William James's “psychologist's fallacy” and contemporary human science research (original) (raw)
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Some reflections on the phenomenological method
There is no unique and definitive definition of phenomenology. It is rather a method and an experience always open and always renewing itself. Phenomenology involves a change in the “sense of the world”: everything acquires its sense and value only when it becomes the content of the lived experience of the subject correlated to his intentional acts. This is the main thesis of the phenomenological method aiming at overcoming the traditional opposition between rationalism and empiricism. Starting from Husserl, the father of this approach, the history of phenomenology undertook different and unexpected developments which in some cases were rather far away from Husserl’s original thought. In the U.K. attention has been given to an analytical-epistemological phenomenology focused on the relationship between intentionality and logical semantics. In France it is mainly an anthropological-existential phenomenology. In Germany an hermeneutic phenomenology was developed, mainly by Heidegger and Gadamer. Regardless of these raw distinctions, a big question is so far unresolved: how to reconcile the phenomenological/existential stance claiming for the irreducibility of each lived experience and the scientific paradigm? Is it possible to imagine brain mechanisms and physiological systems explaining the endless mysteries and manifold paradoxes of the human being?Phenomenology claims that a human being can never be considered as an object, as if he was a natural thing; rather the task is to understand him as the focus of a relationship linking subjective attitudes to the objects showed by the experience. In this sense, an important contribution was Merleau-Ponty’s view that man is not something psychic joined to an organism, but a sort of fluctuation of the existence that sometimes is a bodily one, sometimes refers to personal acts. Consequently, he proposes to reinstate in the existence both its “physiological” and “psychic” sides both being intentionally oriented towards a world.
The Palgrave Handbook of Critical Social Psychology, 2017
The thesis of my paper is that the current “debate” between “descriptive” and “interpretive” modes of doing phenomenology is based largely on a misguided understanding of the meaning of these terms as they are used in the philosophical literature; and that these two adjectives have taken on a life of their own, in the “socially constructed” use of these terms, especially within the group called the International Human Science Research Conference (IHSRC). Berger & Luckmann (1966) indicated that terms such as these might be thought of as “conceptual machineries of universe-maintenance” (p 104). Within the IHSRC, these terms have been used at first informally, and now in a more political manner, for differentiating “camps” within human science research. Walsh & Koelsch (2012) have referred to “qualitative fault lines” within the field, which I agree can do more harm than good: When they set up false boundaries in the work itself of conducting research, then the concern for whether one’s work qualifies as “descriptive” versus “interpretative” becomes problematic and even counterproductive. Through reference to the writings of Husserl and Heidegger on the themes of description and interpretation, we will attempt to sort through the issues at stake when engaging in phenomenological research, and to place in linguistic context what the terms "description" and "interpretation" mean when used in reference to qualitative research (as well as in reference to phenomenology and psychoanalysis).
Phenomenology in Its Original Sense
Qualitative Health Research, 2017
What distinguishes phenomenology in its original sense? My intent is to focus on the project and methodology of phenomenology in a manner that is not overly technical and that may help others to further elaborate on or question the singular features that make phenomenology into a unique qualitative form of inquiry. I pay special attention to the notion of “lived” in the phenomenological term “lived experience” to demonstrate its critical role and significance for understanding phenomenological reflection, meaning, analysis, and insights. I also attend to the kind of experiential material that is needed to focus on a genuine phenomenological question that should guide any specific research project. Heidegger, van den Berg, and Marion provide some poignant exemplars of the use of narrative “examples” in phenomenological explorations of the phenomena of “boredom,” “conversation,” and “the meaningful look in eye-contact.” Only what is given or what gives itself in lived experience (or conscious awareness) are proper phenomenological “data” or “givens,” but these givens are not to be confused with data material that can be coded, sorted, abstracted, and accordingly analyzed in some “systematic” manner. The latter approach to experiential research may be appropriate and worthwhile for various types of qualitative inquiry but not for phenomenology in its original sense. Finally, I use the mythical figure of Kairos to show that the famous phenomenological couplet of the epoché-reduction aims for phenomenological insights that require experiential analysis and attentive (but serendipitous) methodical inquiry practices.
The Meaning of "Phenomenology": Qualitative and Philosophical Phenomenological Research Methods
The Qualitative Report, 2021
I show some problems with recent discussions within qualitative research that centre around the “authenticity” of phenomenological research methods. I argue that attempts to restrict the scope of the term “phenomenology” via reference to the phenomenological philosophy of Husserl are misguided, because the meaning of the term “phenomenology” is only broadly restricted by etymology. My argument has two prongs: first, via a discussion of Husserl, I show that the canonical phenomenological tradition gives rise to many traits of contemporary qualitative phenomenological theory that are purportedly insufficiently genuine (such as characterisations of phenomenology as “what-its-likeness” and presuppositionless description). Second, I argue that it is not adherence to the theories and methods of prior practitioners such as Husserl that justifies the moniker “phenomenology” anyway. Thus, I show that the extent to which qualitative researchers ought to engage with the theory of philosophical phenomenology or adhere to a particular edict of Husserlian methodology ought to be determined by the fit between subject matter and methodology and conclude that qualitative research methods still qualify as phenomenological if they develop their own set of theoretical terms, traditions, and methods instead of importing them from philosophical phenomenology.
Phenomenology-Can-Do: Psychology as a Human Science, Fifty Years Later
Symposium. APA Convention, Sat Aug 11, 9-9:50 am, San Francisco, Mosconi Center, r.216 CE available Co-chairs Scott Churchill and Olga Louchakova-Schwartz Participants: Erik Craig, Scott Churchill, Olga Louchakova-Schwartz Discussant: Fred Wertz In this symposium, we reflect on contributions of phenomenological approaches to psychology's ways of knowing, and examine to what extent this approach requires formalization, and how it can be flexibly adjusted to the needs of research and clinical practice. In addition to early descriptive phenomenology of Husserl, or hermeneutic phenomenological ontology of Heidegger, the authors draw upon the recent developments in phenomenological philosophy: this includes phenomenology of emotions, embodiment, self-awareness, and especially the sphere of inter-subjectivity and the constitutive analysis used by contrast with a more simplified focus on the structures of meaning evident in daily life. Drawing upon his extensive history conducting existential therapy, the first presenter will examine the opening moments of the psychotherapeutic encounter engaging Being-with one- another [Heidegger's Miteinandersein]. This becomes the context within which the psychologist comes to know the patient. The very presence of psychologist becomes the chief way of knowing the other. The second presenter looks at the psychologist's acts of knowing from phenomenological and hermeneutic perspectives, reconsidering the meaning of Geisteswissenschaft [human science] and considering our mode of access to others in terms of empathy, second person perspectivity, and Heidegger's Mitbefindlichkeit [finding oneself in a shared disposition]. Working within the phenomenological tradition of Levinas, Henry, Otto, James and Dahl, our third presenter will review her novel findings regarding the ways in which religiousexperience impacts both the internal and external spheres of experience, such as selfawareness and one's relationship with, and action in, the world. We will show that in psychological clarifications of marginalized areas of human experience, phenomenological reflection offers more than does common sense naturalistic approach to knowledge generally practiced in psychology. In a concluding discussion, we will revisit intuition in its rapidly changing current cultural contexts, as a valid and promising means of delivering novel psychological findings and new strategies of successful clinical work.