Causes of the 1932 Famine in Soviet Ukraine: Debates at the Third All-Ukrainian Party Conference (original) (raw)
2014, Canadian Slavonic Papers
This article, based on documents from a Kyiv archive, explores the preconditions of famine in Ukraine through the 3rd All-Ukrainian Party Conference of July 1932, convened to discuss the grain crisis in the republic. It discusses recent historiography on the subject and the findings of Ukrainian historians. It argues that the causes of the famine may need to be broadened and that the argument that the famine should be regarded as genocide based on ethnic cleansing of Ukrainians is too narrow. Other factors that need to be considered are ignorance of local conditions, based in part on administrative restructuring during the time of the grain procurements campaign, lack of farming experience on the part of plenipotentiaries sent to the villages, overuse and misuse of land, a dramatic drop in livestock prior to 1932-1933 linked to collectivization, and above all the incompetence of Soviet party and government leaders at all levels. RESUME : Cet article, basé sur des documents provenant des archives de Kyiv, explore les conditions de la famine en Ukraine par un examen de la 3e Conférence du Parti communiste ukrainien de juillet 1932, convoquée pour discuter de la crise de grain dans la république. Il examine l'historiographie récente sur le sujet et les conclusions des historiens ukrainiens. Il fait valoir que les causes de la famine doivent être élargies et que l'argument selon lequel la famine devrait être considéré comme un génocide basé sur le nettoyage ethnique des Ukrainiens est trop étroite. D'autres facteurs qui doivent être pris en considération sont l'ignorance des conditions locales, fondées en partie sur la restructuration administrative pendant la période de la campagne des marchés de céréales, le manque d'expérience de l'agriculture de la part des plénipotentiaires envoyé au villages, la surexploitation et la mauvaise utilisation des terres, un dramatique tomber dans l'élevage avant 1932-1933 lié à la collectivisation, et surtout l'incompétence des dirigeants du parti et du gouvernement soviétique à tous les niveaux.
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, Viktor Kondrashin, expert historian on the Soviet famine in the early 1930s, organized a workshop at the Institute for Russian History of the Academy of Sciences (IRI RAN). Contributions by Russian and Ukrainian as well as British, Irish and Swedish historians summed up their research projects concerning the famines in Russia, Kazakhstan and Ukraine in 1929-1933. They highlighted the opposing interpretations of the causes of these famine-stricken regions. They also scrutinized the recent debates in the West of Anne Applebaum's book Red Famine. Motivated by this enlightening discussion, this brief offers a short overview of the history, and contemporary state, of the Soviet famine debate.
Ethnic Issues in the Famine of 1932–1933 in Ukraine
Europe-Asia Studies, 2009
The article discusses recent historiography on the Ukrainian famine of 1933, arguing that whereas there is today a consensus in Ukraine that it constituted an act of genocide by Stalin's government against Ukrainians, no such agreement exists in the West. Further, Western works, while they may offer valuable insights and their conclusions notwithstanding, have tended to neglect the national issue altogether. The article demonstrates that national questions remained uppermost in the discussions of party officials about the failure of the 1932 harvest in Ukraine and argues that a more definitive study of the famine would be enhanced by discussion of the disparate views and further use of archival evidence.
The Man-Made Famine of 1932-1933 in Soviet Ukraine
Journal of Conflict Studies, 1984
Bohdan Krawchenko BACKGROUND In 1933 millions of people in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic died of famine. Unlike most famines, the Ukrainian famine of 1933 was not caused by some natural calamity or crop failure, rather it was man-made. The famine was a consequence of the Soviet government's campaign in the Ukrainian countryside, a campaign whose toll equalled, if not surpassed, Ukraine's losses during the Second World War. The immediate background to the famine was the problem of meeting highly unrealistic goals set by the Stalinist leadership in the first five-year plan. It must be remembered that throughout most of the 1920s Stalin opposed planning and industrialization. Had preparations for industrialization been made early in the 1920s, this would have allowed time to rationalize economic strategies and permit their more gradual implementation. Instead, it was only in 1928-9 that Stalin, very abruptly, changed direction. The result was a highly improvised and 'dilettantish' first five-year plan. Rudzutak, a leading Soviet economic official, was later to report (1934) many instances of the chaos which existed in industry at that time. For example, plans for the Tagil engineering works had to be altered nine times in twentysix months, involving a loss of several hundred million rubles. As a result of poor and hasty planning, fifty per cent of the manufactures produced by the Stankolit works in Moscow was entirely useless. 1 Because too many projects had been started simultaneously, and too many resources had been wasted through bureaucratic incompetence, by 1930 an acute shortage of capital was making itself felt.
Regional variations of 1932–34 famine losses in Ukraine
Yearly estimates of urban and rural direct losses (excess deaths) from the 1932–34 famine are presented for the oblasts of Soviet Ukraine. Contrary to expectations, the highest losses are not found in the grain-producing southern oblasts, but in the north-central Kyiv and Kharkiv oblasts. Several hypotheses are proposed and tested to explain this finding. No single hypothesis provides a comprehensive explanation. Losses in some oblasts are due to specific factors, while losses in other oblasts seem to be explained by a combination of economic and political factors. Quantitative analyses are presented of resistance and Soviet repressions in 1932, and effects of the food assistance program and historical-political factors on direct losses in 1933 are analyzed. Résumé Des estimations annuelles de pertes (décès excédentaires) directement attribuables à la famine de 1932–34 sont présentées pour les zones urbaines et rurales d'Ukraine sovietique. Contrairement aux attentes, les pertes les plus importantes n'étaient pas dans la région méridionale productrice de grain, mais plutôt dans la région du nord-centre, soit Kiev et Kharkiv. Plusieurs hypothèses sont proposées et mises à l'épreuve pour vérifier cette conclusion. Cependant, aucune hypothèse, à elle seule, ne fournit une explication complète. Dans certaines régions, les pertes sont causées par des facteurs précis, alors que dans d'autres, les pertes sont expliquées par une combinaison de facteurs économiques et politiques. Des analyses quantitatives sont présentées sur la résistance et les répressions sovietiques en 1932. L'effet du programme d'assistance alimen-taire et les facteurs politico-historiques attribuables directement aux pertes en 1933 est également analysé.
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