A Comparative Analysis of President Clinton and Bush's Handling of the North Korean Nuclear Weapons Program: Power and Strategy (original) (raw)
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Negotiating to Control Weapons of Mass Destruction in North Korea
International Negotiation, 2005
Negotiations to control and perhaps eliminate North Korea's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) appeared to achieve positive results in the 1990s. But these positive trends reversed direction in 2001–2004 under President George W. Bush. Why? This essay weighs six possible explanations. 1. progress in the 1990s as a mirage; 2. cultural differences; 3. distrust of international agreements; 4. perceptions regarding the utility of WMD; 5. internal divisions within each government and society; and 6. ulterior motives.The evidence suggests that the sixth explanation carries the most weight. Top leaders in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) as well as in the United States had priorities other than arms control. Each side used arms control negotiations as an instrument to promote its political and economic agenda in other realms. Pyongyang demanded large and certain rewards to give up its main bargaining chips. North Korea's negotiating behavior suggested some willin...
During the 1990s, the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons became one of the central issues in international security. In the aftermath of 9-11, when international terrorists demonstrated their willingness to cause mass casualties, dealing with clandestine and incipient nuclear weapons programmes in 'rogue states' became a high priority due to the fear that such programmes might be a source of such weapons or nuclear materials for terrorists. The North Korean nuclear weapons programme had already become a major focus of concern, but the 'agreed framework' negotiated between the DPRK and the United States in 1994 had frozen the nuclear programme in return for various forms of economic support and improved political relations. By the end of 2002 the 'agreed framework' had all but collapsed and North Korea resumed its nuclear activities, resulting in the accumulation of enough plutonium for about eight nuclear weapons two years later. This sequence of events raises several important issues. Why did North Korea walk away from a settlement that clearly addressed concerns crucial to its national interest and economic survival? Why did the Bush administration fail to pursue obvious strategies to maintain the freeze on North Korea's plutonium programme, resulting in a situation where the nuclear threat from North Korea has become practical rather than theoretical, when it went to war with Iraq to prevent a similar outcome? How do we interpret North Korea's negotiating behaviour and what are the prospects of any future settlement of the nuclear issue? The origins of the second North Korean nuclear crisis The issue of the North Korean nuclear programme first developed into a full-blown nuclear crisis in the early 1990s, almost provoking surgical strikes on North Korean nuclear facilities. After the intervention of former President Jimmy Carter who met with Kim Il Sung in Pyongyang negotiated resulted in the so-called 'Agreed Framework' of 1994 that involved a 'freeze' of North Korea's plutonium programme.
The U.S. Congress and North Korea during the Clinton Years: Talk Tough, Carry a Small Stick
Asian Survey, 2004
This essay explores the striking gap between Republican rhetoric and congressional action on North Korea between 1995 and 2001, when the GOP held majorities in both houses of Congress. While historical in nature, this inquiry offers lessons for President Bush—or, if elected president, John Kerry—as he struggles to meet the North Korea challenge. This article was published as Robert M. Hathaway and Jordan Tama, "The U.S. Congress and North Korea during the Clinton years: Talk Tough, Carry a Small Stick," Asian Survey, Vol. 44, Issue 5, pp. 711-733, ISSN 0004-4687, electronic ISSN 1533-838X. © 2004 by The Regents of the University of California. Authorization to copy this content beyond fair use (as specified in Sections 107 and 108 of the U. S. Copyright Law) for internal or personal use, or the internal or personal use of specific clients, is granted by the Regents of the University of California for libraries and other users, provided that they are registered with and pay the specified fee via Rightslink® on [JSTOR (http://www.jstor.org/r/ucal)\] or directly with the Copyright Clearance Center, http://www.copyright.com.
US – N. Korea peace talks: strategic or tactical diplomacy? Outlining the history and factors that have influenced US – North Korea diplomatic relations/ Msiska Abel / Zambia , 2018
The evening of March 28th 2018, amazed the whole world when it was headlined that Trump agrees to have peace talks with the Kim. This state of event not only baffled keen political events followers, but proved err in most public-politic-analysis and predictions previously been made over the US- N. Korea relations, reason being the announcement came at a time when war prospects where at height while others even anticipated the third world war as being very eminent. Attempting to understand this complex relationship between the North Korea and the US can only be made possible if one understood the role of Russia - US relationship especially during the cold war. The influence of Russia in global politics resulted into satellite communist states with their own local ideological frameworks and given the Asian states possessed fragments Maoism and Stalinism. The Korea Republic was divided into two ideological fronts of which the North was occupied by Soviet Union while the south came under US occupation. The members of the ruling Kim dynasty – past and present – enjoy near god-like status in North Korea, which has demonstrated extreme sensitivity to any remark that might be seen as mocking or disrespectful of the leadership. In November 2017, the US elected a new President Donald Trump as America’s 45th president. Negotiating and coming to terms with North Korea is very problematic in light of its long history of the country systematically violating agreements. proponents of this summit and the relationship have generally come to conclude and defend the legitimacy of this meeting and peace talks that where held between the two signatory parties. The idea is if the move is strategic, north Korea and US will enter into long term relationship that will see the two countries protect this agreement no matter what. On the other hand, if this agreement is tactical it possible that there is one country among the two that is merely trying to find a loophole to bring the other government down or frustrate its operations. Points have been leveled forward to deduce that N. Korea is acting out of fear while other proponents have simply argued that these concessions are out of mutual interest in establishing and promoting international peace and security and healthy nuclear programmes. However, from the author’s point of view, the answer to this is still very uncertain as the turnout of events will yet determine whether the new diplomatic relations are tactical or strategic.
Staying the course: Denuclearization and path dependence in the US's North Korea policy
North Korean Review, 2021
Purpose—The purpose of the article is to analyze the U.S.’s foreign policy framework toward North Korea in the post–Cold War era. Design, Methodology, Approach—We employ process-tracing technique and comparative sequential method across successive administrations and find that the U.S.’s foreign policy toward North Korea is one of a self-amplifying process. Findings—We argue that the U.S.’s foreign policy toward North Korea has remained remarkably consistent over the course of three decades. Furthermore, the policy has both hardened and narrowed in its focus on denuclearization. Practical Implications—As the U.S. deepens its pursuit for denuclearization as an end, the misalignment of goals between Washington and Pyongyang persists and even grows. Originality, Value—Through our analysis, we contribute to existing work that identifies North Korea’s liability for the engagement failures and add texture to the understanding of the current deadlock in negotiations.
Staying the Course: Denuclearization and Path Dependence in U.S.'s North Korea Policy
North Korean Review, 2021
Purpose–The purpose of the article is to analyze the US’s foreign policy framework towards North Korea in the post-Cold War era. Design, Methodology, Approach–We employ process-tracing technique and comparative sequential method across successive administrations and find that the US’s foreign policy towards North Korea is one of self-amplifying process. Findings–We argue that the US’s foreign policy towards North Korea has remained remarkably consistent over the course of three decades. Furthermore, the policy has both hardened and narrowed in its focus on denuclearization. Practical Implications–As the US deepens its pursuit for denuclearization as an end, the misalignment of goals between Washington and Pyongyang persists and even grows. Originality, Value–Through our analysis, we contribute to existing work that identifies North Korea’s liability for the engagement failures and add texture to the understanding of the current deadlock in negotiations.
2010
On 12 October 2008, as a successful result of Six-Party Talks, the US government removed North Korea from its list of terrorism-sponsoring states, which had been one of the main reasons for economic sanctions against North Korea. Although it could not be viewed as an imminent and irreversible decision, the softening of the Bush administration's position represents a major change in distrustful interactions between the two countries. What made the Bush administration change its policy course against North Korea, which had continued for a quite long time? Regarding the real effectiveness of sanctions against North Korea, this study seeks to focus on the changing perspectives on economic sanctions in US–DPRK relations and the changing strategy of the Bush administration toward North Korea. Eventually the Bush administration did not give up its basic attitudes on the economic sanctions against North Korea, but redesigned its existing unilateral economic sanctions to build multilater...
M. G. Ciot (2018), New Researches in International Relations, Presa Universitara Clujeana, 2018
It is not difficult to support the claims that North Korea is both a rogue state (refusing to accept certain international responsibilities) and a threat to international peace and security (the nuclear ballistic missile programme). However, the scope of this paper is not to analyse the reasons that led to North Korea's notorious accomplishments, neither to reveal the disturbing human-rights abuses taking place regularly, nor to discuss the depths of state control and oppression of the North Korean people, which, from time to time, surprise even the most jaded of experts. The scope of this article is to assess North Korea's decision-making process in relation with the Trump Administration's change of policy towards the DPRK, thought the words and actions of Kim Jong-un, the country's eccentric dictator. Kim Jong-un became North Korea's Supreme leader in late 2011, following the death of his father, Kim Jong-il. From the start, many tried to portray the young Kim as a degenerate and ruthless dictator, part of which is true, part of which is biased and due to the Western, mostly the US', distaste for anything or anyone which does not share their values, thus adding to the fears of an already paranoid regime. Nevertheless, the new Supreme Leader, Kim Jong-un, has made the headlines by engaging in a very complex and surprisingly able foreign policy by mixing nuclear threats with dialogue with its Southem neighbour. This has marked a premiere as the two Koreas have stopped trans-border cooperation and ceased any communications more than two years ago. This would also mark a premiere for the new South Korean Administration, which is actively seeking dialogue and cooperation, even as the rhetoriccoming from the South's main ally, the United States, indicates otherwise, with President Trump threatening military action to stop the North Korean nuclear programme.
Why do states that make a deliberate effort to pursue rapprochement sometimes fail? This article shows how certain types of elite discourse can shape and constrain the outcomes of major policy initiatives. In the case of the fleeting US-North Korea rapprochement, which lasted from 1994-2002, a consensus among U.S. foreign policy elites about the threat that North Korea posed "shaped and shoved" the US approach to North Korea in ways that strongly favored a collapse of rapprochement and a reversion to a mutually acrimonious relationship. The case examined is both a deviant case for theories of rapprochement and a plausibility probe of the article's threat consensus discursive framework.