Wittgenstein within the Philosophy of Religion (original) (raw)

The commonly held view that Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion entails an irrationalist defense of religion known as 'fideism' loses plausibility when contrasted with recent scholarship on Wittgenstein's corpus, biography, and other sources. This book reevaluates the place of Wittgenstein in the philosophy of religion and charts a path forward for the subfield by advancing three themes. The first is that philosophers of religion should question received interpretations of philosophers, such as Wittgenstein, as well as the meanings of key terms used in interpretations, such as 'fideism'. The second theme is that Wittgenstein's philosophy, across his corpus, pursues a particular end: a searching clarity or perspicuity. The third theme is that with the rise of various religious movements within societies and around the world in recent decades, philosophy of religion has important tasks in clarifying global conversations on living well amidst human diversities and contemplating philosophy as a vocation. Chapter Abstracts: Chapter 1: “Problems of Interpretive Authority in Wittgenstein’s Corpus” identifies a variety of problems involved in developing a principled reading of Wittgenstein. In setting the stage for the book, this chapter explores hermeneutical problems of reading Wittgenstein’s works with an eye to their relevance to philosophy of religion. I explore the merits of some interpretive schemes readers have used in approaching Wittgenstein. While some of the sources that concern religions include private diaries and correspondences never intended for publication, these important but problematic texts merit close attention. I argue that these sources should be read against the central themes and arguments of the texts Wittgenstein did prepare for publication. One such central theme, the ethic of perspicuity, coordinates my readings of his corpus. Chapter 2: “Wittgenstein, Biography, and Religious Identity” argues that studying Wittgenstein's biography is relevant to understanding his philosophical achievements and shortcomings. For Wittgenstein, philosophy was a personal practice as much as an academic discipline and one can see this practice in action in his life. The fragmentary and enigmatic remarks on religion found in places across his corpus can be better appreciated against the background of Wittgenstein’s life. The purpose of this chapter is to better appreciate the sources of discontinuity between Wittgenstein, who appears to have been alienated and possibly self-loathing, and his philosophy, which contains powerful resources for dismantling the very forces that bewitched him. Chapter 3: “A History of Wittgenstein and Philosophy of Religion” explores historically how the ideas of “meaning as use,” “language-games,” and “forms of life" were of interest to philosophers of religion in the middle to late twentieth century due to the influence of verificationist tendencies in theories of meaning and austere naturalistic metaphysics. The chapter also traces the development of criticisms of Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion, with special attention given to the work of Kai Nielsen. Critics such as Nielsen have detected an intellectually evasive or protective trend in Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion, and interpretations of Wittgenstein that suggest or propose a strong identification of language-games with religions clearly ought to be left behind. Chapter 4: “The Traditions of Fideism” presents a perspicuous approach to the histories of philosophy and theology through tracing the genealogies of the critical term “fideism” used in philosophical and theological classification and appraisal. Taking a cue from Wittgenstein, I propose that it is best to see how the term was actually used in its original context and to construct extensions of the term carefully from this original use. I trace the use of “fideism” from its origins in French Protestant and Catholic theological discourses to its current uses in philosophy, concluding that the term is helpful in interpretations only when philosophers scrupulously acknowledge the tradition of use that informs their understanding of the word. Chapter 5: “On ‘Fideism’ as an Interpretive Category” considers the adequacy of “fideism” for approaching Wittgenstein through comparisons with analyses of James and Kierkegaard. What emerges from this historical study of reception and interpretation is that the meaning of this critical term has continued to shift through twentieth century philosophical scholarship, and thus the question of whether or not any particular philosopher is a fideist is not straightforward. While a narrative may be traced showing threads of late nineteenth century French Protestant fideism in James’s writings, connections with Kierkegaard and various traditions of fideism remain speculative and liable to introduce more misunderstanding than clarity. Unless narrowly circumscribed, use of the term “fideism” in interpreting Wittgenstein is likely to introduce more confusion than insight. Chapter 6: “Religions, Epistemic Isolation, and Social Trust" considers whether Wittgenstein’s philosophy provides resources that may be used to epistemically isolate and protect religious beliefs and practices from public criticism. I argue that a central theme in Wittgenstein’s philosophy – the social nature of linguistic meaning – is incompatible with the idea that religious discourses are conceptually cut off from other discourses. The chapter explores the remarks on the idea of a private language in Philosophical Investigations in order to show how the isolationist reading of Wittgenstein does not fit well with central features of his developed philosophy. Drawing on the work of Stanley Cavell on and Annette Baier, I argue that trust is a requirement for establishing and maintaining the cooperative venture of language. Chapter 7: “Wittgenstein's Ethic of Perspicuity and Philosophy of Religion” considers the import of the perspicuity reading of Wittgenstein for contemporary philosophy of religion. In this chapter, I will survey Stephen Mulhall’s therapeutic reading of Wittgenstein, D. Z. Phillips’ conception of contemplative philosophy, and John Clayton’s ideal of clarification of defensible differences. I also explore H. H. Price’s early criticisms of analytic philosophy, that philosophers have duties to their students and to the public that go beyond the mere analysis of concepts. Bringing together Price and Wittgenstein, I explore the role perspicuous philosophy of religion could play at a time in global history characterized by unprecedented contact across cultures and between peoples and in which traditionalist religious movements appear to be on the rise.