The “Tuareg question” in Mali today (original) (raw)
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Over the past decade the displacement of narcotics supply lines has placed the remote and marginalised Sahara-Sahel region on the international drug route to the European market. Border control has become of primary importance, and an essential part of understanding the dynamics of competing political claims and armed movements. Secessionist, jihadist and statist political projects in northern Mali must now be interpreted in the light of dynamics of protection and extraction. In particular, the customary system of the droits de passage (rights of passage) has been transformed by the leap in scale and nature of traditional desert contraband. New actors have arisen, while others have been sidelined as various groups contend for the protection of illicit trade. This report explores the micro-level processes by which illicit economies have reshaped political and armed mobilisation. It explores the ways Tuareg traditions and grievances have been reconfigured under the influence of new illicit revenues. It also examines the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa, a jihadist splinter group that took control of the city of Gao in 2012 when it aligned with business figures seeking to wrest control over trafficking from rival Tuareg groups. In this context, both nationalism and jihadism tend to mask acute social tensions in the region.
Mali: A Neo-Colonial Operation Disguised as an Anti-Terrorist Intervention
In mid-January 2013, France invaded Mali, a former colony that sits in the middle of what was once the enormous French empire in Africa that stretched from Algeria to the Congo and from the Ivory Coast to the Sudan. The French government argued that its invasion of its former colony was an anti-terrorist and humanitarian intervention to prevent radical Salafist Muslims from taking the capital of Bamako and succeeding in taking control of the country. Critics have suggested that France had other motivations, above all maintaining its powerful influence in the region in order to prevent European competitors, the United States, or the Chinese from muscling in, but also because of its specific interests in resources such as uranium. The situation is very complex, in part because of a historic division and even antagonism between the Tuaregs, a Berber people in the North of Mali, and the black African population in the South, but also because, in addition to the various Islamist groups, there are also numerous organizations of traffickers in drugs and other contraband. In this article, Jean Batou unravels the complexity of the situation to lay bare the central social struggles taking place.
The 2012 Tuareg-Arab Uprising in Northern Mali and Regional Actors: The Impact of Libya and Algeria
Anemon Muş Alparslan Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi, 2023
Despite the peace agreement signed in Algeria in 2015, the Tuareg-Arab uprising in northern Mali is still one of the main conflicts that threaten security and stability in the Sahel. Regional actors played an undeniable role both in the development of the crisis and in the solution attempts. For this reason, this article aims to examine the development of the crisis that started in Mali in 2012 and continues today through the regional policies of Libya and Algeria. The fact that many Tuareg tribes lived in the southern cities of both countries caused them to be closely involved in the crisis in Mali and to be involved in the process. Muammar Gaddafi, the former leader of Libya, has been the biggest supporter of the Tuareg society within the framework of his pan-Africanist policies. The Tuareg youth who took refuge in Libya in the 1980s not only returned to their country and started the 1990 uprising, but also laid the foundations for the 2012 uprising. As the spiritual father of Tuaregs, Gaddafi's sudden death in 2011 is also cited as one of the main reasons for the 2012 rebellion in northern Mali. On the other hand, Algeria, which has a large Tuareg population in its southern cities, acted as a mediator not only in the 2012 uprising but also in the uprisings in Mali since the 1960s . They hosted the Peace and Reconciliation Agreement in Mali in 2015. This article is important in that it examines Maghreb-Sahel relations from a regional perspective, which cannot find enough space in the literature where existing studies on the crisis mostly focus on international actors. By evaluating transnational identities, minority issues and regional migration from a postcolonial perspective in supplement to political mobilization and regional security issues around the Mali crisis, this paper will provide a comprehensive understanding of the region.
Conflict and Stabilisation in Mali and the Sahel Region
The report covers factors including: Islamist terrorism; criminal networks and trafficking (of arms, drugs, cigarettes, and vehicles); and Tuareg rebellions against the Malian government. It also considers state weakness, including the weakness of state security structures in the north, and the role of neighbouring countries, ECOWAS, the AU and other international actors. Practical recommendations in the literature include: Adopt a burden-sharing and a multi-tiered approach that builds on the strengths of different actors Support livelihoods and integrate Tuareg concerns over land and livelihood opportunities through inclusive political engagement Seek to weaken incrementally the criminal networks in Mali's north through coherent international support for regional cooperation Establish a common position on ransom payments Consider joint anti-terrorism and development policies aiming to strengthen the state's operational capacity to deliver security and development Draw on traditional conflict-management mechanisms, such as inter-community and inter-clan solidarity systems Be sensitive to historical tensions between the Hausa and Tuareg ethnic groups.