Race in Early Modern Philosophy (original) (raw)
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Justin Smith's "Nature, Human Nature, & Human Difference" examines the historical development of the concept of race within early modern philosophy, focusing on Anton Wilhelm Amo as a pivotal figure. The work delineates a shift from essentialist to naturalistic understandings of race, linking these changes to broader scientific classifications and the emergence of Eurocentric perspectives on human diversity. By dissecting key philosophical figures and their contributions to race discourse, Smith argues for a critical historical ontology that challenges contemporary interpretations of race as inherently tied to physical or essential differences.
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