Epistemic Line of Explanation for Experimental Phenomenology (original) (raw)
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Experimental phenomenology, a challenge
Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research, and Practice
Experimental phenomenology is both a theory and a method and is derived from, but not the same as, Gestalt psychology. The theoretical foundations of this methodological approach maintain that the kind of information obtained during conscious perceiving or imagining is directly given in present awareness, is qualitative in nature, is endowed with meaning, and is not merely a product of the computational representation, retrieval, or elaboration of physical stimuli. From a phenomenological standpoint, a broad line of current research of experimental psychology reflects, methodologically, a reductionistic simulation of the physical sciences and fails, theoretically, to explain the laws of dependence among the (ontologically) different levels of reality. Sharing common phenomenological foundations for the experimental study of sensory consciousness, the five articles in this special issue and the two other following sections describe perceptual "illusions," three-dimensional spatial perceptions, perception of color and light, expressive qualities, and other sensory phenomena as studied by experimental phenomenology differently from psychophysical research.
The consensus in the majority of the philosophic and scientific community is that the scientific project is in its essence concerned with affording explanation and understanding of natural phenomena. We set out to examine the mechanism by which science affords explanation through the presentation and evaluation of two influential models for scientific explanation presented in the 2 nd half of the 20 th century: the Deductive-Nomological (DN) model pioneered by Carl Hempel and Paul Oppenheim, and the Unificationist model as presented and defended by Philip Kitcher. We consider four objections against the DN model, and three against the unificationist model, concluding: that the DN criteria for scientific explanation are indeed necessary but insufficient for explanation, that the unificationist criteria as they stand are neither sufficient nor necessary for explanation, and that both models fall short of a complete model for explanation due to their reluctance to accept the concept of causation as one independent of explanation.
Stuck in between. Phenomenology's Explanatory Dilemma and its Role in Experimental Practice
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2022
Questions about phenomenology's role in non-philosophical disciplines gained renewed attention. While we claim that phenomenology makes indispensable, unique contributions to different domains of scientific practice such as concept formation, experimental design, and data collection, we also contend that when it comes to explanation, phenomenological approaches face a dilemma. Either phenomenological attempts to explain conscious phenomena do not satisfy a central constraint on explanations, i.e. the asymmetry between explanans and explanandum, or they satisfy this explanatory asymmetry only by largely merging with non-phenomenological explanation types. The consequence of this dilemma is that insofar as phenomenological approaches are explanatory, they do not provide an own type of explanation. We substantiate our two claims by offering three case studies of phenomenologically inspired experiments in cognitive science. Each case study points out a specific phenomenological contribution to experimental practice while also illustrating how phenomenological approaches face the explanatory dilemma we outline.
An epistemic analysis of explanations and causal beliefs
Topoi, 1990
Causation and explanation are obviously connected. A sterling task for a philosopher of science is to lay bare the connection. The dominating tradition has been that an explanation is a form of inferential relation between the sentences included in the explanans and the explanandum. This tradition can be traced back to Aristotle:
Some Recent Work In Experimental Epistemology
sites.google.com
I survey some recent experimental work relevant to assessing contextualism in epistemology as well as Interest Relative Invariantism and contrastivism. I discuss some difficulties with drawing strong conclusions from these studies.
Emergence of epistemic phenomena
Poster presented at the Cognitive Science Spring Conference, 2012
Q: Are you using the correct level of analysis? We claim that for the unique requirements of cognition 1. There is only one micro level of ontology, realization and causal explanation (the systems level) A. It is process oriented B. It can causally explain all higher level behaviours and phenomena 2. There are no higher levels of causal explanation A. Causality flows among actual ontological parts, not to or from epistemic abstractions Under the standard macro level approach, we further claim that 3. There are no macro level stimuli, measurements and phenomena – they are epistemic illusions A. Merely arbitrary and uninformed patterns of micro-level inputs or outputs between an experimental paradigm and a non-representational cognitive agent Our claims originate from our unified process model of visual filling-in. We noticed that while the model explains all the phenomena, none of them actually existed. The epistemic phenomena arise from oversimplified and implicit folk-theories. Epistemic phenomena emerge from lack of knowledge, from lack of a Systems level theory. We show the results – the visual demonstration for a variety of "phenomena". Your task: Show me the macro level stimuli, measurement or phenomena! It is only by getting rid of the macro level of analysis that one can hope to uncover a (micro) systems level and begin to causally unify explanations for cognition.
An overview of the main areas of epistemological debate to which experimental philosophers have been contributing and the larger, philosophical challenges these contributions have raised.