“But Me No Buts”: The Theological Debate Between the Hasidim and the Mitnagdim in Light of the Discourse-Markers Theory (English) (original) (raw)
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Most everyone has heard the old saying “it’s best to leave religion and politics at the doorstep”, usually because both topics evoke passionate responses as most people hold their political beliefs and/or religious beliefs dear. Yet, often times, both are intriguing topics of conversation, especially when the speakers involved hold opposing beliefs or when one speaker holds very strong beliefs while the other speaker holds little to no beliefs on the subject at hand. The fact that these conversations have the ability of eliciting similar reactions from the speakers is a sign that the language used to express political beliefs is very similar to the language used to express religious beliefs. In this paper, I will focus on the case of the words used by the speakers in the conversation on a particular religious belief or set of religious beliefs show the incommensurability of religious language in everyday discourse, especially given the diversity of possible speakers, due to the very nature of religious belief and utterances about religious beliefs. Thus, I believe that, particularly for the question of the discourse on religious beliefs, the question what form does this discourse assume? is a very interesting one and one worth investigating further. As such, in this paper, I strongly urge the acceptance that the discourse involving religious language and utterances about religious beliefs between the pious (the serious, genuine religious believer), the conformist (the lackadaisical yet genuine religious individual), the masquerader (the apparent yet nominal religious non-believer) and the atheist (the decidedly non-religious individual) is a clear case of incommensurability. In particular, the discourse which employs religious language where and when used by speakers who hold different beliefs represents an incommensurability between the speakers, such that there does indeed exist a “enormous gulf between [them]” (Putnam 143). In order to situate this discussion,, I will first provide a broad definition of religious language and the four types of speakers. Following, I will discuss incommensurability and religious language as understood by Thomas Kuhn, Ludwig Josef Johann Wittgenstein, Hilary Putnam, and Wilfrid Cantwell Smith. (1) I will discuss Thomas Kuhn’s conception of incommensurability. (2) I will discuss the relation between religious belief and its significance in the use of religious language in religious discourse, as Wittgenstein understood it, as contained in his students’ notes in the “Lectures on Religious Belief”. (3) I will discuss Putnam’s “Wittgenstein on Religious Belief” to consider his analysis of Wittgenstein's representation of religious belief in language. (4) I consider an analysis from comparative religion provided by Smith regarding the conversation held between the pious (the serious, genuine religious believer) and the masquerader (the apparent yet nominal religious non-believer) to present the distinction of speakers wherever religious discourse transpires. (5) Having done so, I return to consider Wittgenstein’s argument of the “un-shakeability” (Putnam 144) of religious beliefs for the pious (the serious, genuine religious believer) and his claim that no contradictions are present in the discourse (Putnam 147) between, as I will term them, the pious (the serious, genuine religious believer) and the masquerader (the apparent yet nominal religious non-believer). In doing so, I then turn to consider Putnam’s interpretation. (1) Having introduced the doctrine of incommensurability, I aim to pinpoint and depict how the different types of speakers present wherever religious language is used in discourse (between the pious (the serious, genuine religious believer), the conformist (the lackadaisical yet genuine religious individual), the masquerader (the apparent yet nominal religious non-believer) and the atheist (the decidedly non-religious individual)). (2) I consider then the special case of a speaker who experiences a change in religious belief, namely the convert. I explore the type of speaker that a convert is before and after his or her conversion by analogy to the Gestalt switch from psychology. Importantly, for the purpose of this discussion, the convert will represent the person who transitions between the four types of speaker, whether into or out of genuine belief. (3) Having introduced the four main speakers and the convert between the types, I illustrate an analogous case of incommensurability by focusing on the language of boredom. In doing so, I will highlight the similarities contained by the sentences “[I believe] I am in a state of boredom”, which is to say “I am bored”, and “I believe in a given set of religious beliefs, Ω”, which is to say “I believe in Ω”. I will also highlight the similarities contained by the sentences “[I believe] I am not in a state of boredom”, which is to say “I am not bored”, and “I do not believe in a given set of religious beliefs, Ω”, which is to say “I do not believe in Ω”. Having illustrated how conversations between different types of speakers using religious language are cases of incommensurability, I investigate the alternatives. (1) I discuss Pope Saint John Paul II’s Encyclical Letter on the Relationship between Faith and Reason (Fides et Ratio), where he expresses that faith and reason are not mutually exclusive but rather compatible and essential in humankind’s search for the absolute truth. This is to say, if faith and reason are compatible due to the absolute truth, then any and all conversations, including those of religious language, must be commensurable. (2) I then consider The Dialectics of Secularization (2004), which follows a conversation between Jürgen Habermas and then-Cardinal Ratzinger (later Pope Benedict XVI), where Habermas concludes that there exist both secularized uses of language and religious uses of language, where believers and non-believers should simply expect disagreement while Pope Benedict XVI concludes that there is an absolute truth to be aimed towards. (3) In detailing these, I will identify how their failures strengthen the need of the acceptance of “doctrine of incommensurability” (Putnam 152) as descriptive of as it is truly the case for the discourse between the pious religious believer and the masquerader. Ultimately, I will show that the first interpretation of the “doctrine of incommensurability” (Putnam 152), as suggested by Putnam, is a plausible claim that should be accepted as the sole answer to the question what form does the discourse between the pious religious believer and the masquerader assume?, because the between the pious (the serious, genuine religious believer) and the masquerader (the apparent yet nominal religious nonbeliever) hold conversation despite the presence of an “enormous gulf” between them (Putnam 144) which causes them to “talk past one another” (Putnam 143), rendering their statements of religious belief as incommensurable.