The Impact of the Industrial Revolution on Warfare (original) (raw)

World War I: A Brief Look at the Causes and Effects of Technological Advancement

The First World War was a marking point for the way that wars would be fought in the modern era. It introduced many new technologies that changed how war would be waged. The new technologies would transform European warfare from one with pomp and dignity to a merciless machine that did not discriminate between soldier, officer or civilian. The new technologies that were introduced during World War I rewrote how warfare would be conducted.

Economic Progress and the Technology of War in Pre-Industrial Europe

SSRN Electronic Journal

In pre-industrial Europe the technology of war advanced at an unusually rapid pace. The period's almost incessant warfare ensured a strong demand for improvements in the technology of war. At the same time, rapid economic development created an environment that was conducive to the supply of such improvements.

THE EFFECT OF MODERN TECHNOLOGY ON WARFARE.docx

Journal of History & Military Studies, 2015

When diplomacy and other available means of settling disputes among states fail, war becomes inevitable. In times of war, states struggle to subdue their adversaries by employing superior weapons. These weapons are usually the latest according to the spirit of the times and as such, technology has always been a major factor to reckon with in war. The contemporary paradigm of war is far different from past centuries and this is responsible for the shift from traditional Clausewitz warfare to an extreme one where empathy is thrown to the wind and described by some scholars as the rise of the machines. Modern military technology poses a grave threat as it is responsible for destroying lives and infrastructures yet developers of these fascinating and sophisticated weapons have not ceased in making more. Meanwhile, most of these weapons negate ethical standards but unfortunately, it is of little or no importance to developers. The big question is why develop most of these weapons if it cannot be used? Some analysts argue that it is used as a form of deterrence which ironically leads to the arms race. Equally, technology has made Non-state actors to actively rebel against the state mostly because they possess modern weapons which in most cases have helped to prolong conflict. Above all, these modern technologies used in war have created a radical ethos which if not handled properly could lead to annihilation of the human race instead of anticipated victory. Thus, it is appropriate to say; the devils are here and waiting for instructions to wipe out humanity through technology in war.

Innovation and the Warlike Phenomenon

This article seeks to demonstrate the connections between the history of the war phenomenon, or simply war history, with the debate on innovation. In this sense, this article presents some technical and technological developments and which were their impacts in wars and human history itself. The discussion was divided into three moments. First, the most relevant theoretical elements of warfare in the light of the work of Clausewitz were presented. Second, we briefly addressed the evolution of the war phenomenon throughout human history, focusing on some technical and technological changes of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. World War I was the object of analysis in a greater depth. Third, it was discussed how the analyzed innovations relate to the categories proposed by Tidd, Bessant and Pavitt.

The 'Cult of the Offensive' Revisited: Confronting Technological Change Before the Great War

Journal of Strategic Studies, 2002

Conventional wisdom maintains that military thinkers before the Great War resorted to an irrational, and ultimately self-defeating, 'cult of the offensive' to overcome the rapidly increasing effectiveness of modern firepower. On the contrary, an underlying and, indeed, compelling military rationale did exist for placing renewed emphasis on the offensive spirit, particularly after the Russo-Japanese War (1904-5). Moreover, the cult's central argument was not that moral forces alone could overcome material factors, but that the human element must be made strong enough to complement the newfound power of military technology. The idea was not to pit man against machine, but to make man worthy of machine. Conventional wisdom maintains that military thinkers before the Great War resorted to an irrational, and ultimately self-defeating, 'cult of the offensive' to overcome the rapidly increasing effectiveness of modern firepower. Rather than admit that the strength of the defensive had made offensive maneuver at the tactical-and by extension the strategic-level of war impossible, this cult allegedly pitted man against machine in a futile contest that accomplished little save the annihilation of a generation of young men, the so-called lost generation of Robert Graves and Ernest Hemingway. Purportedly, the cult's fundamental premises were, first, that the psychological forces associated with the offensive, whether tactical or strategic, were superior to those of the defensive. Second, that moral or psychological factors were manifestly more important than material onessuch as machine-guns, barbed wire, and rifle and artillery fire-and that all that one needed to overcome the strength of the defensive was a resolute will to conquer. 1 Thus, a generation of superannuated generals appears to have ignored the significance of a quarter century of technological innovation and filled its head with so many vagaries concerning psychological forces. However, the conventional wisdom is misleading in at least four ways. First, the logic for condemning the spirit of the offensive tends to confuse faulty execution on the battlefield with apparent flaws in theory or