Has the Cognitive Science of Religion (Re)defined "Religion"? (2014) (original) (raw)
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The cognitive approach to understanding religion 1
Archives de sciences sociales des religions, 2005
One reasonable response to the vast enterprise of comparing religions, their institutions and the behaviour of their followers is a nagging doubt: after all this, is there much difference among the world religions, or indeed between the world religions on one hand, and the innumerable polytheistic and pagan forms across the planet? Recent work in cognitive psychology applied to religion, especially that of Boyer and Atran (Boyer, 2001; Atran, 2003), both strongly influenced by Sperber (Sperber, 1996), has made a strong case for the claim that practices which, taken together, have come to be classified and bundled together as "religious", can be explained in terms of human evolution. Part of their case rests on the observation of constants across vast distances in time, space and language, while another part rests on experimental evidence from cognitive and evolutionary psychology. In this paper I explain why social scientists cannot afford to ignore this work. 2 Social scientists tend to regard the use of evolutionary explanations of social phenomena with much distrust. Indeed, sociology itself as a discipline was built to a large extent on the rejection of versions of evolution. The reasons for this are several. Firstly, the word refers to a process whereby an institution or set of practices are suitable to the functioning of society-it is therefore regarded as a functionalist argument and vulnerable to the usual criticisms of functionalism-among which are functionalism's alleged prejudice in favour of the preservation of order over change, and its use of effects to explain causes. Secondly, because of the perverse, and perverted, history of social Darwinism and the importance of hostility to it in the history of sociology, evolution carries connotations of a concern with differences among human racial categories, even though these connotations are quite foreign to Darwinian evolution (if not precisely to The cognitive approach to understanding religion Archives de sciences sociales des religions, 131-132 | 2006
A Cognitive Theory of Religion
1980
Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. The University of Chicago Press and Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Current Anthropology. http://www.jstor.org "nobody seems to know what [religion] is." Nadel (1954), Eister (1974), and Machalek (1977), among others, doubt the possibility of a definition. Eister (1974:2), for example, says that religion has defied social scientific consensus and may "not be definable in general terms." Of theories themselves, Evans-Pritchard wrote in 1965 that to date "either singly or taken together, [they do not] give us much more than common-sense guesses, which for the most part miss the mark [and] of the many attempts [none] is wholly satisfactory" (1965: 120-21). Geertz said the following year that the anthropology of religion was in a "general state of stagnation" and that there was no "theoretical framework. .. to provide an analytic account of religion" (1966:1-4). Despite Geertz's contribution and others, there is some consensus that anthropological theory of religion has "lagged" (Saliba 1976: 189) and that there still is no theory for "normal" research in the science of religion (Buchdahl 1977). I shall not review present theories here (Saliba 1976 gives a recent short review), but shall mention relevant aspects of several major ones. I agree with Tylor, Durkheim, and Freudotherwise sharply divergent on religion-that it anthropomorphizes the world in some significant way; with Geertz (1966), Bellah (1964), and Spiro (1966) that the use of symbols, characteristically human, is especially characteristic of religion; and with Horton (1960,1967, 1973a) and Spiro (1966) that belief in the human-like beings of religion is based in experience. I disagree with Malinowski (1948) that religion is primarily wish fulfillment. Tylor, who defined religion substantively as the "belief in Spiritual Beings" (1979 [18731:10), was in my view right to define it as a kind of conception of the world. He was also right to say that religious conceptions may be reasonable attempts to understand the world at large and that they attribute humanlike features such as language and ethics to nonhuman natural phenomena. Tylor's weakness is not so much his intellectualism or even individualism as his overestimation of two phenomena (dreams and death) as topics for human thought and therefore as sources of religious notions. His "spiritual beings" are composed of the ideas of the "phantom" and the "life force" that respectively arise from each person's experience of dreams and of death. Tylor's critics have noted that beings so abstractly conceived seem to lack the emotional force of religious conceptions. Nor are dreams and death apparently central (although they may be partial) concerns of all religions. Durkheim, Freud, and many ethnographers suggest instead the reverse: that the stuff of religious conceptions comes more from waking experience of oneself and other living humans than from dreams and death. Durkheim (1976 [1912]), rejecting Tylor's theory, says that the real topic of religious thought is human social relations and that its distinctive feature is not belief in spirit beings (since these are illusions and therefore could not be the basis of anything so universal as religion), but a distinction of "sacred" and "profane." He points out that conceptions of the world are developed not by lone individuals but by members of society and that conceptions of the universe as a kind of society result from their social preoccupations. Still, he agrees with Tylor that religion is largely cognitive and practical (not, e.g., neurotic or expressive) and that it grapples with the world as a whole rather than (as he occasionally-but influentially-claims) with human society alone. Indeed, he says (in passages emphasized by Horton 1973a) that religion and science have the same aims (to interpret and influence the universe), the same topics (nature, man, and society), and the same logic. The difference between them is the greater perfection of scientific methods of inquiry. He also holds, but mistakenly I think, that since gods and spirits do not exist, the real object of religious thought can only be human society and that gods are simply society personified. In my opinion, it is more accurate to say that the object of religious thought is reality in general and that gods are con-I I do not refer to Totem and Taboo, probably the best-known of Freud's other writings on religion, because it seems to me entirely without basis and because it has already been well dismantled by Kroeber (1920, 1939). 182 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY Guthrie: A COGNITIVE THEORY OF RELIGION models of and for the world. Humans must make models, and do so constantly. Here are welcome echoes of the rationalism of Tylor and Durkheim (humans must construct a reasonable world), of the psychology of Freud (they do not know how they do so), and of the psychological pragmatism of Malinowski (if they do not construct a reassuring universe, they will be too anxious to do anything at all). But Geertz fails to distinguish religious models from other models. Although religions generally do what his definition says, so do philosophies, ideologies, and science (Kuhn 1970; Harris 1975:546-47). The feature missing from Geertz's discussion, in my view, is the apparently universal anthropomorphism of religion, a feature not characteristic of (though it may be present in) philosophy, ideology, or science. A further problem in Geertz's definition is that it implies that religious symbols are really directed not, as religious believers think, reciprocally between human and nonhuman (e.g., "divine") communicants, but only between humans: they are devised by men and "serve to produce. .. motivations in men" (p. 4). Geertz may be right and the believers wrong about what they actually communicate, and to whom. But what they believe (that they are addressing and being addressed by gods or spirits, or at least by deceased humans, not ordinary ones) must be mentioned in any attempt to define their activity, since intent is part of the meaning of action. Geertz's definition, then, although a good description, is neither a sound definition nor part of a complete theory, as it neither isolates the phenomenon it seeks to explain nor identifies the characteristic cognitive situation. Another well-known functionalist definition, Bellah's (1970: 21) "set of symbolic forms and acts which relate man to the ultimate condition of his existence," uses Tillich's notion of "ultimacy" to identify religion. As this definition draws on an idea (indeed a claim) familiar in several major religions, it draws, to a degree, on common usage and "common sense." It is, however, as overly general and as ambiguous as Geertz's. First, use of the term "ultimate" as a criterion poses, as does any superlative, a difficult further question (i.e., what in fact is the ultimate condition?). Since the term can be defined only tautologically, its use to define anything else risks circularity. Moreover, this definition, like Geertz's, seems to make sets of symbols such as philosophy also "religion," depending on whose ultimate condition is in question. It, too, fails to circumscribe its topic.6 I turn last to two substantive definitions, much closer to my own. The first is Spiro's (1966:96) "institution consisting of culturally postulated interaction with culturally postulated superhuman beings." The problem here, I think, is the term "superhuman," which Spiro says describes "any beings believed to possess power greater than man, who can work good and/or evil, and whose relationships with man can, to some degree, be influenced by [ritual or symbolic actions]" (p. 98). Many religious systems (e.g., Judaism, Christianity, Hinduism, and Buddhism) include beings (e.g., demons) whose powers, though in some ways greater than those of men, are in other ways less and which are as well called "infrahuman" as "superhuman." Such beings may be reviled, tricked, or threatened-not treatment befitting superhuman beings. On the other hand, some humans (e.g., witches, magicians, and presidents) at least have greater power than ordinary men, yet are distinct from deities and often are nonreligious figures, so extraordinary power alone does not make an entity specifically religious. It might be better to say of the beings who are religious objects only that they are "nonhuman." Yet they are at the same time human-like. They may, for example, be quite human ancestors and still human in principle if not in form. Their humanity is implied by Spiro's specification (not made in his definition itself, which would seem to admit such completely nonhuman, though in some way superhuman, beings as atoms or volcanos) that they can be influenced by symbolic action. This means that they do not include atoms, volcanos, or the universe as impersonally conceived, "superhuman" though these may be in respect of energy, mass, or extension. They include only beings that use and respond to symbols. The beings that Spiro thinks "religion" postulates are humanlike in their capacity for symbolism-in my view, too, their most human-like attribute. But why should believers in them postulate such hybrid beings? Instead of supposing that they may be thoroughly plausible or "good to think," Spiro says, as does Freud, that (although he grants them superficial plausibility) they are postulated because with them believers are...
Theory and Society, 2021
Despite the many definitions of religion offered over the years, religion as a general concept remains “essentially contested” and characterized by a multiplicity of competing definitions and applications. This, however, has not impeded the proliferation of new religious subcategories (e.g., new age religion, secular religion, civil religion, and cultural religion, among others) that challenge the boundaries of religion as conventionally conceived. This article examines the logics underpinning these conceptual innovations with the objective of enhancing reflexivity and clarifying the processes they aim to elucidate. Critically integrating the writings of Weber and Wittgenstein on definition and classification, I advance a framework based on ideal typification and family resemblance which allows for the intelligibility and analytic utility of unconventional subtypes, even when premised on root conceptions of religion that lack precise boundaries and defining attributes. I show how the logics underlying these subtypes are not limited to specification, but also include looser forms of family resemblance. More generally, my analysis explores conceptual classification and innovation as analytic practices involving the identification and creative interpretation of similarities, affinities, linkages, and other kinds of relationships within the constraints of “language-games” relevant not only to academic debate, but also to more basic and quotidian structures of meaning.
An Assessment of the Early Theories of Religion by and Their Nexus with Cognitive Theorizing
2020
From the world on go, man has been asking questions on the origin and formation of religion. These questions are as a result of the quest in man to understand his object of worship, the Supreme Being or the ultimate reality. Hence it has been ascertained that man is homo-religiosus and as such is religiously incurable. It has also been established that people have faith because beliefs make sense in so far as they hold value and are comprehensible. This is also evidenced in the level and quest for people's religiosity in the present dispensation. Religion as it is practiced today developed from theories which are posited by scholars in trying to give their explanations to it. Among those scholars are Edward Burnett Tylor, James George Frazer and Sigmund Freud who made their points from both substantive theory which is focusing on the value of religion for its adherent and functional perspectives which is more interested with what religion does. Their theories were not without some influence from their intellectual backgrounds. It is germane to posit that in trying a work of this nature, the paper makes use of library and internet sources in its research. The paper therefore finds that religion is an aspect of life that is very important to human life, hence the quest for every scholar to make a contribution to it. It concludes that faith and believes arise from the normal function of the human mind of which the human minds acquire, generate, and transmit religious thoughts, practices, and schemas by means of ordinary cognitive capacities.
Cognitive Science and Philosophy of Religion: Embracing the Human Perspective
Journal of Philosophical Theological Research, 2024
The Cognitive Science of Religion (CSR) is a relatively young field that explores the intersection between science and religion. Some argue that CSR, by employing purely explanatory methods and presupposing methodological naturalism, has materialized religion. Others believe that explanatory methods are not the sole approach in CSR, and the use of other methods is permissible. I aim to show how CSR has influenced the entire philosophy of religion. The paper examines various perspectives on the extent of CSR's influence on the philosophy of religion, particularly analyzing its effect on the proofs of natural theology. Contrary to the dominant literature, the impact of CSR can extend beyond merely strengthening or weakening theological arguments and can be used to argue for the reform of religious beliefs. This view is pursued from four different perspectives: first, the concept of God, arguing that weakening classic proofs does not imply weakening belief in God; second, the methodology of studying religion, advocating for methodological pluralism; third, the revelation and the role of humans in religion, suggesting that a behavioral shift desirable in economics is also preferable in religious studies; and fourth, religious pluralism and interfaith relations, arguing against the exclusivity produced by textualism and foundationalism.
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Introduction: The Cognitive Science of Religion, Philosophy and Theology: A Survey of the Issues
2018
Cognitive Science of Religion (CSR) is still a rather young discipline. Depending on what one deems to be the first paper or book in the field, the discipline is now almost forty or almost thirty years old. Philosophical and theological discussion on CSR started in the late 2000s. From its onset, the main focus has been the (potential) epistemic consequences of CSR, and this focus is dominant even today. Some of those involved in the debate discussed the relevance of CSR for further issues in philosophy of religion, and other have examined how CSR weighs in on various theological questions. Finally, a small number of philosophers offered criticisms or support for various CSR-theories. In this chapter, we give an overview of the debates so far and provide an outline of the book.