The implementation of the Fiji Islands Constitution (original) (raw)
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Constitutionalism and Governance in Fiji
The Round Table, 2010
The President of Fiji abrogated the 1997 Constitution in April 2009 and the country was suspended from the Pacific Islands Forum and the Commonwealth, despite Fiji disclosing a potential time line for general elections by 2014 under a new open-list proportional voting system. The European Union subsidy for Fiji's sugar industry was also frozen following accusations that Fiji had breached the 2007 revised Cotonou Agreement, where it promised to hold elections by 2009. This article charts the tensions between the post-2006 coup Fiji government and the 1997 Constitution caused by the legal action from the deposed government, and differences with the Fiji Military Forces Commander Commodore Frank Bainimarama over a quick return to democracy push from the Pacific Islands Forum, the Commonwealth and the European Union. Continued diplomatic pressure from Forum members, Australia and New Zealand increased tensions as Fiji deported the High Commissioners of these two countries in November 2009 and imposed Public Emergency Regulations that curbed freedom of expression of local critics. In what could be seen as a deepening of military rule, Bainimarama clarified in early 2010 that the military would continue to monitor the elected government after the proposed 2014 election and barred mainstream political parties from participating in any future political forum or general elections.
The recommendations on the electoral system: The contribution of the Fiji Constitution Review
Electoral systems in divided societies: The Fiji constitution, 2012
The recommendations on the electoral system: the contribution of the Fiji Constitution Review YashGhai In order to assess the electoral proposals of the Fiji Constitutional Review Commission (CRC), it is necessary to place them in the overall scheme of constitutional reform recommended by the Commission. The Commission states that its report is like a 'seamless document', whose component parts are inextricably linked and that 'its full import will be grasped only if it is read in its totality' (Fiji CRC 1996:3). This approach to the recommendations of the CRC is particularly important in view of the 'social engineering' orientation of its report, whereby constitutional rules are deliberately designed to achieve particular results (as opposed to, for example, a 'liberal' constitution which theoretically seeks merely to establish a 'political market place' where different ideas and options may be freely and equally pursued). Indeed a social engineering approach was required by the terms of its commission. It was the task of the CRC to recommend a constitution that would 'promote racial harmony and national unity and the economic and social advancement of all communities', paying attention to 'Fiji's needs as a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural society' (Fiji CRC 1996: 754-5). The CRC decided that these goals would be best achieved through the emergence of multi-ethnic governments. The Commission also set out the broad framework within which a multi-The recommendations on the electoral system the contribution of the Fiji CRC
Another way: the politics of constitutional reform in post-coup Fiji
1998
Australia and New Zealand, made a conscious attempt to establish trading links with Asian countries. These efforts bore fruit. Almost 11,000 (generally low paying) jobs were created between 1987 and 1992. The tax free zone enterprises, especially in the garment sector, were exporting goods worth around F$200 million. The tourism industry recovered, registering a record 278,000 arrivals by 1990. Unemployment was halved from per cent to 5.7 per cent, and the country enjoyed an average growth rate of 4 per cent. While the links with Fiji's traditional trading partners could not be brokengeography and common sense ensured that-Asian companies moved into Fiji in ways that could not have been foreseen before the coups. Malaysia's MBf company bought one of Fiji's largest companies, Carpenters, and ventured into other areas. A South Korean company began citrus farming in Vanua Levu. Taiwan made inquiries and China explored new trade links. A start had been made, but by the mid-1990s, hopes of continued Asian investment in the Fiji economy had dwindled. With the advent of the currency crisis in 1997, it has vanished altogether. Even in the beginning, however, the Southeast Asian companies, including those from Malaysia, Fiji's new-found friend, were more interested in using the country for 'vulpine extraction rather than solid investment' (Scarr 1997:49). The Falvey Committee The other major task was to restore Fiji to constitutional rule. The Governor General's early attempts to return Fiji to a semblance of constitutionality had foundered. A month later, on 11 June, the interim regime appointed a Constitution Review Committee, chaired by the former Alliance Attorney General, Sir John Falvey (Parliamentary Paper 21 1987). The Coalition refused to cooperate, complaining of under-representation on the 16 member Committee, with only four representatives; the rest (four each) being nominees of the Governor General, the Great Council of Chiefs and the Alliance Party. It was after all, the majority party in parliament. Nor did the Coalition accept the Committee's Terms of Reference which required it to propose 'amendments which will guarantee indigenous Fijian political interests and in so doing bear in mind the best interests of other people in Fiji'. To do so would have compromised its already vulnerable position and undermined its credibility among its supporters. The intimidating environment in which the enquiry was to be carried out was also a problem. Mobility was restricted by decree, soldiers were on the streets, and expression of even mildly critical opinion of the regime invited swift retribution. The Coalition would participate only if the Terms of Reference were revised. The government relented, asking the Falvey Committee to 'review the Constitution of Fiji with the view to proposing to the Governor General any amendments which will guarantee indigenous Fijian political 4 another way interests with full regard to the interests of other people in Fiji.' The change was significant. Despite the constraints and threats, the censorship of the press and the atmosphere of fear and insecurity, the Committee received several hundred submissions from individual citizens, community, cultural and religious organisations, and political parties, at all major centres. The submissions ranged widely, expressing fears and anxieties, outrage at, or enthusiastic support for, what had happened, rather than addressing the purpose of the enquiry which was 'concerned with the central governmental institutions of the State in which Fiji's political interests find their primary representation and protection'. To no one's surprise, the Falvey Committee produced a divided report. The majority recommendations, supported by the nominees of the Great Council of Chiefs, the Alliance Party and two of the Governor General's own representatives, recommended significant changes. Fiji should retain its Dominion status, with the Queen as the Head of State, but the Great Council of Chiefs, and not the Prime Minister (as in the Westminster convention), should nominate the candidate for Governor General, for a term of five years. The Senate should be abolished and its eight Great Council of Chiefs nominees transferred to the House of Representatives where they would continue to exercise their veto over all entrenched legislation affecting Fijian interests. The Lower House should be increased from 52 to 71 seats, comprising, besides the eight Great Council of Chiefs' nominees, 28 Fijian, 22 Indian and eight General Electors members, all elected from communal constituencies, one Rotuman member elected by all Rotumans (living on the island or in Fiji), and a maximum of four members appointed by the Prime Minister acting on his own or on his party's advice. These proposals departed strikingly from the 1970 constitution under which Fiji had gained independence. Then, Fijians and Indo-Fijians had enjoyed parity of representation, each with 22 seats in the Lower House, 12 of which were elected communally and 10 through cross-voting. That principle was rejected on the grounds that 'recognition has been given in a number of international instruments to the appropriateness of positive discrimination for the protection of indigenous rights and in the present circumstances such discrimination is desirable in the interests of the indigenous Fijian people'. Second, all cross-voting was removed. This was a device introduced in sowing the seeds 5 than one elected nationally. The present system has given rise to racial tensions, especially during elections.' This assessment was true because cross-voting was a strange, confusing hybrid. Indians elected on predominantly Fijian votes were seen as traitors by their own community and cheap opportunists by others, like the 'washerman's donkey', belonging neither here nor there. Very few politicians in cross-voting seats commanded broad, multiracial respectonly James Shankar Singh and Semesa Sikivou come to mind. Yet, the Indians elected on Fijian votes, but marginal figures in their own community, were paraded as representatives of the Indian community. The abolition of cross-voting, therefore, was not lamented, but the Committee's prescription of complete communal compartmentalisation of the electorate was worse, based on untenable assumptions of unity and uniformity of interests within each community. Electoral constituencies for the Fijians were replaced by provincial boundaries on the grounds that 'Fijian participation in the electoral system will have more meaning for the Fijian if it reflects the traditional hierarchy and relationships in Fijian society, especially the link between a Fijian and his land area. A system based on the traditional provincial structure will, therefore, be more acceptable to the Fijians'. The definition of 'Fijian' was tightened to include only those registered in the Vola Ni Kaiva Bula, the Register of Native Births. Irrespective of where they lived, Fijians could only vote in the province where their proprietary land unit was situated (that is, the province in which they were registered in the Vola Ni Kawa Bula). The 28 Fijian communal seats would be elected from the 14 Fijian provinces, each returning two members, except Ba which would elect four, and Serua and Namosi one each. This weighting was a not too subtle attempt to shore up the rural constituencies to the disadvantage of Fijians in urban and peri-urban areas where about a third of the Fijian people were living by the late 1980s. The use of provincial boundaries would encourage the emergence of provincial and regional rivalries that many Fijians would come to regret. Another curious feature of the majority recommendation was the 8 another way his own control, while a Council of Advisors would help him run the country. The Alliance and the Coalition would each nominate 11 members to the Council, to be drawn from the elected members of the deposed parliament, with provision for each side to nominate one Senator. Both parties would have equal number of the important portfolios, while six Councillors of State without portfolio would become members of a Constitutional Inquiry Committee. The primary responsibility of this Council would be to oversee the process of constitutional review, its first task being to establish a Constitution Inquiry Committee headed by an independent overseas chairman. In a major breakthrough, unimaginable just a few weeks back, the leaders agreed on broadly acceptable Terms of Reference which would require the Committee to recommend arrangements for the early return to full parliamentary democracy; take full account of the aspirations of the Kaukimoce, Jonetani, allegations against, 39 Kepa, Sailosi, 10 Kermode, Sir Ronald, report on Stephens affair, 41
Historical Account of Democratisation and Constitutional Changes in Fiji
Kathmandu School of Law Review
Fiji a country of 300 islands, having multi-ethnic communities, has gone through a number of constitutional changes from Colonial to post independence time. This paper vividly explores the constitutional history of the Fiji along with a critical review on emerging issue of the ‘Draft constitution’ listing the key human rights violation that occurred during the three Coup de Tats and comparing ‘consociational’ to ‘hegemonic’ constitutions.
A tale of three constitutions: Ethnicity and politics in Fiji
Icon-international Journal of Constitutional Law, 2007
There have been sharp divisions of opinion throughout Fiji's modern history between those advocating an integrated, nonracial state, based on individual rights, and those in favor of a political order based on ethnic communities. Integration and consociation, perhaps, are not apt terms to categorize this division, but, certainly, they have some resonance. Many features associated with consociation have been present in the colonial and the postcolonial constitutions, such as separate communal representation, group rights, asymmetrical autonomy, power sharing, separate educational systems, and entrenchment of rights to culture and land. Norms regarding indigenous peoples' rights have been invoked, as well, adding an extra twist to the integration-consociation polarity. But there have also been strong tendencies toward political integration and broad-based, nonethnic social justice policies. Fiji's experience shows that this polarity has limited intellectual or policy value. Consociation easily and, in Fiji's case, seamlessly slides into hegemony.
CONSTITUTIONAL RE-DESIGN FOR DEMOCRATIC STABILITY IN A DIVIDED SOCIETY: A FIJI CASE STUDY
MA Thesis, 2017
Divided societies have pursued different paths in their attempts to design constitutions that settle ethnic tensions while at the same time promoting and consolidating democracy. Some of these projects have been successful while others have not. Constitutional and democratic design in a divided society has been a difficult process. The negotiation and accommodation of group interests have often been characteristics of the development of divided societies such as South Africa, Lebanon, Mauritius, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina amongst others. The accommodation of contending demands to political and socio-economic rights by diverse ethnic groups – and the strain they present for constitutionality and democracy – has been one the immense challenges confronted by societies that are described by long lasting ethnic division and conflict. Since gaining independence from the United Kingdom in 1970, Fiji politics have been marked by a pattern of coups and constitutional reform. Fiji has negotiated various constitutional arrangements with a view to meeting group claims to difference and equality. While the 1970 and 1997 Constitutions sought a form of multicultural compromise with the realities of Fiji’s demographic make-up, demands for continued ethno-political paramountcy by sections of the indigenous Fijian (iTaukei) population led to the overthrow of the democratically elected governments in 1987 and 2000. The 1990 Constitution institutionalized the privileged ethno-political status of indigenous Fijians while the coup of 2006 ushered in a period of political and constitutional reform that has sought to promote a more civic and ‘ethnically blind’ set of constitutional arrangements. The main research question is: does Fiji’s new ‘ethnically-blind’ constitution increase the likelihood of democratic stability? In order to answer this question, this thesis analyses the failures of Fiji’s earlier constitutional frameworks and examines influential continuities and discontinuities in Fiji’s politics and governance.
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION & CONSTITUTION-MAKING IN FIJI: A Critique of the 2012 Constitution-making Process
Academics and policy makers are ever more interested in efforts towards democratization in ethnically diverse societies and are starting to concentrate more on the processes by which reforms are made, rather than just focusing on the substance of the reforms. This renewed interest in processes of democratization has led to more emphasis being placed on the importance of citizen participation in the drawing up and implementation of constitutions. This form of constitution making is referred to as democratic or participatory constitution making. In ethnically diverse societies, constitutions are seen to play an important role. It offers a clear basis for the development of common relationships between different communities and also signifies the views and attitudes of the dominant community (ies) with regard to other communities. Therefore the processes involved in making the constitution have become an important measure of the success or failure of democratization efforts in ethnically diverse societies. The general aim of this paper is to critically examine the 2012 constitution making process in Fiji focusing mainly on the principle of participation and how it was translated into practice. This was one of the central guiding principles of the Commission and more importantly this principle is now judged as a universal tenet of constitution making. This paper is divided into three main parts. Firstly, the paper will lay out a brief theoretical framework for participation that would be used to analyze the findings. The second part presents a short overview of the history of constitution-making in Fiji and finally the paper will discuss the 2012 constitution-making process and present an analysis of how principle of participation was manifested. ""
State, Society and Governance in Melanesia Discussion Paper 2014/6, 2014
The aim of this paper is to critically examine the 2012 constitution-making process in Fiji focusing on the principle of participation and how it was translated into practice. This was one of the central guiding principles of the commission and, more importantly, this principle is now judged as a universal tenet of constitution-making. While literature clearly shows the possibilities of constitutionmaking processes in transition from conflict and in post-conflict societies, experience of the 2012 constitution-making process in Fiji will highlight the inherent difficulties in such processes in situations of tightly controlled military regimes.