Interests, Markets and the Modern Spirit of Institutions. The Totalization of the Principle of Competition in Early French Enlightenment (original) (raw)
Related papers
Law and History Review, 2012
image of the civitas, which was both a creation of human agents (Hobbes' "Artificial man") and also something founded in nature. Changes of State is a remarkable book in a number of ways. It offers what is, in effect, a wholly new understanding of the emergence of the modern concept of the state, and of the seemingly insuperable question of state sovereignty. By focusing, however, on the relationship of individual human actors to both the human and the nonhuman world-what she calls "the uneasy frontier between nature and the city"-Brett has been drawn into the wider question of how the different civitates related, both politically and legally, to one another. This is not merely to say that in this period the natural law, the law of nations, and the positive law were all believed to be, to some degree, interdependent, but that from its very beginning in the sixteenth century, the nation-state, which we have come to think of as the outcome of an internal process, was also conceived in terms that were inescapable external. Today, when the crossing of frontiers has become a commonplace, when the human relationship to the nonhuman, animate and inanimate, is no longer seen as self-evidently instrumental, a proper understanding of this history might well be, as Brett characteristically understates it, "still fruitful for our political thinking today." The book is remarkable in another more purely historical way. Although Brett confesses to what she calls a "Hobbesian coloring," her story quietly upturns what, ever since the early eighteenth century has been seen as a marked break between the neo-Thomist-that is, "scholastic"-conception of the natural law, and Hobbes' and Grotius' formulation of what Richard Tuck called the "modern natural law." Brett does nothing to diminish the originality of either Hobbes or Grotius. (At the end of Chapter 5 she provides one of the most powerful accounts ever written of what she calls the "revolutionary strength" of Hobbes' conception of the state.) But by reading Hobbes and Grotius simultaneously with their neo-Thomist predecessors and contemporaries, by seeing them on such crucial matters as natural liberty, as "joining hands," she has provided a far richer account of both, than any currently on offer.
Jean-Jacques Rousseau and the History of Political Ideas: Sovereignty of the People
2023
Today it is unquestionable that power legitimately belongs to the people. No one doubts popular “sovereignty,” even if the expression seems ambiguous if not vague. The other claims to legitimacy–divine authority, the rule of the best or the sovereignty of princes (such as the ancient and medieval appeals to Divine Providence, wisdom of the rulers or the nature of man) – have long since been abandoned. Indeed, this abandonment goes back at least to the Enlightenment. The Enlightenment or “Illustration” was a scientific, literary and artistic movement that dominated the European world of ideas during the 18th century and that was the result of an informal association of “men of letters” known as the French philosophes (among whom names like those of Voltaire, d’Alembert, Diderot and Montesquieu stand out). This association is publicly manifested in the project to gather a summary of all knowledge in the Encyclopedia, published between 1751 and 1772 in thirty-five thick volumes, with the collaboration of more than one hundred and fifty scientists and philosophers. However, the movement spread far beyond France, also flourishing in Scotland (with Francis Hutcheson, Adam Smith, David Hume and Thomas Reid), and in Germany (the Aufklärung that includes names as Christian Wolff, Moses Mendelssohn, G. E. Lessing and, in its descending phase, Immanuel Kant). The “Century of Enlightenment” or “of philosophy” is a period of euphoria and confidence in reason, progress and science, which roughly runs from 1715 until it dies at the turn of the century. Despite the enormous diversity of ideas and tendencies, loosely grouped around ideas such as Liberty or Progress, the Enlightenment is more profoundly defined by a fundamental conviction that is widely cherished, even today: the progress of knowledge and science will gradually lead to the moral progress of humanity, through a process of gradual diffusion that will eventually end all prejudices under the “magisterium” of philosophers, that is, thinkers, artists and scientists in general, and not merely philosophers in the current sense. All the people, duly educated, will be able to understand science and philosophy as well as possible, and it will suffice to apply this knowledge to social and political life. Rhetoric – a persuasion technique that mediated the relationship between philosophers and opinion among the ancients and was part of the medieval curriculum – becomes unnecessary and even a little suspicious (it is still devalued today as “merely rhetorical”). To ensure that the inevitable path of progress is cleared, it is enough to uproot the deep-rooted prejudices of obscurantism (and, in some versions, religion). Consequently, although provisionally new “enlightened” policies can be entrusted to a benevolent tyrant (the Enlightened despot), in the long run it is simply inconceivable that sovereignty does not belong to the people. Monarchical and aristocratic Europe, which was already on its knees at the end of the 18th century, disappears and there are great revolutions on both sides of the Atlantic. The “Century of Philosophy” is therefore that of the victory of philosophy over the throne and the altar. This new era is populated by free and equal individuals, endowed with inalienable rights, who no longer recognize any authority other than their own reason. But if today we unhesitatingly subscribe to the idea of “popular sovereignty,” we do not fail to notice that any forms of government is not natural and involve a certain coercion or a more subtle use of power and violence that we deem suspicious. Government is something artificial and does not belong to the natural state of “man.” Due to asphyxiating conventions and the bourgeois ethos, man is not naturally free in any society. As Rousseau states, many before him (especially Hobbes and Locke) looked for man in his natural state, without actually finding him. But when Rousseau strips man of everything man acquires with effort, he discovers a being that is not only solitary, but non-rational, lacking language (which is only born with the first associations) and not even fully human. It appears to be a sub-human or pre-human being that seems to possess unlimited perfectibility or malleability. There is for us an obvious opposition between nature and government (or the “civil state”), but this opposition is closely linked to another, equally evident opposition, between nature and culture (or “the arts”). Nature, as portrayed by Rousseau and as we think of it today, can no longer serve as a standard for social and political behavior. How does this rupture occur?
The Open Sociology Journal, 2008
This paper argues that Pierre Bourdieu was motivated by the frustration of the French Revolution. His work continually criticized the gap between the ideological promise of the Enlightenment and the actual persistence of inequality in modern France. This paper exposes the centrality of the failed revolution in Bourdieu's oeuvre by visiting four topics he delved into: Education, gender, globalization and the role of social science. The analysis shows that the contrast between the ideals of equality and meritocracy and their poor implementation in schools and universities has motivated his sharp critique of the French system of education. Similarly, the failure of the State to support gender equality drove him to expose the deeply embodied cultural mechanisms that guarantee the advantages men have over women. The paper further shows that Bourdieu also extended this preoccupation with the failure of the Revolution to global politics. Specifically, his recent critique of globalization and global organizations suggests that capitalist Western elites betray the cosmopolitan vision of the Revolution while using international law and global companies to exploit third world countries. Finally, the paper shows that Bourdieu's preoccupation with the Revolution reappeared in the role he projected for social science and concludes that, for Bourdieu, the French Revolution is still to come. In that sense, Bourdieu was consistently preoccupied with the Revolution, and it is thus most fitting to see him, emphatically, as the last Musketeer to fight the betrayal of the French republic. The representatives of the French people, organized as a National Assembly, believing that the ignorance, neglect, or contempt of the rights of man are the sole cause of public calamities and of the corruption of governments, have determined to set forth in a solemn declaration the natural, unalienable, and sacred rights of man, in order that this declaration, being constantly before all the members of the Social body, shall remind them continually of their rights and duties; in order that the acts of the legislative power, as well as those of the executive power, may be compared at any moment with the objects and purposes of all political institutions and may thus be more respected, and, lastly, in order that the grievances of the citizens, based hereafter upon simple and incontestable principles, shall tend to the maintenance of the constitution and redound to the happiness of all.
French liberalism, an overlooked tradition?
Cambridge University Press eBooks, 2012
There is an enduring assumption that the French have never been, and never will be, liberal. As with all clichés, this one contains a grain of truth, but it also overlooks a school of thought that has been a significant presence in French intellectual and political culture for nearly three centuries: French political liberalism. This new collection of essays, authored by a distinguished group of scholars from diverse fields, explores this rich and largely untapped tradition in French political thought. The past decade has witnessed a revival of interest in authors like Montesquieu, Constant, and Tocqueville, both in the United States and Europe. New translations have appeared and intellectual historians have significantly advanced our understanding of the political conflicts through which many 'French liberal' ideas were originally developed. Normative philosophers have also begun to employ these arguments in contemporary debates. Yet whether there exists a distinct and internally consistent paradigm underlying this tradition of thought is rarely discussed. Moreover, many influential and interesting members of the tradition, including a large number of political economists, have by and large remained out of sight. One of the core aims of this book is to provide a picture of French liberalism that is at once more comprehensive and more nuanced. Despite the rich variety of thinkers that can be brought together under the heading of 'French liberalism', they do have one common ancestor in Montesquieu. The Spirit of the Laws, Montesquieu's massive, almost encyclopaedic effort to rethink the normative foundations of law in a more empirical manner, set the tone for generations to come. His sharp insights into the relationship between freedom and its social and political preconditions became a major source of inspiration for those who, after the trauma of the French Revolution, tried to strike a balance between revolutionary ideals and a more conservative concern for political order. It is at this juncture that we meet the most prominent examples of the French liberal tradition, such as François Guizot, Mme de Staël,
Beyond his obvious contribution to the cultivation of this project; from a vague and over-ambitious global survey of all anti-liberal movements of both left and right the world over to the far more plausible, modest study that I present to you in these pages; it is also only right, at this point, to mention that it was Dr. Darby who gave me my first taste of philosophy, and opened my mind to the possibility of an understanding of the political world that transcends the bickering of partisan politics and the drudgery of federal bureaucracy. For this I must be forever grateful, as the unconcealing of the possibility of political philosophy to a person for whom such a thing was genuinely uncanny cannot be any small thing. However, as Dr. Darby enters into what we all hope will be a happy, fruitful and productive retirement, it is timely to reflect that the above story is but one of hundreds, if not thousands, of stories wherein young men and women came into Dr. Darby's orbit and had their intellectual lives irreversible, and positively, recalibrated by an encounter with a wonderful teacher and man. Thank you Tom! Naturally I am also grateful to Dr. Waller Newell and Dr. Robert Sibley, both of whom take places on my committee and have taught me over the course of my studies but particular mention is owed to Dr. Geoffrey Kellow, who stepped in at the last moment to ensure that my defence went forward. Alongside Dr. Darby these men have provided, between them, almost the entirety of my philosophical education and as a result my debt to them cannot be satisfactorily conveyed beyond the obvious significance of the acknowledgement of this fact, and it is no small thing in itself. In addition, of course, I must thank friends and family; particularly my editors par excellence, Florence Guillot and Chris Charlesworth; who have been ever reliable for diversion and philosophical conversation throughout this process. Most of all though, I would like to end these acknowledgements by thanking my wonderful partner, Natalia Pochtaruk, who has kept me healthy in body and sound in mind throughout this project. Her kindness, compassion and decency has been an invaluable source of comfort and support, as well as a reminder of the possibility of human goodness, something that one needs reminding of when one's life becomes so deeply entangled in the worlds of Heidegger, Le Pen, Zemmour and Houellebecq. This being established, this paper will undertake its task in the following way. It will begin with a review of literature that will be shown primarily to divide into two separate explanatory lenses, sociological and economic, which have dominated scholarship on this phenomenon. While the claims made by these studies will not need to be discredited, it will be shown that such approaches fail to answer fundamental questions that arise when one considers this phenomenon "Français de papier". Secondly, Heidegger's critique of the concept of ideal forms and of historicism will be shown to represent a rejection of the "progressive" view of history, and therefore "progressivism" itself. This will be compared with the anti-progressivism of Houellebecq and contrasted with the more vulgar reactionary traditionalism of the "far-right". Finally, this part will conclude with two important departures from Heideggerian thought that can be observed when one compares "Being and Time" with contemporary French anti-liberalism. Firstly, the ambiguity surrounding the relationship between the "they" and the Dasein will be shown to be entirely nonexistent in Houellebecq's radical misanthropy nor in the nationalism of the "far-right". And secondly, the project of authentic Dasein will be shown to have no relation to the romantic communitarianism of the "far-right". Altogether, this can be said to represent the underlying concern motivating contemporary anti-liberalism, but not the political substance of the "far-right"