Approaching probabilistic truths: introduction to the Topical Collection (original) (raw)

Approaching deterministic and probabilistic truth: a unified account

Synthese, 2021

The basic problem of a theory of truth approximation is defining when a theory is “close to the truth” about some relevant domain. Existing accounts of truthlikeness or verisimilitude address this problem, but are usually limited to the problem of approaching a “deterministic” truth by means of deterministic theories. A general theory of truth approximation, however, should arguably cover also cases where either the relevant theories, or “the truth”, or both, are “probabilistic” in nature. As a step forward in this direction, we first present a general characterization of both deterministic and probabilistic truth approximation; then, we introduce a new account of verisimilitude which provides a simple formal framework to deal with such issue in a unified way. The connections of our account with some other proposals in the literature are also briefly discussed.

Why Bayesianism? A Primer on a Probabilistic Philosophy of Science

Several attempts have been made both in the present and past to impose some a priori desiderata on statistical/inductive inference (Fitleson, 1999, Jeffreys, 1961, Zellner, 1996, Jaynes, 2003, Lele, 2004). Bringing this literature on desiderata to the fore, I argue that these attempts to understand inference could be controversial.

Probabilism and beyond

1996

Richard Jeffrey has labelled his philosophy of probability "radical probabilism" and qualified this position as "Bayesian", "nonfoundational" and "anti-rationalist". This paper explores the roots of radical probabilism, to be traced back to the work of Frank P. Ramsey and Bruno de Finetti.

Confirmation, Empirical Progress, and Truth Approximation

2005

Hamminga exploits the structuralist terminology adopted in ICR in defining the relations between confirmation, empirical progress and truth approximation. In his paper, the fundamental problem of Lakatos' classical concept of scientific progress is clarified, and its way of evaluating theories is compared to the real problems of scientists who face the far from perfect theories they wish to improve and defend against competitors. Among other things, Hamminga presents a provocative diagnosis of Lakatos' notion of "novel facts", by arguing that it is not so much related to Popper's notion of "empirical content" of a theory, but rather to its allowed possibilities. Miller examines the view-advanced by McAllister (1996) and endorsed, with new arguments, by Kuipers (2002)-that aesthetical criteria may reasonably play a role in the selection of scientific theories. After evaluating the adequacy of Kuipers' approach to truth approximation, Miller discusses Kuipers' account of the nature and role of empirical and aesthetic criteria in the evaluation of scientific theories and, in particular, the thesis that "beauty can be a road to truth". Finally, he examines McAllister's doctrine that scientific revolutions are characterized above all by novelty of aesthetic judgments.

Probabilistic kingdom: problem of objectivity in contemporary science

Argument: Biannual Philosophical Journal, 2020

In modern science, the theory of probability is one of the basic tools. Scientists using probability often refer to its objective interpretation. They emphasize that their probabilistic hypotheses concern objective facts, not degrees of belief. Accordingly, the following questions arise: What is the meaning of this type of probabilistic hypothesis? Is the assumption of objectivity necessary? The paper addresses these questions by analyzing objective probability in the context of the scientific debate on determinism. Two types of arguments will be presented. On the one hand, there is the assertion that objective probability can exist only in an indeterministic world. Then, on the other hand — I analyze the assertions of those who believe in the co‑existence of objective probability and determinism. As a result I show that the acceptance of deterministic and indeterministic fields as possible areas where objective probability can occur is extremely problematic. Depending on the chosen...

Probability in the Philosophy of Religion (Introduction)

The past few years have witnessed a remarkable resurgence of interest in the intersection of formal methodology and epistemological theory, manifested in the organization of various conferences and the publication of numerous edited volumes. It is our opinion that this trend is likely to have a profound and positive impact on philosophical research, and will do so beyond the confines of epistemology proper, as recent developments in formal epistemology are brought to bear on relevant debates in further philosophical sub-disciplines.

Bayesianism I: Introduction and Arguments in Favor

Philosophy Compass, 2011

Bayesianism is a popular position (or perhaps, positions) in the philosophy of science, epistemology, statistics, and other related areas, which represents belief as coming in degrees, measured by a probability function. In this article, I give an overview of the unifying features of the different positions called 'Bayesianism', and discuss several of the arguments traditionally used to support them.

Approximate Truth and Scientific Realism

Philosophy of Science, 1992

ABSTRACT This paper describes a theory of accuracy or approximate truth and applies it to problems in the realist interpretation of scientific theories. It argues not only that realism requires approximate truth, but that an adequate theory of approximation also presupposes some elements of a realist interpretation of theories. The paper distinguishes approximate truth from vagueness, probability and verisimilitude, and applies it to problems of confirmation and deduction from inaccurate premises. Basic results are cited, but details appear elsewhere. Objections are surveyed, including arguments by Miller, Laymon, and Laudan. Comparison is made with Niiniluoto's theory of verisimilitude, and the utility of his theory for realism assessed

A nonpragmatic vindication of probabilism

Philosophy of Science, 1998

The pragmatic character of the Dutch book argument makes it unsuitable as an "epi- stemic" justification for the fundamental probabilist dogma that rational partial beliefs must conform to the axioms of probability. To secure an appropriately epistemic jus- tification for this ...