Cynicism, Scepticism and Stoicism: A Stoic Distinction in Grotids' Concept of Law (original) (raw)

It is a risky enterprise to speak in general terms about 'Stoicism' or of something being 'Stoic'. Old, middle, late and neo-Stoics (Zeno, Cleanthes, Chrysippus, Panaetius, Poseidonius, Marcus Antonius, Seneca and then elements in Christian and early modern authors going up to the seventeenth century) somehow seem to merge into one indistinct stream of thought. The fragmentary nature of what we know about the ancient Stoics contributes to this. However, it is somehow unavoidable to speak in shorthand, particularly when we discuss an author from within a humanist tradition like Grotius. In this paper I focus on an issue which is considered to be typically 'Stoic'. It is the distinction in Stoic ethics between the good and the evil, and of the things which in the perspective of absolute good and evil are indifferent, such as health or sickness and wealth or poverty. This characteristic distinction is in its full details and consequences itself the object of a considerable amount of uncertainty. This is mainly due to the distinction within the category of indifferent things between certain things which are 'preferred' and other things which are to be 'rejected' (and some truly indifferent things), according to the value they have. The precise relation between 'preferred' things and 'good' things has been an object of some controversy. I To mention one source contributing to confusion, according to Diogenes Laertius (7, 103), Posidonius is supposed to have held that health and wealth are among the goods and not merely among the things which are of value. This is a most important issue, for it highlights the crucial relation between the moral good and the preferred things within the category of indifferent things. For an analysis see a.o. M. Reesor, 'The indifferents in the Old and Middel Staa', Transactions and Proceedings o/the Philological Society, 82 (1951) I02-IIO; JM. Rist, Stoir philosophy (Cambridge 1969) 1-21; LG. Kidd, 'Stoic intermediates and the end for man', in: A.A. Long, Stoic problems (London 1971) 150-172. GROTIANA (New Series) vol. zZ/z3 (Z001/zOOZ) 177-196 VAN GORCUM-p.o. box 43-4900 AA ASSEN, THE NETHERLANDS 2 On the distortion of Stoic ethics which may result from conceiving of the adiaphora as intermediate between good and evil, particularly in Cicero, see Rist, Stoic Philosophy, 97-III. Ibidem: 'Ut huic obiectoni respondeatur, sciendum est non sequi iniustum ex quavis negatione iusti etiam positis iisdem circumstantiis; quemadmodum enim non sequitur, si liberalis rex dicendus est qui alicui mille talenta dederit, ideo si non dederit, illiberal em fore, ita non est perpetuum ut id quod iuste fiat, non nisi iniuste omittatur.' 8 !d., I, II, vi, 2: 'Illud lib ens agnosco, nihil nobis in Euangelio praecipi quod non naturalem habeat honestatem: sed non ulterius nos obligari legibus Christi quam ad ea ad quae ius naturae per se obligat, cur concedam non video. Et qui aliter sentiunt mirum quam sudent ut probent quae Euangelio vetantur ipso iure naturae esse illicita, ut concubinatum, divortium, matrimonium cum pluribus feminis.'