Neoliberal Restructuring in the Eurozone Crisis: 'New Constitutionalism' and Italy's Post-Crisis Legal Transformations, 2014-2016 (original) (raw)
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On 9 November 2011 the spread between Italian government bonds and German bunds reached a record high of 553 basis points. Only two years before, that difference was negligible: financial markets had been treating all European countries as if they were effectively the same. This is because the European Monetary Union was founded on the assumption that member countries would converge toward a neoliberal economic model. Yet, the recent Eurozone crisis reminds us that this process never fully took place. Inspired by these developments, this thesis asks why conversion to a neoliberal model did not occur in Italy. More specifically, this study retraces the historical reasons why the precepts of neoliberalism never dominated economic policymaking in Italy. To do so, I identify four main actors in economic policymaking: political parties, unions, industrialists, and the Catholic Church. I then evaluate the influence of these actors by undertaking a longitudinal study of three waves of neoliberal pressures in Italy since WWII. I find that, while the position of most of these actors has fluctuated over time, political parties have constituted a constant obstacle to neoliberal reforms in Italy. The findings of this research are not confined to theoretical debates. This study provides an important starting point to reevaluate policymaking strategies both at the Italian and at the European level. Overall, historical evidence suggests that European authorities cannot impose nor expect economic convergence without a full ideological and political engagement of those national actors responsible for domestic economic policy.
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Austerity measures prescribed to Italy by supranational organisations imposed a sort of para-constitution , which meant the start of a struggle to change the constitution based on principles of popular sovereignty, regionalism and welfare state. Since 2010, central government thrown into crisis by balance-budget goals imposed by Troika's memorandums in a context of strength of national parliament and local authorities as constitutional counter-powers. The reaction of central executive was its enforcement to the prejudice of democratic bodies' prerogatives, both national and local, seen as the fastest way to realize externally imposed austerity policies in future. After only fifteen years from the federal reform, the territorial allocation of powers and policies is affected by the new constitutional reform (which next year will be subjected to a referendum), because of the new " national supremacy clause " , the abrogation of the concurrent legislation of regions and the cut of members and powers of the Senate (which should have been the regional chamber in Constituents' idea of state). This new reform will change also the method of composition of the Senate, introducing the representatives of regional institutions instead of regional communities. A silent institutional revolution is changing the foundations of the Republic, as seen with the insert of a temporary derogation of the procedure of constitutional revision, with the assent of the President of the Republic, which should have been the prime warranter of the respect of entire Constitution. These political reforms could encourage the rise of a model of post-democracy, where legitimation of government is only plebiscitary and formal sovereign, people, is seen only as a recognitional community of effectiveness of government's measures, with no concrete possibility to contribute to national politics as said in Constitution.
Institutional Reform in Italy to Respond to the EU Challenge: Renzi’s Constitutional Reform Project
This paper evaluates Renzi’s constitutional reform programme by assessing it against the main reasons for its failure to be achieved in the past two decades. The first section outlines the scale of those failures against the expectations of the putative reformers of the early 1990s, while at the same time emphasizing the paradox of the scale of change that has nonetheless occurred to in the functioning of the political system in the same period. The subsequent two sections identify two main causes for failure: the intense politicization of the issue and the failure to find an effective process or procedure to carry through the reform. Renzi’s proposed constitutional reforms are then analysed from these perspectives to identify what is different about them and his approach generally. It is argued that Renzi’s programme of reform and its approach does differ to those of his predecessors in ways that increase the possibility of successful achievement, although the outcome remains highl...
2008
Changes in social patterns and in social policies have profoundly transformed the Italian family and society. New technological and economic conditions have challenged the old pattern of production, employment and labour standards. Italy's response has been a "limping reformism": the various components of the Italian social model have developed along different lines. While convergence on legislative features and on macroeconomic policy has been almost mandatory, owing to the external constraints represented by European directives and the common currency, in other fields, namely the labour and product markets, reforms have often been "at the margin" or have not substantially altered the Italian model. Failure (or only partial implementation) of reforms in one area has shifted the cost to other areas. The end result has been the exacerbation of old segmentations and the creation of new ones and the convergence at different speeds on the "European social model". JEL classification: I00; J00; O52. . The authors wish to thank the participants to the EU project "Dynamo" (Dynamics of National Employment Models) and two referees for their comments. The usual disclaimers apply.
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This article on the Italian case is based on recent trends in labour market reform. We critically review the reform approach adopted in recent years, mainly centred on marginal legislative reforms in employment contracts. The diffusion of flexible labour contracts, especially among the younger generations and women, together with a welfare system still based on employment seniority and job characteristics, have reinforced the segmentation of the Italian labour market and social inequalities. The absence of a negotiating strategy in introducing reforms has also increased social conflict. These trends ask for a comprehensive reform of the welfare system and for active policies to support labour market transitions, a reform which is increasingly considered in the current political debate.