Divine Hiddenness in the Christian Tradition (original) (raw)

Schellenberg on divine hiddenness and religious scepticism

Religious Studies, 2010

J. L. Schellenberg has constructed major arguments for atheism based on divine hiddenness in two separate works. This paper reviews these arguments and highlights how they are grounded in reflections on perfect divine love. However, Schellenberg also defends what he calls the ' subject mode' of religious scepticism. I argue that if one accepts Schellenberg's scepticism, then the foundation of his divine-hiddenness arguments is undermined by calling into question some of his conclusions regarding perfect divine love. In other words, if his scepticism is correct, then Schellenberg's case for atheism cannot stand. Finally, I demonstrate how my argument avoids the many defences that Schellenberg has employed thus far in defending these particular atheistic arguments.

Divine Hiddenness and the Concept of God

International Philosophical Quarterly, 2019

John Schellenberg’s version of the divine hiddenness argument is based on a concept of God as an omnipotent, morally perfect, and ontologically perfect being. I show that Schellenberg develops his argument in a way that is inconsistent with each of these aspects, from which it follows that the argument in question proves to be unsustainable.

REVIEW - The Hiddenness of God

Journal of Biblical and Theological Studies, 2020

Michael C. Rea is Rev. John A. O’Brien Professor of Philosophy and Director of the Center for Philosophy of Religion. In this book, Rea deals with two problems induced by divine hiddenness. They are [1] the argument against the existence of God, most notably by J. L. Schellenberg; and [2] the challenge of the idea of God’s love. Rea’s approach to the issues involves two steps to respond to these two problems respectively. The first step involves two arguments to show that the hiddenness problems are based on an unfounded assumption about divine love. The first argument, in Chapter 2, is that Schellenberg’s problem is based on a concept of God which is different from and fails to target specifically Christian belief in God. For Rea, the problem of divine hiddenness is fundamentally “a problem of violated expectations” (p. 25).

Divine Hiddenness and Christian Theism: A Biblical Theodicy

Perichoresis

This article offers a Christian response to J.L. Schellenberg's argument for atheism from divine hiddenness. Utilizing the unique theological features of the Christian tradition, I aim to show that Schellenberg's argument does not undermine belief in Christian theism. The first half of the article focuses on differences between the theological presuppositions of classical theism and those assumed in Schellenberg's use of perfect being theology. In the remainder of the article, I present a biblical theodicy that pulls from the Old Testament and current trends in religious belief to argue that the experience of divine hiddenness should not be unexpected if Christianity it true.

Divine Hiddenness: Defeated Evidence

Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement

This paper challenges a common assumption in the literature concerning the problem of divine hiddenness, namely, that the following are inconsistent: God's making available adequate evidence for belief that he exists and the existence of non-culpable nonbelievers. It draws on the notions of defeated evidence and glimpses to depict the complexity of our evidential situation with respect to God's existence.

Hiddenness of God, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2016)

2016

“Divine hiddenness,” as the phrase suggests, refers, most fundamentally, to the hiddenness of God, i.e. the alleged fact that God is hidden, absent, silent. In religious literature, there is a long history of expressions of annoyance, anxiety, and despair over divine hiddenness, so understood. Understood in this way, divine hiddenness poses an existential problem for those who have such experiences. However, “divine hiddenness” refers to something else in recent philosophical literature, especially since the publication of J.L. Schellenberg’s landmark book, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason (1993). In this context, it refers to alleged facts about the absence of belief of God, on the basis of which one might think there is no God. For example, Schellenberg argues that, since there are nonbelievers who are capable of a personal relationship with God and who do not resist it, there is no perfectly loving God, while Stephen Maitzen argues that naturalism better explains the “demographics” of nonbelief than theism and Jason Marsh argues that naturalism better explains “natural nonbelief” than theism. Understood in this way, divine hiddenness constitutes putative evidence for atheism. We leave divine hiddenness understood in the first way to those fit to address it—rabbis, imams, priests, pastors, ministers, therapists, spiritual directors and the like—although some of the recent philosophical literature addresses it (e.g. DeWeese-Boyd 2016; Garcia 2002). This entry focuses on divine hiddenness understood in the second way.

Nonresistant Nonbelief and Divine Hiding: Some Theistic Considerations

The argument from divine hiddenness centers on the claim that God’s hiddenness from nonresistant nonbelievers counts as evidence against his existence. The argument could be raised this way: given the alleged facts of widely-experienced hiddenness of and the absence of belief in God, on the assumption that theism is true, what we observe in the world is surprising or evidentially unexpected. On the other hand, on the assumption that theism is false, what we observe in the world—both epistemically and experientially—is what we should expect. In this paper, I assess the most recent incarnation of J.L. Schellenberg’s argument from nonresistant nonbelief and present what I think are potential solutions to (or ways to reevaluate) the problem.