Review of Rethinking Asia S Economic Miracle the Political Economy of War Prosperity and Crisis (original) (raw)
Related papers
Miracle Growth in Japan: Its Crucial Significance for the Economics and Geopolitics of the Cold War
Given Japan's history of muscular militarism during the period 1880 to 1945; given its defeat by the Allied Powers in World War II; it is hardly surprising Japanese elites renounced active warfare in forging a postwar constitution, especially given the occupation of the country by the United States. Still, Japan contributed to the American led competition with the Soviet Union and the other Communist powers during the Cold War. Its contribution was economic, ideological and geopolitical.
Asia’s First Giant: A Brief Look at Japan’s Development
"If Amsden (1992) says that South Korea is Asia’s next giant then Japan is the first. Japan’s economic development was unprecedented in history and set an example to other countries in the Asia by showing that late development and catching up were more than theoretical concepts. Japan’s explosive economic growth and its swift catch up with developed countries, along with its overall improvements in efficiency (Krugman, 1994) raised much attention. Much has been said about the Japanese way of economic development in the last several decades, and one thing is clear that Japan charted its very own and unique route to development. This paper outlines the main tenets of Japan’s development, and tries to answer, how Japan became a developed economy in less than half a decade. Section one makes a brief historical introduction, followed by a discussion about the initial conditions, effects of institutional developments in Japan after the World War II, and the impact of colonization. Section two outlines the effects of traditions in Japan’s economic development, enters the discussion of establishment of the dual economy, and the role of government. Section three is about the impact of trade on Japan’s development and how Japan achieved development using its own resources. Section four summarizes the previous three sections and concludes the paper."
Japan and the Asian Economies: A "Miracle" in Transition
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1996
Japan and the Asian Economies: A "Miracle" in Transition ONE EAST ASIAN country after another has taken off from a stagnant state to achieve an annual economic growth rate of 10 percent or more. The fact that such high economic growth rates are being sustained, along with observation based on growth convergence regressions that prior economic and social conditions do not seem to have warranted such rapid growth, has led many to call the East Asian growth a miracle. ' However, this is not the first time that an Asian country has grown miraculously fast. From the mid-1950s until 1973, Japan grew at a rate comparable to that of the East Asian economies today. And just as concerns are voiced today that some East Asian economies are overheating and their governments face the difficult task of inducing a " softlanding," a similar concern was heard in Japan three decades ago. Japan's high rate of growth from the mid-1950s through the early 1970s was a topic explored by many studies at the time. Several authors believed that Japan's economic institutions and policies were unique, and that its growth was an exception to the rule. In light of the rapid growth of the other East Asian economies in recent years, this earlier Japanese experience is no longer viewed as exceptional. The success of the East Asian economies offers fresh case studies for development economics and growth theory. The World Bank study The East Asian The views expressed are those of the author and should not be interpreted as representative of the staff or trustees of the Brookings Institution or the International Monetary Fund. David Weinstein offered constructive comments and helpful suggestions for revising the paper. The comments of other participants at the Brookings Panel meeting, in particular, Jeffrey Frankel, Edward Lincoln, and Yung Chul Park, were also very helpful. Tokuo Iwaisako provided excellent research assistance. 1. See, for example, World Bank (1993), Page (1994), Easterly (1995), and Campos and Root (1996). 3. Representative examples from the 1970s include Ohkawa and Rosovsky (1973), Patrick and Rosovsky (1976), Denison and Chung (1976a, 1976b), and Ohkawa and Shinohara (1979). Long-term statistics for various sectors, as well as aggregate variables, are collected in the fourteen volume series Estimates of Long-Term Economic
Wartime and Post-war Economies (Japan) | International Encyclopedia of the First World War (WW1)
2021
Although the military and geopolitical relevance of World War I to Japan must be considered limited, its economic impact was considerable. In sharp contrast to the prewar deficit years, Japan saw its external trade expand rapidly. This article describes how the country’s establishment reacted to this shift. In addition to lending to several allies, it also engaged in the politically risky strategy of extending loans to China. These “Nishihara loans” not only reverberated in U.S.-Japan relations for decades to come, but also impacted the Terauchi cabinet’s decision to take part in a multilateral Siberian intervention. The domestic consequences of this intervention (the rice riots of 1918) would lead to the downfall of the cabinet and the shelving of pan-Asianist policies until the early 1930s. Economically, the 1920s were a decade of crises and reorientation in the postwar, mostly American-led order.
2007
Since the 1980s, a widespread view has arisen in the literature that the post-1950 economic successes of Taiwan and the Republic of Korea have been due, in part at least, to the legacy of Japanese colonialism. This paper challenges that view by comparing Japanese economic achievements in both Taiwan and Korea with those of the British, French, Dutch and Americans in their Southeast Asian colonies. The paper examines the record of economic growth and structural change across the various colonies, and also discusses policies relating to government revenue and expenditure and to trade, exchange rates and the balance of payments. The paper also looks at some non-monetary indicators relating to living standards, including mortality rates and educational enrolments. The main conclusion is that the facts do not wholly support the case for Japanese exceptionalism.
Miracle Growth in Japan and Japan's Cold War Contribution
Relying on a military power equation created by the author - an equation taking account of economic prowess and geopolitical location - this paper argues Japan may important contributions to the success of the Western powers in combatting the Communist bloc during the Cold War.
Caucasus International, 2017
Michael R. Auslin, a former history professor at Yale University, opens his book with the statement, “Since Marco Polo, the West has waited for the Asian Century”. According to Auslin, the world believes that this century has now arrived, but that Asia is a fractured region threatened by stagnation and instability. His book is based on a quarter-century of engagement with and study of Asia, and years of travel throughout the Indo-Pacific region, including three major research trips and several shorter trips starting in 2010. Auslin interviewed dozens of politicians, military officials, academics, business leaders, media figures, and ordinary citizens during these journeys. In this book, Auslin assesses the current situation in Asia as well as its future challenges and prospects. In doing so, he separates the book into seven sections, and provides a pragmatic overview of the region. He starts by presenting the ‘risk map’ of Asia, mapping out five discrete yet interrelated risk regions, aimed at demonstrating that, “the most promising way to reduce risk is to push for greater liberalism and a strengthened rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific” (p. 10). In the second section, Auslin focuses on Asia’s economic miracle. He posits that the region has taken over the mantle of ‘the world’s workshop’ from Western countries, and alleges that this transformation has not been driven by China alone, but by many Asian countries. His main point in this section – and in this book as a whole – is that “today the economic miracle of Asia is at risk from the failure of economic reform to deal with the costs of growth, whether in advanced countries like Japan or developing nations like India and Indonesia” (p. 14).