prove the claim that there is a possibility of elaborating an environmental virtue ethics (EVE) that involves others (including nonhuman beings). I prove that claim through analyzing Ronald Sandler's EVE, especially his concept of pluralistic virtue and a pluralistic approach to the aim of ethical endeavor which is not only focused on personal flourishing but also helps others (including nonhumans) to flourish. I start my analysis with a close look at the application of anthropocentrism in VE, beginning by discerning the three types of anthropocentrism that are most often used in discussion on EE and EVE, namely ontological, epistemological, and ethical. Subsequently, I analyze the concept of personal flourishing, which is responsible for the anthropo-centric/egoistic nature of VE, proving that VE is anthropocentric/egoistic only formally , not in its content, and as such is only a rational theory, not a moral one.
Being a Friend to Nature: Environmental Virtues and Ethical Ideals
This paper argues that environmental virtue ethics requires the adoption of an ethical ideal in order to guide the identification and practice of virtues. I recommend friendship as one such ideal due to emphasis such an ideal places upon the quality of the relationship with nature rather than the evaluation of individual actions. After describing the value of friendship as an ethical ideal, I respond to some of the objections that have been raised against it in the context of environmental virtue.
Ecological Virtuous Selves: Towards a Non-Anthropocentric Environmental Virtue Ethic?
Philosophies, 2024
Existing predominant approaches within virtue ethics (VE) assume humans as the typical agent and virtues as dispositions that pertain primarily to human–human interpersonal relationships. Similarly, the main accounts in the more specific area of environmental virtue ethics (EVE) tend to support weak anthropocentric positions, in which virtues are understood as excellent dispositions of human agents. In addition, however, several EVE authors have also considered virtues that benefit non-human beings and entities (e.g., environmental or ecological virtues). The latter correspond to excellent character dispositions that would extend moral consideration and care for the benefit of non-human beings, entities, or entire ecosystems. In this direction, a few authors have argued that EVE could be considered non-anthropocentric insofar as it could: (a) promote non-human ends, well-being, and the flourishing of non-human beings and entities; (b) involve significant relations to non-humans. Drawing from different traditions, including ecofeminism and care ethics, we argue for a broader notion of self and a decentered notion of virtues. The broader notion of selfhood corresponds to the “ecological self”, one that can be enacted by both human and non-human beings, is embedded in a network of relations, and recognizes the more-than-human world as fundamental and yet indispensable otherness. We suggest that this broader notion of agency allows for an expansive understanding of virtues that includes a-moral functional ecological virtues, which can be exercised not only by humans but also by certain non-human beings. This alternative understanding of selfhood and ecological virtues within EVE could have several theoretical and practical implications, some of which may enable different types of agencies and transform collective action.
Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics (23:1-2) pp. 167-83, 2010
Many environmental problems are longitudinal collective action problems. They arise from the cumulative unintended effects of a vast amount of seemingly insignificant decisions and actions by individuals who are unknown to each other and distant from each other. Such problems are likely to be effectively addressed only by an enormous number of individuals each making a nearly insignificant contribution to resolving them. However, when a person’s making such a contribution appears to require sacrifice or costs, the problem of inconsequentialism arises: given that a person’s contribution, although needed (albeit not necessary), is nearly inconsequential to addressing the problem and may require some cost from the standpoint of the person’s own life, why should the person make the effort, particularly when it is uncertain (or even unlikely) whether others will do so? In this article I argue that justifications for making the effort to respond to longitudinal collective action environmental problems are, on the whole, particularly well supported by virtue-oriented normative theories, on which character traits are evaluated as virtues and vices consequentially or teleologically and actions are evaluated in terms of virtues and vices. If ethical theories are to be assessed on their theoretical and practical adequacy, and if providing a compelling response to the problem of inconsequentialism is an instance of such adequacy, then this is a reason for preferring virtue-oriented ethical theory over non-virtue-oriented ethical theories, such as Kantian, act utilitarian, and global utilitarian theories.