Space and Time as Relations: The Theoretical Approach of Leibniz (original) (raw)
Related papers
Space and Time in Leibniz’s Early Metaphysics
Leibniz Society Review, 2008
In this paper I challenge the common view that early in his career (1679-1695) Leibniz held that space and time are well-founded phenomena, entities on an ontological par with bodies and their properties. I argue that the evidence Leibniz ever held that space and time are well-founded phenomena is extremely weak and that there is a great deal of evidence for thinking that in the 1680s he held a position much like the one scholars rightly attribute to him in his mature period, namely, that space and time are merely orders of existence and as such are purely abstract and occupy an ontological realm distinct from that of well-founded phenomena. In the course of arguing for this interpretation, I offer an account of the nature of Leibnizian phenomena which allows Leibniz to hold the view that space and time are phenomena, while at the same time thinking of them as abstract, ideal orders of existence.
Leibniz on Relativity and the Motion of Bodies
Philosophical Topics, 2003
In a number of writings Leibniz argued that it follows from the Cartesian account of motion as change of relative position that individual bodies cannot be said to move at all. I In this paper, I shall be concerned with some additional consequences that Leibniz drew from this argument that shed important light on the relationship between physics and metaphysics within his philosophy. I begin with an account of Leibniz's "argument from relativity" that differs from those previously offered in the literature. But I am also concerned with the way in which Leibniz uses the argument as a platform from which he can offer his own view of what it is for individual bodies to move. Leibniz provides three such accounts during his career and I shall discuss all three below. However, the llrst one that I shall discuss is far less significant since it appears only once, relatively early in Leibniz's life. Commentators have suggested that the remaining two discussions provide competing accounts of what is required for a body to move, the presence of which indicates a significant change in Leibniz's thinking about the issues over time. I argue instead that they are complementary components of a unified account of bodily motion that Leibniz adopted throughout his mature writings.
Leibniz's Metaphysics of Time and Space
Leibniz's Metaphysics of Time and Space, 2008
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On What There Already Is: Leibniz’s Theory of Time
Theodicy and Reason. Logic, Metaphysics, and Theology in Leibniz's Essais de Theéodicée (1710), M.Favaretti Camposampiero et al (eds.), Edizioni Ca'Foscari, Venezia, 2016
This paper contains an investigation of Leibniz’s ontology of time. Standard debates on Leibniz’s theory of time hinge upon the question whether the nature of time is relative or absolute and focus mainly on the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence. Focusing instead on Theodicy and referring to the contemporary frame and debate, I address some different questions: whether Leibniz is an A-theorist or a B-theorist, or an advocate of a hybrid form of an A/B-theory; and whether he is a presentist (who think that only present things and states of affairs exist) or an eternalist (who claims that past, present and future things and states of affairs are equally real). After careful analysis of several passages that seemingly support a presentist interpretation, I conclude that under the most charitable interpretation Leibniz should be considered as an eternalist, and precisely as a dynamical one. I further argue that Leibniz’s peculiar view on modality mirror this hybrid theory of time.
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research), 2022
We systematically analyze the conceptual structure of modern physics, i.e., the theory of relativity and quantum mechanics and quantum field theory, from the perspective of Leibniz's three basic principles of identity, sufficient reason and continuity. We find that Leibniz's way of thinking can still provide insight into fundamental problems of physics, such as the nature of physical constants, the relation between physical invariances and covariant coordinate representations, the role of the Planck scale and quantum mechanical indeterminism and the measurement problem. Leibniz himself could not possess all those insights, simply because physics was not yet sufficiently developed then, but he had already forged some conceptual tools with which some fundamental problems of modern physics can be addressed. *** * Acknowledgement: I am grateful to Richard Arthur and Vincenzo De Risi for critical comments and extensive discussions which provided me with much insight.
Thaumazein. Rivista de Filosofia, 2013
In this paper the author argues that the common narrative on 17th century science that uses the concept of scientific revolution to establish a strong distinction between ancient and modern philosophy has prevented the historiographical tradition to recognize the true role of the German syncretic philosophy, which significantly influenced Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz in the development of his concept of natural inertia and vis viva. I argue instead that their views cannot be described as syncretic in a negative way, since their development shows the level of advancement of that debate, which was already highlighting some limits of modern mechanism.
Teleology and Realism in Leibniz's Philosophy of Science
Leibniz and the Structure of Sciences, 2019
This paper argues for an interpretation of Leibniz's claim that physics requires both mechanical and teleological principles as a view regarding the interpretation of physical theories. Granting that Leibniz's fundamental ontology remains non-physical, or mentalistic, it argues that teleological principles nevertheless ground a realist commitment about mechanical descriptions of phenomena. The empirical results of the new sciences, according to Leibniz, have genuine truth conditions: there is a fact of the matter about the regularities observed in experience. Taking this stance, however, requires bringing non-empirical reasons to bear upon mechanical causal claims. This paper first evaluates extant interpretations of Leibniz's thesis that there are two realms in physics as describing parallel, self-sufficient sets of laws. It then examines Leibniz's use of teleological principles to interpret scientific results in the context of his interventions in debates in seventeenth-century kinematic theory, and in the teaching of Copernicanism. Leibniz's use of the principle of continuity and the principle of simplicity, for instance, reveal an underlying commitment to the truth-aptness, or approximate truth-aptness, of the new natural sciences. The paper concludes with a brief remark on the relation between metaphysics, theology, and physics in Leibniz.