The United Kingdom and the Future of Europe: Winning the Battle, Losing the War (original) (raw)

Structuring Europe: Powersharing Institutions and British Preferences on European Integration

Political Studies, 2000

Scholars examining British-European relations typically ascribe UK governmental positions firstly to a combination of distinct and incompatible values, attitudes, and beliefs stemming from historical experience; secondly to a distinct and incompatible set of functional imperativesnamely less interaction with European partners than is the case for other EU member states; and third a distinct and incompatible set of domestic interests. This article challenges these views. It presents evidence to suggest that British governments have failed to assimilate social demands, and that the reason is an under-recognized and untheorized intervening variable -namely the structure of decisionmaking institutions in Parliament. It models the influence of this variable, and suggests that historical institutionalist theory captures key elements of the variable in a manner superior to extant approaches.

British Policy Formulation for the EU

Claremont-UC Undergraduate Research Conference on the European Union, 2011

Historical and Institutional Legacy To understand the current context in which this investigation takes place, one must understand both the British and European legacy that led to this point in time. After WW2, the Cold War separated Europe into roughly two halves. Encouraged by the US, Western Europe began to integrate, both politically and economically. Britain at first encouraged this integration, while it remained outside of it at the same time. Subsequently, because of the loss of economic prowess and the advantages of the European project, the United Kingdom attempted to join the European Community. Indeed, while Europe no longer dominated the world as it once did, it still had one of the largest economies in the world. Finally, in 1973, after numerous attempts, the UK joined the present day European Union. The UK now serves as one of the main powers of the EU, giving it more relative power than if it was to act on its own. Key executive actors remain bounded by this historical legacy of a necessary, but reluctant membership within the EU. At the same time they are also constrained by the constantly changing evolutionary nature of the EU. Starting with the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952, then the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957, then the EU in 1993, and ultimately the consolidation of all of these various elements in 2007, the nature of the European transnational organization has not only evolved economically, but also politically over the latter half of the twentieth century (Miller and Clark, 2010, p. 3). While the degree of integration can be argued, the EU today is a politically and economically binding organization that impacts not only the Foreign Office, but also every single domestic agency, central or quango, in the UK. With its three main executive and legislative bodies consisting of the European Council, the Commission, and the European Parliament (EP), the EU is a transnational organization, not an international one (Miller and Clark, 2010, p. 7-9). While the balance between these organs has shifted over the course of EU history, British political actors remain constrained by the institutional mechanisms that blur the line between national and European interests. Public Attitudes toward the EU On the domestic level, public opinion tremendously influences the executive at the international negotiation table. In the United Kingdom, the public generally disapproves of the EU. According to a Eurobarometer poll in late 2009, trust in the EU is quoted at 22 percent, with trust in the Commission at 22 percent and trust in the EP at 22 percent (Miller, 2010, p 3). The UK public, according to political scientist Alistair Jones (2007), consistently "comes last" in the EU when asked "if membership of the EU is a good thing" (p. 157). Indeed, the UK is consistently among the least enthusiastic countries for the EU, though in recent years there has been more widespread discontent with some advancement in institutional change in other EU states, such as Ireland and the Netherlands (Jones, 2007, p.160-161). But there is something beyond just a lack support for the EU. The British public is

The UK idols and the EU institutions

This essay was written before the Lisbon Treaty came into force, but the European Constitution was rejected by way of referendum in France and the Netherlands. Keeping an eye on any sign of federalism, I tried to unveil the most striking peculiarities of the British legal and political culture> the symbols, the institutions, the idols, with the Queen above all else. In the second part, I have drafted a comparison to the EU institutions and legal system, seeking for possible common characteristics or, on the contrary, on their main divergence aspects/. Despite the fact that the interwar period acknowledged a UK's leading position and interest in the European unification projects, even for the federal variant, London has been reluctant to all the steps that followed the end of the world confrontation. The strong feeling of "otherness" together with that of greatness, coming out of Britain's proven capacity to oppose Hitler by itself for such a long time, turned to be strong reasons for them to believe they deserve at least, a leading position on the continent. For the entire the British performance meanwhile the war, they expected to be fully recognized as primum inter pares if not in a (morally, at least) hegemonic position. But Plan Marshall's requisites for some kind of united Europe as well as France's decision to cooperate with the Western part of Germany, left the British leaders alone not only on their island, but in their utopian dream. Instead of realizing a European unity against Germany, they were watching how Germany was supported both by the US (from whom UK expected largest assistance) and by France (which Churchill invited to set an anti-German alliance with). In this new context, the British leaders had to decide whether to accept an alliance and, thus, cooperation with their former enemy or to reinvent their entire foreign politics. The failure of The Free Trade European Association as well as the dissolution of the British Commonwealth placed the Westminster government in a very delicate position. "From a political point of view, the British space is a distinct part of the world-nor European, nor Asian, nor African, nor Australian or American, but simply, Britain. Its cohesion is not owed to any geographical connections, but to the community of language and culture of the dominant nation, as well as to the wisdom of its leaders." 2 Being so close related to its (ex-) colonies, The United Kingdom proves too large to be part of European Union, although its