[Thomas Aquinas on] Grace and Free Will (original) (raw)

The Function of Free Will in Aquinas' Analysis of Grace

KUL course paper, 2019

The tension between God’s existence and human freedom is a perplexing problem. While several thinkers argue for the incompatibility of God’s existence with human freedom, a number of theologians follow Aquinas’ assertion that the dilemma can be addressed theologically through the lens of concurrentism. Arguing from the point of view concurrentism, I highlight the function of free will in Aquinas’ analysis of grace. I noted that for Aquinas, grace expands options rather limiting it through anchoring it to the divine will that stretches it out in all imaginable horizons of possibilities. God, as the ultimate good, is the source of grace and of our being as inherently good. In that sense, God is the fullness of our human freedom rather than its threat. Since our inherent self is characterized by goodness, we become freer by choosing what is good. What this means is that since we are inherently good, although not perfect, we express ourselves more and attain the perfection of our being, as good, by our pursuit for the universal good in all things. But the pursuit for the universal and ultimate good necessitates an understanding of the will of God. Fortunately, humans possess the faculty of reason and faith that enable them to discern and correspond to God’s will. It is also through reason that humans are capable of attuning their will to the divine will and participate in God’s active saving grace through the pursuit of a life of virtuous. Living a virtuous life is a way forward towards the beatific life, which by God’s grace, becomes accessible either partially and lacking (in the here and now) or completely and perfect (in the eschatological time). Aquinas theological project, as reflected in the Summa Theologica, can be rightly appreciated through the lens of his idea of grace. In the end, we can conclude that Aquinas’ theology begins and ends with grace. There is no contradiction between God and human freedom since the latter not only finds its origin and end in the former but its intellectual and moral aliment and perfection as well.

Aquinas on Free Will and Intellectual Determinism

Philosophers' Imprint, 2017

From the early reception of Thomas Aquinas up to the present, many have interpreted his theory of liberum arbitrium (which for Aquinas is free will specifically as the power to choose among alternatives) to imply intellectual determinism: we do not control our choices, because we do not control the practical judgments that cause our choices. In this paper we argue instead that he rejects determinism in general and intellectual determinism in particular , which would effectively destroy liberum arbitrium as he conceives of it. We clarify that for Aquinas moral responsibility presupposes liberum arbitrium and thus the ability to do otherwise, although the ability to do otherwise applies differently to praise and blame. His argument against intellectual determinism is not straightforward, but we construct it by analogy to his arguments against other deterministic threats (e.g., the one posed by divine foreknowledge). The non-determinism of the intellect's causality with respect to the will results from his claims that practical reasoning is defeasible and that the reasons for actions are not contrastive reasons.

Virtue and Grace in the Theology of Thomas Aquinas

Cambridge University Press, 2020

Throughout his writings, Thomas Aquinas exhibited a remarkable stability of thought. However, in some areas such as his theology of grace, his thought underwent titanic developments. In this book, Justin M. Anderson traces both those developments in grace and their causes. After introducing the various meanings of virtue Aquinas utilized, including'virtue in its fullest sense'and various forms of'qualified virtue', he explores the historical context that conditioned that account. Through a close analysis of his writings, Anderson unearths Aquinas's own discoveries and analyses that would propel his understanding of human experience, divine action, and supernatural grace in new directions. In the end, we discover an account of virtue that is inextricably linked to his developed understanding of sin, grace and divine action in human life. As such, Anderson challenges the received understanding of Aquinas's account of virtue, as well as his relationship to contemporary virtue ethics.

Freedom and the unconscious in Thomas Aquinas

2000

If Thomas Aquinas had to be given a religious name, as it is customary among Carmelites, he could have been called Thomas a Creatore. With this proposal in his delighting essay on Aquinas, G.K. Chesterton has underscored a ruling perspective of Thomistic thought. This ruling perspective of the unity of theology of creation and salvation underlies the following affirmation which I understand as an urgent plea for interdisciplinary learning and dialogue to be sought by theologians: "Error circa creaturas redundat in/alsam de Deo scientiam, et hominum mentes a Deo abducit in quem fides dirigere nititur" (Summa contra Gentiles 11,3). An error about the creatures causes an even more mistaken theology, and distracts human minds from God in whom they ought to direct their faith.