Trussht me, I know what I sshaw: The acceptance of misinformation from an apparently unreliable co-witness (original) (raw)
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2007
Inaccuracies in eyewitness accounts can occur when witnesses are exposed to post-event misinformation via discussion with a co-witness. The current study examined the role of co-witness relationship by comparing the memory performance of pairs of romantic couples, friends and previously unacquainted strangers with that of individuals. Ninety-six participants viewed an event and then discussed the witnessed event with a stranger, a romantic partner or a friend. One member of each pair saw a theft take place during the witnessed event. Individual group participants did not discuss the witnessed event with anyone. Results indicate that all co-witness dyads produced less accurate recall accounts than participants who did not interact with another witness. However, witnesses who were previously acquainted with their co-witness (either in a friendship or romantic relationship) were significantly more likely to report information obtained from their co-witness that they had not seen themse...
2020
Inaccuracies in eyewitness accounts can occur when witnesses are exposed to postevent misinformation via discussion with a co-witness. The current study examined the role of co-witness relationship by comparing the memory performance of pairs of romantic couples, friends and previously unacquainted strangers with that of individuals. Ninety-six participants viewed an event and then discussed the witnessed event with a stranger, a romantic partner or a friend. One member of each pair saw a theft take place during the witnessed event. Individual group participants did not discuss the witnessed event with anyone. Results indicate that all co-witness dyads produced less accurate recall accounts than participants who did not interact with another witness. However, witnesses who were previously acquainted with their cowitness (either in a friendship or romantic relationship) were significantly more likely to report information obtained from their co-witness that they had not seen themselv...
Objectives. Errors in eyewitness accounts can occur when a witness comes into contact with post-event 'misinformation'. A common way to encounter misinformation is through face-to-face interaction, in particular, via conversation with other individuals who also witnessed the crime. The current research compares this kind of misinformation with the non-social post-event narrative method typically employed in laboratory studies. Method. Young (17-33 years) and older (58-80 years) adults viewed a simulated crime event on video and were later exposed to four items of misinformation about it. The misinformation items were either introduced as part of a discussion about the event with a confederate or were embedded within a written narrative about the event that participants were asked to read. A questionnaire containing 20 items about the event was given to participants before and after the experimental manipulation. Results. Participants were less accurate than controls on questionnaire items after encountering misinformation. More importantly, misinformation encountered socially was significantly more misleading than misinformation from a non-social source. This was true for both young and older adults. Conclusion. Misinformation encountered socially produced more errors than misinformation from a non-social source. This finding has implications both for applied (forensic) and theoretical understanding of eyewitness memory. When asked to remember an event, people often report information that they have encountered after the event, rather than what they originally experienced (Loftus, 1979). Within the eyewitness literature there has been a particular focus on the effects of encountering errant post-event information (misinformation), as this is a potentially serious cause of witness error. The act of reporting misinformation in place of the
Personality Correlates of Co-Witness Suggestibility
Journal of Forensic Psychology Research and Practice
The present study examined the relationship between co-witness suggestibility and individual differences in interpersonal characteristics. Participants (N=473) took part in an eyewitness simulation, five independent conditions were used to control for misinformation size. Using confederates, the researchers exposed participants to misinformation about the witnessed event, prior to collecting their statements. The participants then completed the Fundamental Interpersonal Relations Orientation-Behaviour assessment (FIRO-B; Schutz, 1958), a measure of expressed and wanted control, affection, and inclusion. Results suggested that the wanted control dimension was an accurate predictor of co-witness suggestibility. Eyewitnesses who scored highly on Wanted Control, were significantly more likely to accept misinformation from co-witnesses; and were more likely to lose confidence in their own judgements, after a group discussion. In addition, the results suggest that the unanimity of misinformation, but not the size, had a significant influence on co-witness suggestibility.
2014
After witnessing an event, people often report having seen details that were merely suggested to them. Evidence is mixed regarding how well participants can use confidence judgments to discriminate between their correct and misled memory reports. We tested the prediction that the confidence-accuracy relationship for misled details depends upon the availability of source cues at retrieval. In Experiment 1, participants (N = 77) viewed a videotaped staged crime before reading a misleading narrative. After seven minutes or one week, the participants completed a cued recall test for the details of the original event. Prior to completing the test, all participants were warned that the narrative contained misleading details to encourage source monitoring. The results showed that the strength of the confidence-accuracy relationship declined significantly over the delay. We interpret our results in the source monitoring framework. After an extended delay, fewer diagnostic source details were available to participants, increasing reliance on retrieval fluency as a basis for memory and metamemory decisions. We tested this interpretation in a second experiment, in which participants (N = 42) completed a source monitoring test instead of a cued recall test. We observed a large effect of retention interval on source monitoring, and no significant effect on item memory. This research emphasizes the importance of securing eyewitness statements as soon as possible after an event, when witnesses are most able to discriminate between information that was personally seen and information obtained from secondary sources.
Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition, 2019
We examined the replicability of the co-witness suggestibility effect originally reported by Garry et al. (2008) by testing participants from 10 countries (Brazil, Canada, Colombia, India, Japan, Malaysia, Poland, Portugal, Turkey, and the United Kingdom, total N = 486). Pairs of participants sat beside each other, viewing different versions of the same movie while believing that they viewed the same version. Later, participant pairs answered questions collaboratively, which guided them to discuss conflicting details. Finally, participants took a recognition test individually. Each of the 10 samples replicated the Garry et al. finding: Participants often reported on the final test a non-witnessed answer that their co-witness had stated during the collaboration phase. Such co-witness suggestibility errors were especially likely when the witness had not disputed the co-witness’s report during the collaboration phase. The results demonstrate the replicability and generalizability of the co-witness suggestibility effect.